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The overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the current debates 
on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension, by exploring the 
effectiveness of the EU in influencing regionalisation processes. As the process 
of regionalisation is the result of the interaction of different endogenous and 
exogenous drivers (Murray and Brennan 2015), this thesis focuses on the role of 
actors and goes beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, by 
adding other relevant actors into the analysis, namely Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and the US. It does so by applying an original analytical framework based 
on four analytical categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the 
implementer and by exploring the role played by the EU within these four 
categories in comparison to other actors involved. By using a process-tracing 
methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2013) this research looks at the process of 
institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management. The empirical 
analysis of the institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management is 
divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to the adoption in 2004 of the 
ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM); the second 
part focused on the signature in 2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER); and the third part is 
devoted to the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for 
Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre). Despite the 
increasing emphasis within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of 
regional integration and inter-regionalism, this research shows how just sharing 
the label ‘regional organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner 
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is not enough to effectively collaborate together. Even more, this research 
advanced doubts on the effective role of the EU as ‘point of reference’ for other 
regional organization, demonstrating how –at least in the disaster management 
case- the initial reference role played by the EU was lost during the process. This 
research, while contributing to the theoretical debate on EU actorness, also has 
strong policy implications. First, it provides an updated overview of the disaster 
response policies implemented by the EU and ASEAN, thus contributing to the 
knowledge of both systems in responding to crisis. Second, the debate on the role 
of the EU outside its borders is on-going. The EU Global Strategy (2016) 
reinforced the importance of interregional organizations in EU external policies, 
yet too often the interregional bond is taken for granted and its concrete added 
value is lost in vague declarations.  
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 “The development of the AHA Centre is a mix of taking the best practice, 
experience, and at the same time, fitting it to our culture here in ASEAN. It’s still 
evolving, and that’s the beauty of the ASEAN Way. Everybody, every Member 
State, every stakeholder in the Member States has a viewpoint, and we consider 
their viewpoints very carefully before we embark on what we are going to do. It 
has its limitations, and it tends to go slower. But it works — slowly, but surely.” 
  
Colonel Kadir Maideen, Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) 
(AHA Centre 2016e, 58)  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the current debates 
on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension. More specifically, 
the thesis explores the effectiveness of the EU in influencing regionalisation 
processes by examining the process of institutionalization of ASEAN regional 
disaster management. As the process of regionalisation is the result of the 
interaction of different endogenous and exogenous drivers (Murray and Brennan 
2015), this thesis focuses on the role of actors and goes beyond the 
conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, by adding other relevant 
actors into the analysis, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. It 
does so by applying an original analytical framework based on four analytical 
categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer and by 
exploring the role played by the EU within these four categories in comparison to 
other actors involved and by using a process-tracing methodology (Beach and 
15	
Pedersen 2013). Despite the increasing emphasis of scholars and practitioners 
within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of regional integration and 
inter-regionalism, this research shows how just sharing the label ‘regional 
organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner is not enough to 
effectively collaborate together. Even more, this research argues that the EU 
constitutes a ‘point of reference’ for other regional organizations, demonstrating 
how –at least in the disaster management case- the initial reference role played 
by the EU was lost during the process. This research, while contributing to the 
theoretical debate on EU actorness, also has strong policy implications. First, it 
provides an updated overview of the disaster response policies implemented by 
the EU and ASEAN, thus contributing to the knowledge of both systems in 
responding to crisis. Second, the debate on the role of the EU outside its borders 
is ongoing. The EU Global Strategy (2016) reinforced the importance of 
interregional organizations in EU external policies, yet too often the interregional 
bond is taken for granted and its concrete added value lost in vague declarations. 
 
The puzzle 
Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission 
during her first hearing at the European Parliament in November 2014 stated, ‘I 
think we will need to work together with other regional organisations […]. We 
have common work, just as we have a common agenda’. During the last decade 
there has undeniably been a growing emphasis within and outside the EU on the 
strategic importance of regional integration and inter-regionalism, not only as 
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region-to-region relations, but also as institutionalised multidimensional 
cooperation between at least one regional grouping and either a regional 
grouping or a large country belonging to a different region (Telò, Fawcett, and 
Ponjaert 2015). This is sometimes understood as a process of regional emulation, 
in which existing regionalisation processes trigger the formation of new ones, 
with potentially positive or negative consequences (Hettne 2002; Rüland 2001). 
Others understand inter-regionalism as a means of managing relations in a 
globalising world; in particular in terms of a division of labour where regional 
actors take on increasingly important roles (Fawcett 2004). According to this 
understanding regions can be seen as a forum for building trust that is not 
possible on a global scale. For this reason, regions can often be more effective in 
establishing common policies (Telò 2007; Haver and Foley 2011). Scholars have 
developed multiple analyses of processes of regionalisation: by looking at the 
region-specific factors (Mattli 1998; Rosamond 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 
2003; Wiener and Diez 2009; Laursen 2003), or as reaction to global challenges 
(Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne 2002, 2007). 
Scholars looked at the EU as model for other regions, as well as a sui generis 
actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere. The post-revisionist approach to 
regionalisation on which this thesis builds (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) 
asks for a synthesis between these two approaches. It still considers the EU as an 
important point of reference for other regions, but without ignoring the reality of 
the multipolar world. Today the observation from Söderbaum and Langenhove 
about the ‘pressing need to learn more about the ‘Why’ and ‘Hows’ of 
Interregionalism in the EU’s foreign policy’ (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 
2005, 3) is still valid. 
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This research contributes to the literature that defines inter-regionalism as the 
institutionalised multidimensional cooperation between at least one regional 
grouping and either a regional grouping or a large country belonging to a 
different region (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2). This definition is in line 
with the most recent understandings of inter-regionalism (Baert, Scaramagli & 
Söderbaum 2014) that it is not anymore limited to ‘pure’ forms of interactions 
between institutionalised regional organisations, but it includes also forms of 
hybrid inter-regionalism between one regional organisation and one regional 
group or between two regional groups (Hänggi 2006), forms of transregionalism 
where the interregional relations is even more dispersed (Aggarwal and Fogarty 
2004) and forms of quasi inter-regionalism between one regional organisation 
and a single third state (Hänggi 2006). The use of inter-regionalism for this third 
category, might be perceived as a borderline form of inter-regionalism, yet it is 
relevant and useful to describe a relation that cannot be labelled as bilateral as it 
involves at least one regional organisation and it is not limited to two nation-
states (see the work done by Fioramonti and Kotsopoulos 2015 on the relations 
between the EU and South-Africa). Based on these considerations the relation 
between ASEAN and its strategic partners enters more the definition of 
(borderline) inter-regionalism, than bilateralism.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debates on the inter-regional 
dimension of actorness, where ‘actorness’ is defined as the effective capacity of 
an actor in influencing regionalisation processes. This study provides an 
empirical application of the post-revisionist approach by looking at the EU as a 
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proponent of the management of disasters at regional level, but without 
excluding from the analysis local and external actors who played a role in the 
process. By doing so, it proposes an original framework that goes beyond the 
idea of the EU as a sui generis actor and adds a comparative dimension to the 
analysis of the EU’s influence on these regional processes.  
 
The EU’s influence towards other regions has been mainly studied by looking at 
direct influence in the terms proposed by the policy transfer literature (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), as well as in terms of indirect 
influence as proposed by the diffusion literature (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012b). 
While looking at the potential influence that the EU had on the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster response this research will dialogue with 
both these two literatures, contributing to their advancement by proposing a way 
to empirically analyse the influence of the EU in relation to the other actors 
involved. Furthermore, the study will integrate the role played by local actors. 
This element is often forgotten in the analysis of regionalization processes that 
looks at the EU as a potential model (Acharya 2004, 2009).  
 
Overall, this research not only provides a research framework to study the 
influence of the EU towards a policy implemented by another regional 
organisation, but it does so by looking into a less explored policy field such as 
disaster management. While substantial research has been carried out on the 
EU’s Interregional relations in the field of trade and economics, there is currently 




The puzzling case: the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster 
management 
The thesis focuses in particular on the institutionalization of ASEAN regional 
management of disasters. The EU and ASEAN are among the most advanced 
region-building projects and the EU-ASEAN inter-regional relationship is 
considered an example of pure Interregionalism (Hettne 2014). They both 
recognise stability and prosperity as goals of their regional projects. Yet, both 
regions are heavily affected by natural and man-made crises that might represent 
serious hazards. Therefore, crisis management represents a priority for both EU 
and ASEAN.  
 
In July 2005, with the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the ten members of 
ASEAN created their own regional disaster management mechanism. In 
November 2011 the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance 
(AHA) was officially launched and between 2011 and 2016 developed a full 
regional disaster response mechanism. As the crisis management domain has 
been traditionally an exclusive competence of nation states, the ASEAN regional 
institutionalization of disaster management was an unexpected development for 
scholars studying this region (Pennisi di Floristella 2015). Even more puzzling 
were the two different explanations of this process given by scholars focusing on 
the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. 
 
20	
On one hand, diffusion scholars explained the ASEAN development in disaster 
response as a selective borrowing from the EU, reinforcing the idea that the EU 
represents a point of reference not only for its neighbours but also towards the far 
abroad, de facto influencing the policy implemented by another region (Börzel 
and Risse 2012b; Pennisi di Floristella 2015). In fact, the institutionalization of 
ASEAN disaster management followed the EU implementation of its own 
disaster regional mechanism. In 2001 the Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism (CCPM) was officially established. The aim of the mechanism was 
to facilitate and reinforce the cooperation on civil protection assistance among 
EU member states. Two years after the EU created the Monitoring and 
Information Centre (MIC), a coordination hub at the centre of the EU regional 
coordination of disasters. This explanation of the ASEAN institutionalization as 
a consequence of the EU advancement in the same domain is often replicated in 
EU officials’ narrative (European Commission Official 2015, European 
Commission Official 2017a, European Commission Official 2017b, EEAS 
Official 2015).  
 
On the other hand, differently from the diffusion scholarship, scholars who see 
ASEAN as an anti-EU model would argue that these developments are similar 
just because they are responding to parallel problems (Yeo 2009). Although 
acknowledging the importance of both literatures in explaining regional 
phenomenon, this research aims at going beyond these literatures, adopting a 
deductive approach to the empirical analysis and assessing the direct and indirect 
influence of the EU in comparison with the other internal (ASEAN members) 
and external (non-ASEAN members) actors involved in the process of 
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institutionalization. These two alternative explanations of the evolution of 
disaster management within ASEAN are puzzling. Therefore, the aim of this 
research is to further shed lights on this unexpected ASEAN institutional 
development.  
 
The research question 
Overall, the aim of this research is to analyse the relative role of the EU in 
influencing the policies of other regional organizations, and in particular the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN regional response to disasters. In order to do 
so the mechanism that explains this process needs to be unpacked. 
 
The central research questions of this project are: Who are the main actors in the 
process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster 
response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process? 
 
By opening the black box of the processes that lead to the institutionalization of 
ASEAN disaster response policy, the thesis focuses on exploring the role of the 
EU in directly and indirectly influencing another regional organization but taking 
into account the other potential internal and external actors’ that contributed to 
this outcome.  
 
Influence is one of those catch-all, vague concepts that can be used and applied 
in all sorts of contexts. Influence is often analysed by looking at the 
effectiveness, impact and/or performance of the actor(s) involved (Costa and 
Jørgensen 2012a). In this problem-driven and empirically-oriented research 
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(Costa 2017; Jupille and Caporaso 1998) influence is defined as the adoption of a 
similar policy.  
 
The EU capacity to spread institutions and policies across different contexts has 
been extensively analysed and discussed by EU studies scholars with a focus on 
the causal mechanisms (legal imposition, positive and negative incentives, and 
socialisation by persuasion and learning) through which the EU’s transfer is 
achieved (Börzel and Risse 2009; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano and 
Vink 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). But they were not the first to explain why 
different institutions (regional organisations in this case) have the tendency to 
develop similar tools to respond to similar challenges, arguing that this is not the 
result of independent decision, but should be understood in the framework of 
transnational context and interdependent decisions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
The idea that institutions, and in particular countries and international 
organizations might have an influence on decisions taken by other countries and 
international organizations is present in many academic works coming from 
different fields of study. The first research on how and why institutions influence 
each other started in the public policy literature with the famous works of 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on institutional, coercive and mimetic 
isomorphism, of Rose (1993) on lesson drawing and of Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996, 2000) and their work on coercive and voluntary transfer. A systematic 
analysis of these processes has only recently started in the field of International 
Relations (Gilardi 2013). Yet, analysis on how policies and institutional designs 
spread can be found in related (sub) disciplines, from EU studies with 
Europeanisation and diffusion theories (Radaelli 2006; Börzel and Risse 2010), 
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to the literature on inter-organizational studies (Costa 2017).  Moreover, 
comparative analysis has also informed the discussion on the spread of policies 
but looking more at the outcome (congruence) than focusing on the mechanisms 
of transfer and diffusion (Bennett 1991).   
 
The research design 
The thesis considers the institutionalization of a regional policy as the outcome 
to be explored by looking at the influence of domestic, regional and international 
actors. The thesis argues that the mechanism that explains the institutionalization 
of a regional policy is based on the influence on the process of four actors’ types: 
the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.  
 
The main analytical component of the study uses a process tracing methodology 
to investigate the institutionalization process of ASEAN disaster response and to 
identify the actors influencing this institutionalization. The fundamental logic 
behind the methodology of process-tracing is to investigate the causal 
mechanisms (Bennet 2008; George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2012) 
defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the 
interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan 1996, 52), rather than focusing on the 
correlation between independent and dependent variables (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994).  
 
As discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, this relatively new methodology 
is particularly suited for an in-depth analysis through a qualitative methodology. 
The institutionalization of ASEAN disaster response is set as the outcome that 
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needs to be explained. The selection of actors that could potentially influence the 
institutionalization of a regional institution was identified in the first phase of 
process-tracing (collection of empirics). This included the ten ASEAN member 
states; other external actors’ such as: the EU; other states that supported the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN policy on disaster management, mainly 
Australia, Japan, US, New Zealand; and the UN as a multilateral driver of 
integration. The roles of the identified actors in influencing processes of 
institutionalization have been explored by the different literatures discussed 
above. These literatures are used to inform the building of the causal mechanism 
(third phase of the process tracing) that explains the chosen outcome: the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management. Overall, the thesis proposes 
a theory-building process-tracing, as the objective is to provide strong inferences 
about a specific phenomenon with the aim  ‘to build a theory about a causal 
mechanism that can be generalised to a population of a given phenomenon’ 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11). The empirical analysis of the institutionalization 
of ASEAN regional disaster management is divided into three parts: the first part 
is dedicated to the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on 
Disaster Management (ARPDM); the second part focuses on the signature in 
2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response (AADMER); and the third part is devoted to the operationalization of 
the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (the AHA Centre). 
 
The research uses data from primary and secondary sources. As further discussed 
in the section dedicated to data collection, documentary analysis, as well as 
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expert interviews have been conducted to collect the necessary information to 
‘build the process’ of institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response policy 
and to trace back the role of the different drivers in the process, as well as to run 
the comparative analysis. Interviews were conducted in the EU and ASEAN 
Headquarters in Brussels and Jakarta. In order to improve the reliability of data, 
triangulation both across different interviewees and between different kinds of 
sources has been applied. 
 
Policy implications 
This research, while embedded in the theoretical debate on Interregionalism as 
part of the EU external policies and the conceptual research on the EU 
mechanisms to influence the far-abroad, is also strongly linked to policy analysis 
and therefore involves strong policy implications. 
 
First, this research provides an updated overview of the disaster response policies 
implemented by the EU and ASEAN and by doing so it contributes to the 
knowledge of the EU and the ASEAN systems to respond to crisis. Reciprocal 
knowledge is the first steps to help policy-makers in fostering cooperation. 
Moreover, disasters affect all regions of the world, therefore the experiences of 
the EU and ASEAN might serve as an example for other regional organizations, 
such as the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, as well as the Caribbean Community. Even more, crises are not only 
transboundary (between countries that share borders, see Boin, Ekengren and 
Rhinard 2013) but are also transregional. A crisis in a region might have effects -
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as shown by the 2004 Tsunami- in other far-abroad regions. These effects not 
only lead to economic losses, but also directly affect the local population, as well 
as tourists, workers and students coming from other regions. In a world that is 
more and more globalized it is unavoidable to look for new actors that can 
provide solutions that national states cannot provide alone.  
 
Second, debates on what the role of the EU outside its borders should be is 
ongoing. The EU Global Strategy (2016) has reinforced the importance of 
interregional organizations in EU external policies, yet too often the interregional 
bound is taken for granted and its concrete added value lost in vague 
declarations. This research shows how just sharing the label ‘regional 
organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner is not enough to 
effectively collaborate together. The EU has to learn from ASEAN as much as 
ASEAN has to learn from the EU, but mutual visits are not enough anymore and 
it is time to move the cooperation to a next step. Having a regional organization 
in South-East Asia that can be the single point of contact in times of crisis 
represents an immense opportunity for the EU (and the world) and should be not 
only supported, as other actors in the region have already understood, but also 
taken as a best practices producer. By showing what ‘the others’ are doing to 
support ASEAN in implementing its disaster response policy, this research aims 




The structure of the study 
To summarize, this doctoral research looks at the institutionalization of the 
ASEAN disaster response policy to assess the influence of the EU in comparison 
with other actors of regional integration.  
 
In July 2005 the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER). In 2016 the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for 
Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) coordinates a full regional disaster response 
capacity. Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU 
directly or indirectly influence this process? These are the research questions that 
guide this research project.  
 
By using a process tracing methodology to analyse the institutionalization 
process and to identify the actors involved in the process, this doctoral study 
represents an example in which ASEAN was not subject to the influence of the 
EU, yet developed regional cooperation mechanisms to respond to disasters, 
overall concluding that in a competitive multipolar world being a regional 
organization is simply not enough for the EU to (directly or indirectly) influence 
other regions. 
 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the field of studies that looks at the 
actorness of the European Union and at its capacity to influence institutions 
outside its borders, by claiming that a comparative perspective is missing and 
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that this should be added in order to be able to assess the real role of the EU in 
influencing other regional institutions. Moreover, this research project 
contributes to the massively growing empirical discussion on EU-ASEAN 
relations (Rüland, Hänggi, and Roloff 2006; Wunderlich 2012; Murray and 
Brennan 2015; Allison 2015b) in particular on disaster management, as a topic 
relevant for both regions.  
 
The doctoral thesis is divided in to three main parts. The first part covers the 
relevant theory and methods used in the analysis. The first chapter provides a 
systematic review of the literature. It presents the two weaknesses of the EU 
actorness literature addressed by this research. The importance of moving 
beyond the consideration of the EU as a sui generis actor that cannot be 
compared is challenged and a clear definition of actorness is provided. The 
different understandings of the concept of influence in different literatures are 
discussed and the argument that the analysis of influence should look at the 
outcome as much as at the process is made. The second chapter presents the 
research design and the methodology used in the study. Regional policy 
institutionalization is chosen as the outcome to be explored in the process-tracing 
analysis. As the study aims at showing the relative influence of the analysed 
actors in the process, the chapter explains how the concept of influence is 
operationalized in the study. A process tracing methodology is used to explore 
the potential influence of the EU on the process and to put this in perspective by 
analysing the influence of other relevant actors. The analytical framework 
proposed by this thesis is presented and the four analytical categories (leader, 
reference, sponsor and implementer) are defined and explained.  
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The second part is needed to set the scene of the study. The third chapter 
provides the global context in which the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster 
management took place. It presents the disaster management policy’ evolution at 
national, global and regional level. In this chapter the EU, as well as Australia, 
Japan, US, New Zealand policies are presented to show how all actors could 
have potentially exercise the same level of influence on the regional process that 
took place in ASEAN. 
 
The third part is devoted to the empirical analysis and is divided in three 
chapters. Each chapter investigates a different phase of the institutionalization 
process of ASEAN disaster response by using a theory building process-tracing 
based on empirical evidence. The fourth chapter focuses on the first part of the 
process that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster 
management: the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on 
Disaster Management (ARPDM). The fifth chapter analyses on the second part 
of this process: the signature in of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The sixth chapter is 
dedicated to the last phase of the analysed process: the operationalization of the 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (AHA Centre).  
The investigation of the process pays equal attention to all actors involved in the 
different stages (not the EU only) and after introducing each outcome, the 
mechanism is explained by identifying the four actors involved: the leader, the 
reference, the sponsor and the implementer. For each of the actors the objective 
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of the influence, the rationale behind it and the modes in which this is realised 




The European Union’s ambitions to be an influential 
inter-regional actor: an overview of the literature 
 
The first chapter of the thesis presents a review of the literature. By identifying 
the main weaknesses of the addressed literature, the chapter aims at showing how 
the research’s overall aim is to provide a concrete contribution to the current 
debates on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension.  
 
This chapter starts with a short introduction on the EU’s external policies. It 
stresses in particular two main elements. First, when discussing the external 
policies of the EU, our understanding should go beyond what has been until 
2009, the second pillar of the European Union (the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) and it should comprise other policies with an external 
dimension, such as trade, development, environment and humanitarian aid of the 
EU (Smith 1998; White 2001; Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008; Bretherton 
and Vogler 2005; Tonra and Christiansen 2010; Telò and Ponjaert 2016; Hill, 
Smith and Vanhoonacker 2017). Second, EU external actions have responded to 
different logics depending on whether directed to its neighbours or its partners 
far abroad (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012; Ponjaert 2013). Therefore, the different 
elements of the EU external actions should be interpreted differently according to 
the target towards which they were directed. Following this introductory part 
dedicated to the debate on the EU’s external policies, the main weaknesses of the 
literature of EU actorness in its external policies are introduced. Overall, this 
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literature review is organised around two main weaknesses faced by the literature 
on EU actorness (Drieskens 2017).  
 
First, the need to move beyond the consideration that the EU is a sui generis 
actor, with the consequent impossibility to compare it with other actors, has been 
identified by both scholars focusing on EU actorness (Niemann and Bretherton 
2013; Drieskens 2017), as well as by scholars focusing on the inter-regional 
dimension of this actorness (Wunderlich 2012; Murray and Brennan 2015; Telò, 
Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). Although suggesting different options to do that, 
they agree that adding a comparative dimension to the analysis of processes in 
which the EU plays a role should help in evaluating the EU actorness in 
perspective. 
 
Second, the exploration of EU actorness cannot avoid to clearly define what 
actorness is. Here the chapter discusses the different ways in which actorness has 
been conceptualized, in particular in the inter-regional literature.  As in this 
thesis actorness is defined as the effective capacity of an actor in influencing 
regionalisation processes, the concept of influence is further explored in the 
second part of the chapter. By looking at both public policy literature, as well as 
IR literature, this part of the chapter presents a different understanding of 
influence. On one hand, defining influence should include a clear explanation of 
what the influence is about, who is the influencer and who is the target of this 
influence, and finally which are the mechanisms that trigger this influence. On 
the other hand, the literature review will show how often the analysis of 
influence has focused more on the outcome and less on the process. Furthermore, 
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when focusing on the process, both public policy and IR literatures give more 
attention to the reasons behind the action of the sender rather than those of the 
receiver, thus missing a comprehensive analysis of the process, when the same 
actor can sometimes influence and sometimes be influenced.  
 
This chapter concludes by stating how this research aims at contributing to the 
literature(s) discussing EU inter-regional actorness, by filling the gaps identified 
in the literature review. 
1.1 EU actorness in its External Policies 
1.1.1 The External Policies of the EU: an overview 
The European Union started as a regional project in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. As of 1951 with the signature of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the six founding countries started 
an economic cooperation with the aim of avoiding conflict by promoting 
economic and political integration. Today the EU, with 28 member states, is one 
of the largest global players in world trade and is playing a growing role in the 
international arena. It is therefore not surprising that the EU has been studied 
more and more as an international actor able to influence the international 
system. Even more so since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the 
launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union. Yet, the low efficiency and lack of effectiveness of the EU response 
towards the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) inspired the revision of 
CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). In October 1999 Javier Solana was 
appointed as the first EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy in charge of co-ordinating and representing the EU’s foreign 
policy. Solana’s main focus in the following 10 years was to enhance the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) set up in the context of the 
Cologne and Helsinki Council decisions in 1999 (Koops 2012). Although the 
Maastricht Treaty divided the policies of the EU with an external dimension 
across the three pillars1, the analysis of what the EU’s external action is, cannot 
be limited to CFSP and CSDP. In fact, the limited success of these two 
intergovernmental policies was paralleled by the growing relevance of the 
external policies coordinated by the European Commission (EC). In addition to 
that the activism of the EU in policies such as trade, development and 
humanitarian aid is often cited as an element of success for the EU (Smith 1998; 
White 2001; Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008), reinforcing the idea that the 
EU is a relevant international actor worth studying.  
 
Another consideration that should be taken into account when discussing EU 
external policies is the unavoidable division in geographical targets and the 
consequent different logic that also explains EU’s actions abroad. As 
summarized by Ponjaert (2013) the EU responds to different logics in its external 
actions: an enlargement logic is applied to countries that are considered as part of 
Europe (Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus before accession, Turkey, 
Montenegro, etc.); a stabilization and partnership logic is applied to countries 
that are part of the EU’ neighbourhood (mainly Mediterranean countries such as 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc., as well as eastern countries such as Belarus, 
                                               
1 With external trade, development cooperation, conflict prevention and sanctions part of the first pillar 
characterized by community method and the CFSP/CSDP assigned to the second pillar with decision taken 
by unanimity by the Council.  
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Georgia, Ukraine, etc.); bilateral logic with the emerging powers which are 
strategically important for the EU (such as China, Brazil, Japan, India, etc.); and 
inter-regional logic when dealing with other regional groupings (such as 
ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States, etc.) no matter if located in the 
near or in the far-abroad. Different scholars coming from different disciplines 
have analyzed the external policies of the EU and its different components 
(CFSP, CSDP, trade, development, humanitarian aid, etc.). Realists, 
Institutionalists and Constructivists have all discussed the different logics of EU 
external actions (Manners and Whitman 2000; Bretherton and Vogler 2005; 
Tonra and Christiansen 2010; Telò and Ponjaert 2016; Hill, Smith and 
Vanhoonacker 2017). Indeed, the EU and its external policies, still remain a key 
element to be researched.  
 
1.1.2 The current weaknesses of the research on the EU actorness in 
its external policies  
Since the 1970s discussions about the role of the EU in International Relations 
(IR) moved away from the state-centric approach that looks at the EU as the 
result of member states’ interests to analysing the EU as an actor active in the 
global sphere (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Galtung 1973; Sjöstedt 1977). 
Although the seminal work of Cosgrove and Twitchett looked not only at the 
European Economic Community, but also at the United Nations as new 
international actors, the research on actorness has evolved since then with a 
‘strong European imprint’ (Drieskens 2017, 1536). This is due to the fact that the 
work of Sjöstedt, referred by scholars working on actorness as the ‘first 
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systematic study (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 265), focused on the EC’s actor 
capability producing the definition of actorness as the ability to work ‘actively 
and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt 
1977, 7).  
 
The discussed progressive attempts to provide a framework to the study of 
actorness focused more and more on the EU, with Bretherton and Vogler (2006) 
finally renouncing to provide a framework with relevance beyond the EU by 
labelling the EU as a sui generis actor (Drieskens 2017, 1536). This 
conceptualization of the EU as an actor like no others led the next generation of 
European Studies scholars to explain the EU external policies by looking inside 
the EU. Indeed, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
launch of the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
as second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, discussions started among 
researchers about the most appropriate label for the EU. Discussions about the 
EU identity proliferated (Drieskens 2017) and academic debates focused on 
whether the EU is or should be not only a (conflicted) trade power (Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 2006) or a market power (Damro 2012), but also a civilian power, 
using diplomatic co-operation means to solve international problems (Duchêne 
1972; Telò 2005); a normative power, where the focus is given to the capacity of 
the EU to shape ideas (Manners 2002); or an ethical power where the EU is 
evaluated for what it does in promoting the ‘global good’ (Aggestam 2008). In 
addition to that, discussions about the nature of the EU continued. 
Conceptualized as a superpower using diplomacy, economic and political 
incentives, and soft power to exercise a global influence (McCormick 2007), or 
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as a small power, strategically acting more like Argentina or Sweden than as a 
great power such as China or Russia (Toje 2008), the EU has been also 
considered an integrative power able to influence organizational processes 
between the EU’s institutions, as well as with external actors’ such as NATO and 
the UN (Koops 2011). 
 
After the innovations produced by the adoption of the Lisbon treaty and the 
global financial crisis that heavily affected the EU’s member states, scholars 
progressively abandoned the discussion of what sort of power the EU is and 
focused again on the broader discussion of EU actorness. The reason behind this 
shift is well explained by Niemann and Bretherton. They noticed how studies on 
the EU were primarily concerned with its character, taking actorness for granted 
and they underlined how ‘perhaps the second step was taken before the first, that 
is, that talking about ‘what sort of power/actor’ initially requires more 
(systematic) analysis of actorness itself’ (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 264).  
 
Based on this consideration, EU scholars took a step back to systematically 
analyse EU actorness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013), in particular by following 
the so-called ‘effectiveness turn’ (Drieskens 2017, 1539), which built from 
Smith’s observation that EU actorness should be looked at by analysing its 
activities and policies (Smith 2010). Overall, according to these scholars, the 
study of EU actorness needed to move away from its conceptualization as ‘the 
capacity to act’ and focus more on ‘the empirical explorations of the actual 
extent of EU actorness and especially effectiveness in international politics’ 
(Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 262).  
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Overall, this new focus on actorness asked EU Studies scholars to consider two 
changes in their research approach. First, the new research on EU actorness 
should move beyond the consideration of the EU being a sui generis actor. For 
Niemann and Bretherton this meant adding a comparative dimension to the 
research on the EU, by integrating other actors (Niemann and Bretherton 2013). 
Second, the new research on actorness should be as clear as possible on what is 
the definition of actor. If this is not possible with one single definition, then 
researchers using this concept should at least clarify their understanding of 
actorness by clearly stating how the concept is operationalized in terms of, for 
example, presence, impact, capacity, power, effectiveness and influence. 
 
The next two sections will discuss these two major weaknesses of EU actorness, 
in particular by looking at the role of the EU as an inter-regional actor. Not the 
only one, but one among others. By presenting these weaknesses in the literature, 
the two sections will show how the thesis aims at giving a contribution to the 
different, yet complementary literatures that looks at the EU as an actor of the 
international arena. 
1.2 Moving beyond the EU as a sui generis actor 
1.2.1 The challenge of moving beyond the EU as a sui generis actor  
The need to move beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, 
and to add a comparative perspective on the analysis of EU actorness has 
recently encountered the favour of EU scholars. Among the various attempts, 
Hettne’s framework of actorness was built by looking at both the EU and the US 
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in a comparative manner (Hettne 2007). Overall, the inclusion of a comparative 
dimension to EU Studies on actorness has been interpreted in two different ways.  
 
The first way suggests assessing the actorness of the EU by looking at its 
performance on a specific issue by contemporarily including the comparative 
analysis of other actors’ performance on the same issue. Among the most recent 
attempts, Brattberg and Rhinard proposed an examination of EU actorness in 
international disaster relief by comparatively assessing the United States role in 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Brattberg and Rhinard 2013). Their comparative 
choice is based on the assumption that ‘the actorness concept was first developed 
in an EU context, but can be applied elsewhere and is constituted by variables 
that, in principle, are ‘abstract from any particular institutional form’ (Brattberg 
and Rhinard 2013, 357). Indeed, they show how their definition of effectiveness 
as context-related, coherence-related, capability-related and consistency-related 
could be equally applied to the EU, as well as to the US.  
 
The second way recently implemented by scholars who want to move beyond the 
conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, is the attempt of discussing 
actorness by not looking at the EU only, but by including other regional 
organizations such as ASEAN or Mercosur in the discussion on actorness – 
regional actorness, in these cases. Here the work of Wunderlich, which 
comparatively examines the actorness of the European Union and ASEAN, is 
particularly relevant (Wunderlich 2012). Wunderlich suggests a framework that 
challenges the uniqueness of the EU as an international actor. By using his 
framework based on self-image/recognition, presence/institutionalization and 
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decision-making structures, he argues that ASEAN is also more and more 
behaving as an international actor. Relevant to this discussion is the link between 
regional actorness and the socio-historical background in which the process of 
regional integration took place. This was explored by Brennan and Murray 
(2015) with their edited volume that looks at the drivers of integration and 
regionalism in Europe and Asia. Even more relevant for this thesis is the 
intuition of Allison. Based on Wunderlich’s framework Allison’s research looks 
at the European Union’s ambition to be an international actor by promoting its 
regional experience to ASEAN (Allison 2015b). What Allison suggests is to 
move beyond a simple comparison of the EU and ASEAN regionalism(s) by 
looking at the inter-regional dimension of EU-ASEAN relations, meaning 
looking at the concrete ways in which the EU is intervening in the ASEAN 
regional process. 
 
Overall, the two intuitions on how to move beyond the idea that the EU cannot 
be compared (i.e. the policy focused comparative intuition of Brattberg and 
Rhinard and the regional dimension of Wunderlich, Murray and Brennan and 
Allison) were lost in the subsequent works that looks at EU actorness, which 
went back to an EU inner-looking approach, giving up on the idea that the EU 
actions should be compared in order to be properly understood and assessed 
(Koenig 2014; Lettenbichler 2014). And the same Allison’s intuition (i.e. the 
exploration of EU actorness with the literature on norm diffusion), although 
deserving attention, it finally focused only on the EU avoiding to go deeper in 
the analysis, by looking into the role played by other relevant actors in the region 
different from the EU. Therefore, this thesis should be read as an attempt to 
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contribute to the discussed EU actorness literature by going beyond the 
incomparability of the EU by focusing on one single policy, meaning disaster 
management, while looking at the role played by other actors beyond the EU 
itself.  
 
Indeed, the need to avoid the ‘EU as a sui generis actor’s’ conceptualization as a 
way to prevent any comparative analysis was also felt in the inter-regionalism 
literature. The next section will show how the suggestion of expanding the 
analysis of EU actorness by including other relevant actors into the analysis was 
not only relevant for EU scholars working on actorness, but also for scholars 
looking at regionalism and Interregionalism. 
 
1.2.2 The EU as a non-unique inter-regional actor 
Interregionalism defined as a region-to-region interaction and as the situation or 
a process in which two (or more) regions interact as regions (Baert, Scaramagli, 
and Söderbaum 2014) is not a prerogative of the EU only.  International regions 
were initially defined as ‘a limited number of States linked together by a 
geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’ (Nye 
1971, vii). New Regionalists gave more attention to the institutional dimension 
of these regions and they refined regionalism to signify institutionalized, 
multidimensional cooperation among interdependent neighbouring countries 
belonging to the same continent (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). New 
Regionalists focused more on globalization and the economy as drivers of these 
new forms of institutionalized regional cooperation, giving less importance to the 
security issues typical of the Cold War period. More recently, the ‘pure’ 
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understanding of Interregionalism has been enlarged to encompass other forms 
of cooperation. ‘Pure Interregionalism’, as the cooperation developed between 
two clearly identifiable regional organisations within an institutional framework 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004) has been extended to other forms of 
Interregionalism, like Hybrid Interregionalism, a framework where an organised 
region negotiates with a group of countries from another unorganised region 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) or 
Transregionalism, a dialogue process with a more diffuse membership which 
does not necessarily coincide with regional organisations (Rüland 2010). 
 
Interregionalism flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s. All three main IR 
literatures have contributed to the discussion and the development of 
Interregionalism. Realists focus on the balancing function of Interregionalism, 
Institutionalists on the mechanism of cooperation, and Constuctivists on the 
constitution of identities and the process of regionalism though Interregionalism 
(Doidge, 2014). As Baert, Scaramagli and Söderbaum (2014) argue, it remains 
conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped, but the still on-going cooperation 
between regional organisations and the discourse of regional organisations’ 
leaders, support the idea that it would be misleading to conclude that 
Interregionalism is giving way to other forms of cooperation like bilateralism, 
regionalism and multilateralism. Even more so as Interregionalism has become a 




Far from being perfect, it is undeniable that the EU is a successful example of 
regional integration where tensions between competing countries have been 
transformed in a cooperative structure where divergences are peacefully 
discussed (Fawcett and Gandois 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU 
tries to export its model outside the region. Yet, this idea of looking at the EU as 
the champion of regional integration able to export its norms and institutions 
have been questioned by the revisionist scholarship which invites us to look at 
other alternative examples to the EU and to take into greater consideration the 
local drivers of regionalism. The two following sections will present the main 
features of these two opposite views of the role of the EU in the inter-regional 
arena. 
 
1.2.3 The EU as a Model: The Eurocentric vision  
A plethora of embryonic regional projects exploded already before 1945. They 
did not immediately result in formal structures of cooperation, but helped the 
development of a ‘regional consciousness’ (Fawcett 2015b, 36). Initiatives such 
as Pan-Americanism (Sikkink 2014), the conferences that lead to the creation of 
the League of Arab States in 1945 (Fawcett 2013), as well as discussions about 
African Unity or discourses on Pan-Africanism (Murithi 2005) developed before 
the start of the European project. Yet, since the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the ensuing experiences of 
EURATOM and the European Economic Communities (1957), Europe provided 
the first successful example of formal regional institution-building. The 
economic link between Europe and its former colonies reinforced the idea that 
the European model would be - to some degree - exportable to other regions of 
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the world. Furthermore, the successful adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
favoured the idea that the European project could represent a model not only for 
economic integration, but that also political and security issues could be dealt at 
regional level.  
 
The scholarship that looks at the EU as a potential model for other regions is 
based on the idea of the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002) and as a 
global actor alternative to US leadership (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). This 
view is articulated in two distinct understandings, one looking at the direct 
mechanism that the EU uses to promote its model and the other one arguing that 
the EU is a model that other regions autonomously decide to emulate (Börzel and 
Risse 2009). 
 
The first group of scholars look at EU foreign policy and its efforts to promote 
the European way outside via external incentives (conditionality) in the near 
abroad, as well as technical and financial assistance (capacity-building) in the 
far-abroad (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 2005; Radaelli 
2006). The explicit efforts to promote regional cooperation outside its border is 
also perpetrated by using political dialogue and cooperation venues to persuade 
other actors to adopt the EU model –or at least some elements of it. In this 
framework inter-regionalism defined as ‘institutionalized multidimensional 
cooperation’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2) has been the main venue used 
by the EU to diffuse its institutions and policies. Some examples of this are the 
EU relations with Mercosur and the 50 million euro to support its Secretariat and 
Parliament. Similarly, the EU also supported the Andean community in building 
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its regional institutions and, finally, the EU also influenced to some extent 
ASEAN through a 40 years long structured cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2015). 
 
On the other hand, the second group of emulation scholars still consider the EU a 
model that is replicated by others without the need of self-promotion or in the 
specific framework of an inter-regional cooperation agreement. Emulation is 
driven by recipients and in the words of Börzel and Risse ‘the EU is often more 
successful as a model of regionalism when it just sits there, while others emulate 
and localize its institutional designs’ (Börzel and Risse 2015, 49). The EU is here 
considered as a model because other actors emulate its policy or institutions 
because these are perceived to be the best practices in a certain policy (Börzel 
and Risse 2009) or because an actor is looking to increase its legitimacy by 
adapting practices and norms implemented by another actor recognised as 
legitimate (Polillo and Guillén 2005). 
 
Overall, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two understandings. Is 
the EU actively promoting itself as a model for other regions, or are the other 
regions simply looking at the EU as a model as such? Although different 
mechanisms have been proposed to assess the level of influence of the EU, as we 
will see later in the chapter, it is hard to argue in favour of one explanation 
excluding the other. For example, Jetschke and Murray (2012) argue that 
ASEAN has adopted EU-style institutions -and in particular the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and elements of economic integration- in a case of 
lesson-drawing and normative emulation in which the EU only played a passive 
role. Yet, the fact that the EU and ASEAN are considered a model of inter-
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regional relations with many opportunities for their representatives to meet and 
exchange (Rüland, Hänggi, and Roloff 2006) makes it hard to believe that the 
EU did not play any role in the promotion of its institutions towards ASEAN.  
 
The idea of the EU being a model, in both its understanding of self-promotion 
and emulation, has been counter-balanced by a more critical view provided by 
the Euro-critical scholars inspired by the work of Acharya (Acharya 2004, 2009). 
 
1.2.4 The irrelevance of the EU: contesting the EU as a Model vision 
Euro-critical scholars started from the assumption that the EU is a sui generis 
actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere, as perfectly summarised in the 
sentence ‘one of the lessons of European integration is that it is not a lesson’ 
(Hurrell 2005, 40). The distinctive nature of the European integration process is 
too embedded in its historical and geographical features to be replicated. The 
general perception that Europe is in crisis has reinforced the idea that the EU 
should not be considered as a model for other regions anymore. According to this 
critique the Eurozone crisis (2008) shows some of the limits of the economic 
integration of European member states (Fawcett 2015b). Even more the rejection 
of the European project expressed by UK citizens in the pro-Brexit vote (2016) 
risks, according to some, to end the European dream. These discourses reinforce 
those scholars contesting the idea of perceiving the EU as a model for other 
regions in the world. To explain why the EU should not be considered as a model 
for other regions, Euro-critical scholars advanced two alternative proposals. 
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The first proposal focuses on the alternative options available in the multipolar 
world. Although the EU is the most integrated regional organisation, there are 
alternative models that can be take into consideration. The UN remains a key 
norm producer in the global world, but also other growing regional organisations 
can provide an alternative understanding of regionalism. The most famous 
example of this is the inter-governmental alternative structure proposed by 
ASEAN and the general idea of the ASEAN way. But also Latin America 
proposes several alternative options, as with Mercosur and its alternative model 
to the Western-hegemonic view (Malamud 2013). 
 
The second proposal prioritizes internal dynamics and localization processes. 
Here the main drivers of integration should be found in the cognitive priors of 
the local actors (Acharya 2004). The analysis should focus on the local agents 
and on how they reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the 
local’s cognitive priors and identities. This Euro-critical literature has its 
foundation in Acharya’s work (2004, 2009). He was the first scholar that raised 
the attention around the important role played by local agents in diffusing norms 
in the case of ASEAN.  According to him, the international relations scholars 
who want to focus on the causal mechanisms and processes by which ideas 
spread, should take into consideration local agents and how they reconstruct 
foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents’ cognitive priors and 
identities. Acharya named this process localization. In more detail, Acharya 
defined localization as the ‘active construction through discourse, framing, 
grafting, and cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in 
the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’ 
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(Acharya 2004, 245). When discussing the conditions that may affect the 
likelihood of localization, Acharya identified four main catalysts: first, a main 
economic or security crisis that might question the existing norms/practices; 
second, a more systemic change in the distribution of power; third, a domestic 
political change in the norm-taker (for example a new focus on human rights); 
fourth, international or regional demonstration effect could lead to ‘norm 
borrowing’ via emulation, imitation, and contagion, and so on (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, Acharya (2004) argues that localization also 
depends on ‘its positive impact on the legitimacy and authority of key norms-
takers, the strengths of prior local norms, the credibility and prestige of local 
agents, indigenous local traits and tradition, and the scope for grafting and 
pruning presented by foreign norms’ (Acharya 2004, 247).  
 
Initially the aim of this literature was to counterbalance the ‘illusionary and 
rhetorical’ Eurocentrism of the literature (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 3) 
and to bring the attention to the role of beliefs and practice arguing that the 
process is more complex, interactive and co-constitutive than a mere copying of 
the EU. For example, Biörkdahl et. al (2015) focused on how the normative 
power of the EU is perceived and received in different parts of the world and 
how EU norms are sometimes resisted if not rejected. In addition to that, some 
scholars have been highly critical of the EU’s external action both in terms of 
efficiency and legitimacy (Cusumano 2018; Bicchi 2014; Carta 2014). Yet the 
EU remains a recognised key actor of the international scene. This has 
encouraged EU scholars to re-conceptualize the role of the EU in the world 
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(Missiroli 2016). In this context, post-revisionist scholars present themselves as 
the synthesis of the Eurocentric and Euro-critical visions. 
 
1.2.5 The EU as a Point of Reference: the post-revisionist vision  
The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism is a theoretical approach that 
aims at going beyond the Euro-centric approach of ‘normative power Europe’ 
(Manners 2002) but still looking at Europe’s distinctive integration process that 
continues to be referenced by other regional organizations. Moreover, this 
approach also aims at going beyond the more Euro-critical approach to 
Interregionalism, which argues that ‘the only lesson to be drawn from the EU’s 
experience of integration is that there are no lessons to be drawn’ (Telò, Fawcett, 
and Ponjaert 2015, 5). The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism, similar 
to the recent considerations of the literature on EU actorness, recognises that 
Interregionalism is not a monopoly of the European Union (EU), since a set of 
other state-powers and regional organizations have initiated various partnerships 
with regions belonging to other continents. Yet, this approach still considers the 
EU as key proponent of the regional option within the emerging multipolar 
system. The three main questions identified by Fawcett, Ponjaert and Telò are: 
‘How should we understand and locate European regionalism in the wider world 
of regionalism and multilateralism? How is the EU changing its internal and 
external policies towards other regions? And how do other regional groupings 
make reference to the EU’s unprecedented institutional experience?’. A series of 
attempts to apply the post-revisionist approach to the study of inter-regionalism 
explored the impact of EU-sponsored interregional dynamics on de facto drivers 
of regionalism in other regions of the world (Shu 2015; Valladao 2015; Jakobeit 
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2015). The three authors, with a focus on the EU’s interregional efforts towards 
East Asia, Latin America and Africa, answered the question ‘How the EU’s 
purposeful external action has impacted the endogenous regionalization 
dynamics in its main partner regions?’. Although in their conclusions all three 
authors remained sceptical and considered the interregional policies and formats 
set up by the EU inadequate and characterised by a lack of strategic thinking, 
they do not provide a systematic analysis of where in the process the EU is 
failing. Their analysis is limited to a pure assessment of the outcome. In addition 
to that, the missing comparative analysis with the other actors potentially 
involved in these processes, makes it hard to assess the actorness of the EU as 
there is no clear benchmark.  
 
Overall, although the post-revisionist understanding to the EU’s role in the 
international arena has not been yet systematically applied, it suggests a new 
reading of the inter-regional actorness of the EU that is worth exploring further.  
 
1.3 Conceptualizing EU actorness via its 
operationalization 
The aim of this research is to contribute to overcoming the first challenge of the 
literature on EU actorness, meaning the identified need to go beyond the 
conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor.  The contribution will build on 
Allison’s proposal to look at EU actorness towards the regionalization process of 
another region, such as ASEAN, but it will expand the analysis by including the 
other actors that have an important role in the process of regionalizing ASEAN 
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disaster management policy. The thesis will look at the EU, as well as ASEAN 
member states and ASEAN dialogue partners, mainly Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and the US. 
 
By doing so this research will contribute to the post-revisionist approach to 
Interregionalism (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). It is only by looking at the 
other actors involved in the process that the extent to which the EU effectively 
plays any role in the institutionalization process can be assessed. By discussing 
the effective roles of the EU in its inter-regional organization within a post-
revisionist framework, this thesis will contribute to the broader discussion of EU 
actorness. 
 
1.3.1 The challenge of conceptualizing EU actorness  
In an attempt to provide a research agenda for actorness, Drieskens (2017, 1542) 
noticed how the concept of actorness lacks a clear definition by stating ‘[…] 
actorness measures the degree to which an entity qualifies as an international 
actor, so the lack of a universally accepted definition of the latter complicates a 
universally acceptable definition of the former’. Although she does not provide 
any clearer definition of what an international actor is –and consequently of what 
actorness is - she provides a convenient way forward. A researcher who bravely 
wants to enter the actorness debate, should - at minimum - clearly state how the 




Yet, the need to operationalize this general definition of actorness has proved to 
be a challenge for several generations of researchers. Sjöstedt’s work (1977) has 
been considered too difficult to operationalize and to apply to specific cases. It 
focuses too much on ‘state-like characteristics’ as requisites for actorness 
(Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 265) by ‘implicitly or explicitly using the state 
as comparator’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 1). Another attempt to 
operationalize the EU actorness concept was proposed by Jupille and Caporaso 
and their four criteria: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion (Jupille 
and Caporaso 1998). Yet, this framework was also considered excessively 
complex to apply, given the fact that each of the four criteria contains several 
sub-criteria (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 266) and that it is too focused on the 
EU’s internal dynamics (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This element was 
initially raised by Hill in his famous article on the European Community’s 
‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill 1993). By looking at the Gulf War, the 
Uruguay Round and the Yugoslavia war, Hill concluded that ‘[the] European 
Community is not an effective international actor in terms both of its capacity to 
produce collective decisions and its impact on events’ (Hill 1993, 306). Beyond 
Hill’s pessimistic conclusions, this article raised our awareness on the need to 
focus the analysis of EU actorness around its effectiveness rather than its mere 
conditions of existence.  
 
Hill’s intuition inspired the more successful attempt of Bretherton and Vogler 
(1999, 2006), who pushed the analysis of the operationalization of EU actorness 
beyond the previous inner-looking attempts. They proposed a framework based 
on three inter-related concepts: opportunity, presence and capability. Opportunity 
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is described as the ‘external environment of ideas and events which frames and 
shapes EU action or inaction’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 24). In the second 
edition of their book, Bretherton and Vogler described post 9/11 as the context in 
which the EU produced the European Security Strategy (2003) stating that the 
EU should take its role in the responsibility for global security. Of course, 
actorness cannot simply be what the EU would like it to be, therefore the two 
other concepts balance the framework. Presence is defined as the ‘the ability to 
exert influence externally’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 27). Presence, in 
Bretherton and Vogler’s understanding, is not only the proactive action to shape 
perception, expectation and behaviours as proposed by Allen and Smith (1991, 
1998), but is also a consequence of the simple being of the EU. Finally, they 
noted how the ‘fact of just being’ is not enough and they added capability as the 
third concept. Capability refers to the ‘internal context of the EU action or 
inaction’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 29) which mitigate the notion of 
presence. By adding the capability element, Bretherton and Vogler remind us 
that the expectations on what the EU can or cannot do in reality often depends on 
its capacity to formulate and implement policy. Initially conceived in terms of 
consistency, coherence and the availability of policy instruments, more recently, 
the capability element has been explained in terms of coherence among EU 
instruments (Niemann and Bretherton 2013). 
 
Around the same time Lucarelli (2007) engaged with this evolving literature by 
noticing how the evaluation of the EU as an international actor was ignoring an 
important aspect such as the external perceptions of the EU. Her work started a 
full line of research around the external perception of the EU giving an important 
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contribution to the discussion on EU actorness (Chaban and Holland 2008; 
Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Chaban et al. 2013). Yet, this research which 
operationalized the concept of actorness by looking at the ‘others’ perception’ 
should complement the research of EU actorness and not substitute the analysis 
that looks at the action of the EU to assess its effectiveness. 
 
In the literature that looks at the regional actorness – mainly - of the EU, several 
contributions provided different criteria for actorness. Hettne’s contribution, 
clearly inspired by Bretherton and Vogler, identifies regioness, presence and 
actorness as the key elements that identify regional ‘actorship’, meaning the 
capacity of an actor to act on the external world. Regioness is described as the 
internal integration, and is complemented by presence, as the means to be 
influential (economic strength and/or military power) and actorness, as the will 
to act in the international sphere (Hettne 2007, 2011). Doidge (2008) wanted to 
pay more attention to the institutional dimension of actorness and proposed 
another framework based on the action’s triggers (the goals, interests and 
principles of a given organization as well as to emergent situations requiring a 
response and which triggers the action), the policy process/structures (the ability 
to take decisions in relation to an action trigger) and the performance structures 
(the possession of the structures and resources necessary to implement the action, 
after the decision to act is taken). In the effort to find a synthesis between Hettne 
and Doidge, Wunderlich (2012) provides his criteria for regional actorness and 
applied them to both the EU and ASEAN. He elaborated his own framework 
around three criteria for actorness: internal self-understanding/self-image; 
recognition and presence; and institutionalization and decision-making 
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structures. If Wunderlich applied his framework to a comparative analysis 
between the EU and ASEAN, Allison (2015b) subsequently used the same 
framework to look at the interaction between the two regional actors, and in 
particular at the EU’s promotion of regionalism to ASEAN. In terms of internal 
self-understanding and self-image, Allison explored if the EU considers itself to 
have the capacity and responsibility to promote its regionalism experience 
abroad. She looked at the recognition criteria by exploring ASEAN perceptions 
regarding the role played by the EU in its more recent regional experience, and 
presence criteria by assessing if the EU has been able to utilise its resources to 
promote its experience. The criteria that looks at the institutionalisation and 
decision-making structures is operationalized by asking if these structures have 
been adequate to facilitate the EU’s promotion of regionalism towards ASEAN. 
The element of impact is added to assess if the EU was able to transform the 
‘target environment’. Finally, domestic and external perceptions are assessed by 
exploring if the analysed actions have been considered successfully internally 
and externally.  
 
Overall, by building on the literature that looks at the EU’s promotion of 
regionalism to ASEAN, but in line with the effectiveness turn of the actorness 
literature, this thesis conceptualizes actorness as the effective capacity of an actor 
to influence the regionalization process. As further discussed in the next sections, 
in this research the analysis focuses on ASEAN’s process of regionalization, 
therefore influence results as the best possible concept as it focuses mainly on the 
recipient, rather than exploring the reasons inspiring the sender. If and how the 
EU, as well as other relevant actors, influences the ASEAN regionalization 
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process is the main concern of this thesis. Clearly, influence is a key concept of 
this research and therefore it needs further clarification.  
 
1.3.2 The challenge of defining influence in Public Policy, IR and EU 
Studies 
There are a variety of explanations on why different regional organizations try to 
institutionalize similar forms of cooperation. For some scholars, similarities 
among institutions should be explained by looking at the context, meaning 
analysing the conditions and challenges faces by the organizations. In this case 
authors assumed that there is no influence among similar organizations or that 
the influence is minimal and not enough to explain the fact that different 
organizations resemble each other (Hay 1995). In contrast the literature on policy 
transfer and policy diffusion starts from the assumption that organizations 
influence each other and seek to explain the different mechanisms of this 
transfer. The literature on policy transfer focuses its attention on the ways in 
which the influencer projects (and sometimes imposes) its vision, while the 
literature on policy diffusion pays more attention on the reasons why a receiver 
accepts the influence. Theories on transfer, diffusion and convergence can all be 
linked back to the broader concept of influence. Influence is one of those catch-
all, vague concepts that can be used and applied in all sort of contexts. Influence 
is often analysed by looking at the effectiveness, impact and/or performance of 
the actor(s) involved (Costa and Jørgensen 2012b). Yet, scholars have explored 
the concept of influence in a variety of ways. Scholars working on the concept of 
influence in both public policy and IR focus traditionally on the relationship 
between two identifiable actors: the sender and the receiver, giving alternatively 
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more attention to one or the other. Moreover, the discussion around influence has 
sometimes focused on the process of influencing, but much more often on the 
outcome of this transfer. Indeed, if the literatures on policy transfer and diffusion 
mainly look at the mechanism to transfer/diffuse policies, comparative policy 
literature focuses on the outcome, measuring the degree of similarities. The 
concept of policy convergence (Bennett 1991) has been extensively used by this 
literature. Comparative literature mainly focuses on identifying the dependent 
variable that can explain similar outcomes. Less attention has been given to the 
processes. The following sections will present the concept of influence and its 
understandings in the public policy literature and in IR literature, where EU 
Studies, as well as Inter-organizational Studies have given different definitions of 
influence and different suggestions on how to operationalize this concept.  
 
 
The question on ‘Why different institutions developed similar instruments?’ has 
driven the public policy analysis for many years. Some authors claim that 
institutions assume the same form just because they are subject to the same 
environment. Hawley argues, ‘Units subjected to the same environmental 
conditions…acquire a similar form of organization’ (Hawley 1968, 334). Even 
more, according to the Ecologists in Organizational studies (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977; Baum and Oliver 1996; Ries 2017), isomorphism results from 
competitive processes because organizations are pressured to assume the form 
best adapted to survival in a particular environment (Scott 2001). However, 
organizational scholars soon realised that similar external factors were not 
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enough to explain similarities and started exploring the process by which ideas, 
institutions and organizations spread. 
 
At the first stage the spread of common policy trends across different 
environments focused on the state level. The studies around the diffusion of 
legislation among American States (Gray 1973; Walker 1969) show the initial 
interest for these processes. Yet, Di Maggio and Powell (1983) were the first 
organizational researchers that focused on the homogeneity of forms and 
practices among organisations and on the mechanisms that diffuse 
institutionalisation. In particular the idea of institutional isomorphism, as the 
process that furthers the diffusion of ideas, practices and organizational structure 
among organizations that adopt similar structures and become similar. According 
to DiMaggio and Powell organizations become similar due to coercive, mimetic 
or normative pressures. The coercive isomorphism is the result of a vertical 
pressure from an organization to another dependent organization and can be the 
result of a direct and explicit imposition of a model. However, as Boxenbaum 
and Jonsson (2008) underline, coercive isomorphism could also result from 
resource dependence. In this case the coercive pressure is the result of the 
demand to adopt specific practices in order to be eligible for funding or to be 
admitted in a specific group. The mimetic isomorphism, also described as 
modelling, is the response to uncertainty, where the model serves as a convenient 
source of practice. Organizations model themselves to similar organizations 
perceived as successful or legitimate in their field. As Greenwood et. al (2008) 
notice, among the mechanisms of diffusion the mimetic one has been the most 
applied to empirical studies, although often erroneously. Finally, normative 
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isomorphism is used to describe the process that gives similar values to 
professionals with a similar education and can be described as a horizontal 
pressure.  
 
Ten years after DiMaggio and Powell, Rose (1993) published the book Lesson 
Drawing in Public Policy, which provided the basis for the further development 
of the discussion, promoted by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000). They defined 
the transfer of policy as ‘the process in which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another 
time and/or place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 344). As Evans (2009) points out, 
with this definition Dolowitz and Marsh incorporate all previous definitions 
raised since the 1990s: policy diffusion (Majone 1991), policy learning (Haas 
1992), lesson drawing (Rose 1993) and policy convergence (Coleman 1994).  
 
In the Dolowitz and Marsh analysis (1996) actors engage in coercive or 
voluntary policy transfer. Coercive transfer is the one in which an actor forces 
another actor to adopt a policy (direct), a typical example is the relationship 
between the state and supra-national organizations. Alternatively, a change of the 
environment might also force the actor to adapt to the new reality (indirect), for 
example because of technological developments, emergence of international 
consensus. On the other hand, voluntary transfer can be summarised as the 
voluntary search for a new solution in a situation that does not satisfy the actor 
looking for the change. Voluntary transfer implies different degrees of transfer. 
Copying is the full import of a policy without any adaptation. Emulation is based 
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on the idea that the policy emulated provides the best available standard. The 
import of policy is limited to the goal of the policy, whereas the content and 
instruments are adapted to the local reality. Hybridization and synthesis is the act 
of selectively choosing the part of the policy developed by different actor the 
best suited the receiver (Rose 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Finally, 
hybridization and synthesis are the two concepts advanced by Rose (1993) and 
merged by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) to describe the process of picking and 
choosing part of the policy from different actors in order to create the best-suited 
policy for the importer.  
 
The ‘direct coercive transfer’ of a policy/institution is considered rare in terms of 
imposition done by powerful state, and mainly limited to the standard imposed 
by supra-national institutions (Radaelli 2006). Therefore, scholars working on 
policy transfer focus mainly on the degree by which the receiver actor 
implements institutions or policies initially developed by the sender. Here, 
mechanisms of learning and emulation are introduced. Policy learning implies a 
rational decision of the receiver who wishes to improve the efficiency and 
efficacy of its policies (Rose 1991). On the other side, mimicry and processes of 
emulation implies the receiver’s deliberate search for legitimacy. Although 
maybe inefficient, the policy is replicated by the receiver in order to legitimize 
its actions (and existence sometimes) (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
 
In 1991 Bennett moved the discussion from the ‘modes of transfer’ to an analysis 
more focused on ‘what can be transferred?’, by providing a first set of policy 
elements that could be transferred: goals, content and instruments (Bennett 
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1991). Dolowitz and Marsh expand this classification (1996) adding four objects 
of transfer to the initial three. According to the two authors policy instruments 
and administrative techniques, as well as institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes 
and concept can also be transferred, together with negative lessons. Some of 
these elements can be considered sub-elements of the three main categories 
identified by Bennett more than additional categories. For example, the broad 
concept of goals contains as sub-elements ideas and concept. Institutions can also 
be considered a sub-element of instrument2. Overall, this literature argues that 
norms, as well as instruments, can be transferred. Yet, they are often considered 
mutually exclusive. As the three empirical chapters of this thesis will show, a 
systematic analysis of influence can be applied to both norms (Chapter 4 and 5) 
and instruments (Chapter 6). 
 
Finally, by discussing ‘who’ can transfer a policy, Dolowitz and Marsh identified 
six main categories of actors that transfer policies: elected official, political 
parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, experts 
and supra-national institutions. In terms of supra-national organisations, the two 
authors, in agreement with Rose (1991), refer to both intergovernmental and 
international organizations. Evans and Davies (1999) add that the transfer of a 
policy does not occur unintentionally, but there should be an agent that 
intentionally promotes the process. Following this assumption, in order to 
identify if a policy transfer occurred, it is necessary to: first, identify the agents 
of transfer, second, specify which role the agents played, and third, the nature of 
the transfer that the agents are seeking to make (Evans and Davies 1999).  
                                               




In 2004 Stone tried to provide the first comprehensive framework covering all 
the elements discussed in the Public Policy literature: what type of transfer, 
transfer of what, done by whom (Stone 2004). She distinguished among three 
modes to transfer policy: Ideational, Institutional and Networks. The Ideational 
transfer is the soft transfer of ideas, paradigms and lessons, done by think-tanks, 
experts, professional associations via conferences, professional associations, 
‘best practice’ advocacy, etc. The Institutional transfer is the hard transfer of 
instruments, legislation, policy approaches, done by politicians, international 
civil servants and state officials, via legislation, regulation, standards setting, war 
and invasion, aid conditionality. The Networks transfer is both a hard and soft 
transfer, done by multiple actors including NGOs/civil society and state and 
international agencies, via partnerships and alliances for implementation. 
Overall, Stone’s attempt showed the importance of clarifying what we are 
exploring in terms of transfer, or influence.  
 
To summarise, the public policy literature focused on two main elements. First, 
the need to always clarify not only the process of transfer between two actors, 
but also the importance of clearly stating who are the actors exercising and 
enduring influence, as well as what is the is actually transfer. By focusing on the 
three types of isomorphism, as well as the differentiations between direct and 
indirect influence, the public policy literature provided the first analysis of how 
institutions influence each other.  
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The idea that countries and international organizations have an influence on the 
decisions taken by other countries and international organizations is present in 
many academic works. Yet, a systematic analysis of these processes has only 
recently started in the field of International Relations, whereas this is much more 
advanced in the EU studies subfield (Gilardi 2013). 
 
Interesting attempts have also been proposed by inter-organizational studies 
scholars (Koops and Biermann 2017). Discussing the influence that IOs exert on 
each other, Costa noticed how ‘assessing the influence of international 
organizations (IOs) on other IOs has not been a key endeavour of the literature 
on inter-organizational relations (IORs)’ (Costa 2017, 389). Yet, there are several 
examples of the attempt to respond to the questions: How much do Inter-
organizational relations matter for IOs? How much do they change IOs and in 
what ways? This said, answers to these questions have often looked back to the 
EU (Howorth 2003; Biermann 2008; Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Brosig 2010; 
Gawrich 2017). 
 
Indeed, the role of the EU in shaping institutions is become a popular topic of 
research. Although research has been conducted on the role that international 
institutions play in shaping EU policies (Costa and Jørgensen 2012b), the EU 
capacity to exert an influence beyond its borders still remains an element to be 
further explored. Within EU studies the EU capacity of influencing institutions 
has been discussed at different levels of analysis, both looking inside and outside 
the EU borders. These different levels of analysis have produced different 
literatures. The first level of analysis (internal) analyses the role of EU member 
64	
states (but also non state actors) in shaping the EU and its policies, as well as the 
reverse process that looks at the role of the different EU institutions in shaping 
its member states policies. A second level of analysis (external near-abroad) 
focuses on the capacity of the different EU institutions in influencing the policies 
of the country located in the neighboured area, as these countries experience 
different types of preferential relationship with the EU (free trade agreements, 
accessions agreements, etc.). A third level of analysis (external far-abroad) 
explores the ways in which the EU influences (and is influenced by) states that 
are not involved in the EU accession process (US, Canada, China, etc.). A fourth 
level of analysis (inter-regional) is the one that focuses on the capacity of the EU 
to influence other regional processes. Although the EU is considered the most 
integrated regional organisation, other parts of the world also experience 
processes of regional integration (ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab 
States, Mercosur, etc.). This literature looks at the other regional integration 
processes to assess the influence exercised by the EU. Finally, the fifth level is 
the one that looks at the multilateral level, exploring the ways in which the EU 
influences and has been influenced by international organizations, such as NATO 
and the UN.  
 
The EU capacity to spread institutions and policies across different contexts has 
been mainly analysed and discussed by EU studies scholars in Europeanisation 
research studies. Europeanisation studies focus on the EU’s impact on the 
domestic policies, institutions, and political processes of the member states as 
well as on the accession candidates, particularly with regard to its Eastern 
enlargement (Börzel and Risse 2009; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano 
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and Vink 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012) explain that in 
order to spread its ideas the EU has developed five sophisticated diffusion 
mechanisms that exert direct and indirect influence. Coercion, manipulation, 
socialization, and persuasion are the direct mechanisms, in general, used to 
explain the Europeanisation process within the European Union, whereas 
competition, lesson-drawing, normative emulation are the indirect mechanisms 
that are more relevant when there are no binding laws to comply with, as it is the 
case in EU-ASEAN relations. The ways (legal imposition, positive and negative 
incentives, and socialisation by persuasion and learning) through which the EU’s 
transfer is successful have been studied. As Börzel and Risse rightly noted, ‘the 
further we move away from the EU and its immediate neighbours, the less it 
makes sense to call the spread of EU policies and institutions Europeanisation’ 
(2012, 2) 
 
Policy diffusion can be defined as the process in which a policy spread from one 
primary institution to a plethora of other institutions. The literature on policy 
diffusion mainly developed in the IR literature, but as Gilardi (2012) noticed, the 
mechanisms of diffusion are similar to those identified by the policy transfer 
literature: coercion, competition, learning and emulation. If coercion, 
competition and emulation somehow replicate the policy-transfer literature, 
competition adds the case in which countries, or organizations, compete to attract 
the same economic resources and therefore their policies (such as privatization, 
deregulations, etc.) look more and more similar (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; 
Drezner 2001). Börzel and Risse (2012) provide a synthesis of the 
transfer/diffusion mechanisms that have been used to explain influence. They use 
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the EU as their main case study, useful to explain both direct and indirect 
influence. Direct influence is divided in to pure coercion, as well as socialisation 
and persuasion. Indirect influence is explored in its three understandings: 
competition, lesson learning and mimicry.  
Table 1. The modes of influence  
Direct influence (focus on Sender) Indirect influence (focus on Receiver) 
Coercive transfer  
(by powerful state) 
Learning  
(to improve efficiency) 
Coercive transfer  
(standard set by supra-national 
organization) 
Emulation or mimicry  
(to improve legitimacy) 
Socialization Competition  




This chapter presented the literature on EU actorness by focusing on two of its 
identified weaknesses: the need to move beyond the conceptualization of the EU 
as a sui generis actor, and the challenge to operationalize actorness by looking at 
the influence of an actor on a process. The review of the literature was 
instrumental in explaining the aim of this thesis as a contribution to the literature 
on EU actorness. 
 
Overall, this thesis aims to build on the research that looks at the EU-ASEAN 
inter-regional relations by going beyond the idea of the EU as a sui generis actor 
that cannot be compared. Following Allison’s attempt (Allison 2015b), this 
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thesis looks at the role played by the EU in the regional institutionalization 
process of ASEAN and it does so by not limiting the analysis to the EU, but by 
looking at the role played by the other actors involved. Inspired by the recent 
turn of Interregionalism policy which suggests that the EU is not the only actor 
promoting regionalism, and that we have to take into consideration the entire 
framework in which this is happening (Telò 2015b), this thesis adds a 
comparative dimension to the analysis by taking into consideration, beyond the 
EU, other relevant actors, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. In 
order to do that, and following the suggestion of Brattberg and Rhinard (2013) 
this thesis focuses on the specific policy of crisis management and  explores the 
mechanism that led to the institutionalization of this ASEAN’s policy and assess 
what the role of the EU has been in the process in comparison to other actors 
involved.  
 
To respond to the second identified challenge faced by the actorness literature, 
meaning the need to clarify the understanding of actorness by clearly stating how 
the concept is operationalized, this part of the chapter introduces the concept of 
influence.  
 
The discussion about the way in which public policy and IR look at the concept 
of influence, and in particular at the similarities among institutions, showed the 
divisions between the investigations that focus on the outcome of the influence 
(convergence), and the ones that focus on the process that lead to the specific 
outcome (policy diffusion or transfer). Moreover, among the latest work, a clear 
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division exists between the research that focuses on the sender (policy transfer) 
and the research that looks at the receivers (isomorphism).  
 
In this thesis influence is defined as the capacity of an actor to condition a policy 
or institution adopted by another actor. By arguing that in the institutionalization 
process the roles are less clearly defined, this research focuses both on the role 
played by the recipient, while exploring the different roles played by the external 
actors involved in the process. In fact, this research argues that the ASEAN 
member states, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, that are traditionally perceived 
as the influenced actors, can exercise both roles: they can influence the process, 
as much as they can be influenced by other actors in pursuing one type or another 
type of institutionalization.  Overall, this thesis will contribute to the discussion 
on influence and inter-regional actorness by providing an analysis (and an 
original framework) which gives equal attention to the exploration of the 
outcome, as we need to know if the two policies/institutions are actually similar, 
and to the process, as we need to explore the actions that influence the process in 
one or in another direction, in order to ultimately explain how did we get to the 
existing outcome.  
 
Although more and more scholars have recognized that regional organisations 
are interested by the process of transfer (Stone 2004; Börzel and Risse 2012a; 
Lenz 2013; Jetschke and Lenz 2012) the focus has been mainly on the EU ability 
to transfer regionalism, in terms of regional structures (Börzel and Risse 2012a), 
rather than on the general ability of transferring specific policies to other regional 
institutions. There is a lack of attention in the analysis of how and with which 
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effects policies are transferred from one regional institution to another. The EU is 
still recognised as a model for other regional organisation and as Börzel and 
Risse (2012) rightly noted the research on the diffusion of the EU’s institutional 
models to other regions of the world is just beginning. What this thesis argues is 
that this research should expand by focusing not only on assessing the EU 
capacity to be perceived as a regional reference of regional integration, but also 
as a reference for other policies, and more specifically as a potential point of 
reference for other regions in the disaster management domain. 
 
This thesis will start from the assumption that the exploration of the influence 
exercise by an actor towards a process, will tell us more about the actor itself. 
The traditional role of the EU as a model or as a point of reference will be 
analysed by looking at the process of regionalization of a policy, rather than 
limiting the analysis to the influence towards an actor as such. 
 
Based on these assumptions, the next chapter will introduce the original 
analytical framework to analyse the process of ASEAN regional 
institutionalization of the disaster management policy and to assess the EU 
(relative) effectiveness in directly or indirectly supporting this process composed 





The research design: an original analytical framework 
and a process-tracing methodology 
 
This second chapter presents the analytical framework of the thesis and the 
methodology used to answer the main research question: Who are the main 
actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN 
disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this 
process? 
As the overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the debate on 
the inter-regional dimension of EU actorness, the research question will be used 
to guide the analysis. By exploring the role of actors as drivers of the process that 
led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism, the 
thesis will unpack the actorness mechanism and will assess the role of the EU in 
directly or indirectly influencing this process. By doing so the thesis will 
contribute to overcoming the identified two weaknesses of the EU actorness 
literature, moving beyond the conceptualization of the EU as an actor that cannot 
be compared and operationalizing the conceptualization of actorness via the 
actor’s influence. 
 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section introduces the 
institutionalization of a regional policy as the outcome to be explored. It starts by 
introducing New Institutionalism and its different understandings (rationalist, 
historical and sociological) as the most fitting approach to study institutional 
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change. The section continues by justifying why the analysed process is labelled 
as an ‘institutionalization process’, instead of using labels particularly focused on 
the regional dimension of the process, such as ‘regionalization’, ‘regional-
integration’, ‘region-building or ‘regionalism’. The discussion proceeds by 
reflecting on ‘institutionalization’ as a progressive process characterized by 
consecutive phases (multi-phases process) and on how this choice has affected 
the empirical component of this thesis.  
 
The second section gives an overview of the drivers (both actors and factors) 
identified by the scholars working on these processes of regional change. It 
introduces the influence of domestic, regional and international actors as the 
independent variable that explains the outcome (the explaining causes). By doing 
so it reinforces the idea that the EU is not the only actor influencing ASEAN 
institutionalization processes, but that other relevant actors in the region should 
be equally explored as potential drivers. Overall, it provides a concrete 
contribution to the debate on how to add a comparative dimension to the study of 
EU actorness.  
 
The third section presents the analytical framework. Overall, it is argued in this 
thesis that actors are fundamental drivers of the institutionalization of regional 
policies and that their role in influencing this process should be explored in a 
systematic way. This analytical framework will allow for this more systematic 
analysis. In particular, this chapter introduces the mechanism that –the thesis 
argues- explains the institutionalization of a regional policy. It suggests that there 
are four key actor types involved in this process: the leader, the reference, the 
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sponsor and the implementer. Each of them performs an important role in 
influencing the adoption of the identified regional policy. This chapter offers a 
conceptualization of each of these key actors and it defines what, how and why 
they are influencing. Finally, it also looks at the disaster management case in 
ASEAN, advancing the hypothesis on how the EU would be expected to perform 
in one of these roles. 
 
The fourth section covers the methodology used in the study. It starts by 
presenting the debates surrounding the nature of causality and the different 
understandings of the nature of causal mechanisms. The causal mechanism is 
then defined, the ways to observe it are discussed, and the choice of using 
interpretative process-tracing justified. The section continues by introducing 
process-tracing as the methodology applied to this research and, and more 
specifically, explains how a theory-building design of process-tracing has been 
operationalized in the research. 
 
The final section describes how data were gathered via expert, semi-structured 
interviews and document-analysis. The strengths and limitations of doing 
fieldwork are also discussed in order to present the reasoning behind the specific 
research choices of this thesis.   
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2.1 The explored outcome: the institutionalization of a 
regional policy 
This research established the institutionalization of a new policy at regional level 
as its main outcome to be explored. The next section will introduce the 
conceptualization of ‘institutionalization’ as the multiphase process that this 
thesis will investigate. 
 
2.1.1 Focusing on (regional) institutions 
The attention of political scientists on institutional arrangements started in the 
1930s (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008), but has been substantially revised in the 
1980s with the launch of ‘new institutionalism’. Before that, other theories tried 
to explain the change within organisations. The structural-contingency theory 
focuses on the selection of appropriate structural arrangements to face 
circumstances, tackle uncertainty and gain objectives; resource-dependence 
theory focuses on the dependency on other organisations in terms of resources; 
and ecological theory focuses on the inability of organisations to quickly adapt to 
the change of the environment (Greenwood et al. 2008). Yet, since the 1970s the 
literature on political institutions increased and urged the need to prioritise the 
focus on the political institutions rather than on the social context and on the 
roles of individual actors (March and Olsen 1983). Interesting questions like 
‘What is a political institution?’, or ‘How do political institutions work?’ were 
stimulated by March and Olsen’s work.  
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New institutionalism did not respond with one single answer, but different 
approaches try to address these questions from different perspectives. The 
differentiation proposed by Hall and Taylor (1996) identifies three main 
approaches: rationalist, historical and sociological. Rationalist (Rational-choice) 
institutionalism sees institutions as an arena used by individuals to maximize 
their utilities. Actors create the institution for their advantage, in order to ‘gain 
from cooperation’ (Shepsle 2009). The change in the approach is justified by the 
change in the preferences of the actors involved (Tolbert and Zucker 1999).  
Historical institutionalism combines institutions with organizations and the rules 
or conventions promulgated by formal organization. The focus is on the 
sequencing of change across time and it is characterised by a path-dependency 
logic (Mahoney 2000; David 2001) interrupted by critical junctures as the causes 
of change. Sociological institutionalism focuses on why organizations take on 
specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols and the meaning 
institutions, as norms and cultures, represent for individuals. Institutions embed 
rules and routines that define what constitutes an appropriate action 
(appropriateness logic). Variants of sociological institutionalism are its 
constructivist and discursive understandings. In 2006 Hay underlined the 
importance of including Constructivist institutionalism to the family of 
institutionalism (Schmidt 2002, 2008; Campbell, Pedersen, and Pedersen 2001). 
According to Hay (2006), institutions are codified systems of ideas and the 
practices they sustain. Ideas, discourse and narratives are used to explain, 
deliberate or legitimate political action. Similarly, Schmidt (2010) suggested 
another form of institutionalism: discursive institutionalism. It focuses on 
institutional change, and in particular on the dynamics of this change generated 
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by the interaction of preferences, strategies, and normative orientation of the 
actors. This change is explained, according to Schmidt, by looking at ideas and 
discourse. 
Although the three key understandings of new institutionalism are still valid and 
useful to explain reality, they are often accused of focusing mainly on the 
outcome often assuming the process (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). In addition, they 
complement each other in particular if the focus of the research is on processes. 
A single approach could be useful to explain one single phase of the process, but 
for the researcher who aims at exploring more complex processes (multiple 
phases and multiple actors) one single logic is not sufficient. Even if they seem 
providing competing logics to explain reality, they are also complementary 
sources of theoretical inspiration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002).  
 
The European Union is one of the most institutionalised international 
organizations in the world (Pollack 2007) and the most integrated regional 
organization. Therefore, it is not surprising that the lenses of new 
institutionalism, as the most dominant approach to understanding organisations 
(Greenwood et al. 2008), has been widely used to explain the European 
institutionalization process. Rationalist institutionalism explained institutional 
development in the EU by mainly focusing on principle-agent theory (Pollack 
1997). Historical institutionalism gives more attention to structures, explaining 
institutional development by applying logics of path-dependency. Finally, 
sociological institutionalism focuses on the capacity of the EU to diffuse its 
norms inside or outside its borders (Schmidt 2013). Overall, a lot of attention has 
been given to the endogenous elements that influence the institutionalization of 
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the EU, whereas less attention has been devoted to the role of exogenous actors 
and factors in this process. An exception to this tendency is the volume edited by 
Costa and Jørgensen (2012a), where they look at the influence of international 
institutions on EU internal and external policies, processes, institutions and 
behaviour. Differently, the case of ASEAN has been mainly analysed looking at 
the exogenous actors, giving less attention to the endogenous drivers of 
institutionalization. In particular the EU is often looked at as model (Börzel and 
Risse 2009) or as a point of reference (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) for the 
institutionalization processes within ASEAN.  
 
In summary, inspired by the work of Costa and Jørgensen (2012a), this thesis 
looks at the ASEAN institutionalization process in disaster management policy, 
to assess the influence of the EU, as one exogenous actor among many that have 
influenced the institutionalization of the disaster management policy within 
ASEAN.  
 
2.1.2 Defining (regional) institutionalization: a process 
Processes of regional institutionalization have been labelled differently in the 
literature on regional and inter-regional relations. Terms such as regionalization, 
regional-integration, region-building and regionalism have been used 
interchangeably.  
 
Regionalization is understood and defined in two different ways. First, 
regionalization is understood as the horizontal process that sees the creation of 
more and more regional institutions in the world. This process must be 
77	
understood in parallel with the globalization process (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; 
Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne 2002; Telò 2007; De Lombaerde and Schulz 
2009; Telò 2015a). For some authors, this process is led by state or non-state 
actors (Hettne 2014), for some others the process is led by the market, private 
trade and investment flows, which supports regionalism, understood as the 
emergence of intergovernmental dialogue led by national states (Breslin 2002). 
Second, regionalization is understood as the vertical process that sees a region 
deepening the level of integration among its member states (Eliassen and 
Arnesen 2007; Coman and Ponjaert 2015). A full set of other terms has been 
used to explain the same process. Concepts such as regional integration (Fawcett 
2015a), region-building (Murray and Brennan 2015) and even regionalism 
(Allison 2015a) have been used to describe this exact process.  
 
Starting with ‘regional integration’, even if the term is understood as a process 
and not as a finished product, as suggested by Haas (1958) and Fawcett (2015a), 
other authors would argue that this process of integration involves only the EU 
and no other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, where the same process 
would be better described as increasing regional cooperation (Murray and 
Brennan 2015).  
 
Region-building has been initially defined as the application of a self/other 
perspective to regions (Neumann 2003). This initial focus on regional identity 
building has then been extended to the entire process of regionalization or 
regionalism (Murray and Brennan 2015). Similarly, also the term regionness has 
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been understood as ‘a prelude and integral part of formal regionalism’ (Fawcett 
2015b, 34). 
 
The term regionalism described as the ‘formation of regionally-based groupings 
for the purposes of policy coordination’ (Fawcett 2015b, 36; Van Langenhove 
2016) or ‘institutionalized multidimensional cooperation among neighbouring 
countries’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2) would, according to some 
authors, better describe the process of what we have called vertical 
institutionalization. For example, Söderbaum (2007, 200) argues that 
‘Regionalism represents the policy and project, whereby state and non-state 
actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region or as a type of 
world order. It is usually associated with a formal programme, and often leads to 
institution- building’. Yet, it does not reflect enough the idea of a multiphase 
process this research aims to address. As noticed by Gamble (2007) when we 
talk about regionalism, we refer to a static system of policies whereas when we 
talk about regionalization we refer to a complex process. 
 
Overall, in order to avoid any terminological confusion, ‘institutionalization’ has 
been chosen as the best term to describe the process analysed in this thesis, as it 
already captures the outcome to be explored in this research with no need to 
further underline its regional dimension.  
 
The understanding of institutions as a ‘set of social arrangements’ is paired with 
the understanding of the institution as a process (Scott 2014). Indeed, Scott 
underlined the importance of answering the question ‘How and why does 
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institutionalization occur?’ as according to him, institutional theorists have ‘too 
often neglected to address questions of the ‘who’ and ‘how’ with regard to 
institutional effects’ (Scott 2014, 144). Reflecting on the various strands of 
institutionalism, Scott identifies three conceptions of institutionalization. The 
first one based on increasing returns and a path-dependent process. This 
mechanism is based on positive feedbacks that produced the effect that ‘further 
developments in the same direction are rewarded, whereas the costs of switching 
to an alternative increase over time’ (Scott 2014, 144). The second conception of 
institutionalization proposed by Scott is institutionalization based on increasing 
commitments (Scott 2014, 145). This mechanism is based on the idea of Selznick 
(1957, 16) that ‘in its most significant meaning ‘to institutionalize’ is to infuse 
with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’. Finally, the 
third conception advanced by Scott is based on increasing objectification. This 
mechanism is based on the progressive transmission of objectified beliefs to third 
parties, defined as ‘the individuals who played no role in constructing them’ 
(Scott 2014, 148). Tolbert and Zucker (1999) are among the scholars that, 
according to Scott, mostly contributed to this conceptualization of institutions as 
processes by advancing a model based on four stages. First innovation, 
understood as the moment in which an organization search for a solution to an 
occurred problem. Second habitualization, when new structures are set up to 
respond to the identified problem. Third objectification, when some degree of 
social consensus is built around the value of the new structures. Finally 
sedimentation, when the new created structures are perpetuated over time.  
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Overall, in this research institutionalization, set as the outcome to be explored, is 
indeed understood as a progressive process characterized by consecutive 
milestones. Therefore, there is the need to identify certain events that more than 
others, represent a step forward in the process. The adoption of a first 
programme, the signature of a legally binding agreement and the launch of a 
dedicated instrument have been identified as the three key temporal steps, as, it is 
argued, in each of this step the regional cooperation among ASEAN member 
states deepened. This is reflected in the empirical analysis, where the process is 
divided into three main phases. The first identified phase is the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster 
Management, as it marked the emergence of a regional approach to disaster 
within the ASEAN regions (Chapter 4). The second phase towards a deeper 
institutionalization of a regional approach to disaster is the adoption of the 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Disaster Response 
(AADMER), as a more institutionalize and legally binding agreement (Chapter 
5). The third and final phase of the analysis covers the creation of the actual 
instrument to regionally coordinate the ASEAN response to disaster: the AHA 
Centre (Chapter 6). Although the empirical analysis looks at the influence of 
actors on these three milestones of the institutionalization process separately, the 
overall claims of the thesis speak at the institutionalization process of ASEAN 
disaster management as a whole.  
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2.2 The explanatory factors of regional integration: the 
actors’ influence 
This section will first provide an overview of the main drivers that have been 
used in the literature to explain why independent states decide to integrate 
policies at regional level. As this thesis aims at contributing to the debate on 
actorness, the section introduces also the influence of national, regional and 
international actors as the explanatory elements that also contributed in 
explaining the outcome analysed in the thesis. Finally, the section is devoted to 
explaining how crises will be conceptualized in the empirical part of the thesis as 
intervening variables.   
 
2.2.1 The drivers of regional integration: a focus on national, regional 
and international actor’s influence 
The research that looks at regional institutions cannot avoid answering the 
question ‘how and why regional organizations -such as the EU and the ASEAN- 
are formed and sustained?’. However, it is hard to present a single set of factors 
that facilitate the creation and the further institutionalization of regional 
organizations. Comparing regional experiences is always considered risky as the 
specificities of each organization allowed them to be considered ‘unique cases’. 
For example, the historical and geographical factors that facilitated European 
integration cannot be found in the ASEAN experience. Yet the effort should be 
made to better understand the processes that drive institutionalization. Moreover, 
although different in substance some common factors are present across different 
experiences (Mattli 1998; Laursen 2003; Murray and Brennan 2015). In a 
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contribution edited by Brennan and Murray (2015) internal or external factors 
explaining the process of regional institutionalization, intended as progressive 
regional integration/cooperation have been explored. Fawcett (2015a) identifies 
three different drivers of regionalism: ideas, institutions and core states. Mayer 
(2015) proposed historical narratives as normative drivers of integration, and 
Moxon-Browne (2015) examined the role of institutions in regional integration. 
Economic and business perspectives are also considered to play a key role in 
regionalism. Particular focus has been given to the role of international business 
(Brennan 2015), as well as trade and investment (Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2015). 
Furthermore, traditional and non-traditional security is also proposed as one of 
the drivers of regional integration. Here authors look at the role of great powers 
(Stumbaum 2015), or at specific issues such as food security (Matthews 2015; 
Silfvast, Brennan, and Murray 2015) and climate change (Torney 2015). 
 
Indeed, there are several elements that could explain a further institutionalization 
of regional cooperation. The initial attention given by realist to nation-states 
(Morgenthau 1948) has been progressively challenged by including also non-
state actors in the analysis (Keohane and Nye 1977), and then by looking at the 
normative and cultural aspects as fundamental drivers of these processes 
(Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). Without undermining the role that 
other drivers could potentially play in the process, as the aim of this research is 
to contribute to the debate on actorness, its focus will be on the actors that could 
potentially play a role in the process.  
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The term ‘actors’ here includes domestic, regional and international actors. 
Indeed, although national actors have been often considered to play a primary 
role in promoting a deeper regional cooperation (Moravcsik 2002), increasingly 
attention has been given to similar pre-existing regional structure. The direct 
consequence of this has been the growing role assigned by scholars and policy 
makers to the EU as a model for other regional experiences (see discussion in 
Chapter 1) or to the importance of the inter-regional relations more in general 
(De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Allison 2015b). Finally, international and 
multilateral actors also deserved attention as ‘crucial factors in the start-up, but 
also in influencing and controlling […] regionalism’ (Fawcett 2015a, 44). In 
addition to these three categories of actors, this research also includes the other 
non-domestic nation states with a role in the process. Fawcett (2015a) refers to 
them as powerful or hegemonic states, mainly referring to the United States. In 
this research this fourth category of actors includes state actors relevant to the 
process and not necessarily powerful states as such.  
 
2.2.2 The role of crisis as intervening variable 
Because of the specific focus of this thesis on disasters, among the several 
elements that could explain the institutionalization process, the role that crises 
have on the process needs a further exploration. Historical institutionalists 
consider crises key drivers of regional integration or cooperation (Fioramonti 
2012), as these ‘critical junctures’ are fundamental in explaining change (Pierson 
2004, 135). Being a threat (Gillespie 2015) or an opportunity (Ryan 2015) it 
seems hard to exclude crises from the explaining causes of the 
institutionalization process. Yet, as this thesis looks at the role played by actors, 
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the existence of a crisis, defined as a ‘perceived threat that must be urgently 
averted or addressed in order to avoid dire consequences’ (Boin, Ekengren, and 
Rhinard 2013), will be considered for its effects on actor’s actions. Instead of 
considering crises that affected the ASEAN member states across the period 
analysed, as the direct explanatory cause of the further institutionalization of a 
regional mechanism or as a component of the mechanism, crises will be looked 
upon as intervening variables (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 188). These variables 
can vary and are not a necessary elements of the mechanism, as system where 
each part has no independent causal impact on Y. Overall, crisis will be 
considered as one potential trigger of actor’s behaviour, when they trigger 
actor’s involvement in new phases of the process, or as an accelerator of an 
already existing process, when already agreed phases of the institutionalization 
process will see an acceleration. 
2.3 The analytical framework: internal and external 
actor’s influences 
This thesis advances an original analytical framework to investigate the 
mechanism that explains the influence of internal and external actors in the 
institutionalization of disaster management as an ASEAN regional policy. The 
framework proposed allows for unpacking the concept of actorness in light of 
institutional literature. By proposing four analytical categories (the leader, the 
reference, the sponsor and the implementer), the framework is proposed as a tool 
to explore the EU’s role in comparison to other actors involved in the same 
institutionalization process, going beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a 
sui generis actor. 
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The proposed framework argues that this multiphase process could be explained 
by the influence exercised by four identifiable types of actors, each of them 
performing a necessary, but not sufficient role in the mechanism of 
institutionalization. By un-packing the types of actors that influence the process, 
the framework is in line with the aim of the thesis of shedding light on the role of 
actors in institutionalization processes. These roles synthesize the contribution of 
the different neo-Institutionalist approaches (rationalist, historical and 
sociological) and they also reflect the debate about the different modes of 
influencing derived from both IR as well as Public Policy theories (see Table1, 
page 65). 
 
These roles have been attributed to both internal, as well external actors, 
meaning that both ASEAN member states, as well as ASEAN dialogue partners 
could in principle –and did in reality- perform all these roles. Moreover, it is 
important to notice that one or more actors can perform the same role, as well as 
one actor can perform more than one role. 
 
In the following sub-sections each role is defined (see Table 2 The Analytical 
Framework). After giving a clear definition of what the leader, the reference, the 
sponsor and the implementer are, each sub-section clarifies what we should 
expect to be influenced by each actor (objective of influence), the institutional 
logics that could explain actor’s involvement, as well as the different modes of 
influence at the disposal of each actor. Finally, the section presents the working 
hypothesis explaining the reasons why the EU would be expected to perform in 
86	
any of the identified roles, as well as the ways in which the EU as a regional 
actor might exercise influence on an ASEAN institutionalization process. 
 
2.3.1 The Leader 
The role of the leader is attributed to the actor(s) that first took the initiative of 
proposing a new step (goal) towards the institutionalization of a regional policy 
in general, and disaster management in particular. The leader does not set the 
content of the new initiative, but makes the point that this new step should be 
made. The leader is successful in framing the issue as a political or technical 
objective for ASEAN.  
 
ASEAN member states are the first natural leaders of their regional 
institutionalization. Yet, as Murray (2015) noticed, also external actors can play 
a key role in leading these types of processes. This is the case for example in the 
role played by the US in the EU own process of regional institutionalization. 
 
The reasons why the leader is so keen in proposing certain advancement in the 
institutionalization of the disaster management policy are of three types and can 
be explained by looking at the three new-Institutionalist logics. First, as a 
rationalist reading would suggest the leader is driven by the calculation logic and 
it has a primary interest in the adoption of the given advancement. This interest 
can be economic, as the advancement positively impacts the leader, or a more 
strategic one as leader sees the added value of having the coordination of this 
policy done at regional level, as it considers it more efficient and effective. In 
this case the leader will use its political resources to pro-actively propose new 
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venues for cooperation.  Second, as an historical Institutionalist reading of the 
issue would suggest, the leader sees the institutionalization of this specific policy 
as a natural continuation of a path broadly involving the region. In this case, the 
leader will insist on the need to advance the cooperation, as the process cannot be 
stopped. Finally, following a sociological Institutionalist reading, the leader 
might be interested in supporting the advancement of the general idea of ASEAN 
regional integration and the potential advancement in the disaster management 
domain simply serves this purpose. In this third case, the leader will insist more 
on the benefits that advancing this policy will have more in general on ASEAN 
cooperation. 
 
Independently from the logics behind the leader’s action, its influence is realised 
via a direct influence on the process. Following Börzel and Risse’s 
conceptualization (2009, 2012a), leader’s influence can take the form of 
coercion, manipulation of utility calculation, socialisation or persuasion. Firstly, 
coercion will be difficult to find in the explored case, as ASEAN institutional 
setting does not allow for rules that are legally binding for member states or 
partners. Secondly, for similar reasons, the manipulation of utility calculation 
will be mainly present in terms of positive incentives (and not as negative ones). 
The leader might propose forms of positive rearwards to its fellows in forms of 
financial and technical assistance, not necessarily proposing itself as a potential 
sponsor or implementer (see definitions below), but also by showing that there 
are credible actors ready to take up these roles. Thirdly, socialization, by setting 
certain expectations during social situation (from technical working groups to 
summits) the leader influences the process, as it is able to act as the entrepreneur 
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that influences priorities and agendas. Finally, persuasion is used by the leader to 
convince its fellow actors about the legitimacy of its proposals, as they make 
sense to the overall objective.  
 
Why would we expect the EU to act as a leader? 
The leader is intended to proactively suggest the adoption of a certain step (goal) 
towards a more integrated regional cooperation in disaster management and not 
to provide directions on the content of this norms or instruments. As a key 
proponent of regionalism and interregional relations, driven sometimes by the 
desire to export its own version of regional actorness (Mattheis and Wunderlich 
2017), the European Union could be expected to act as a leader. European 
commitment towards regionalism linked with the reading of the EU as a 
normative power (Manners 2002) suggests that the EU would be a pro-active 
proponent of the regional solution to tackle disaster cooperation in South-East 
Asia. The EU would be expected to pro-actively influence ASEAN in seeking to 
adopt regional norms and instruments to manage crises for three reasons that 
reflect the institutional logics.  
 
First, following a rationalist logic the EU will insist on the need to have an 
independent ASEAN in the response to disasters as this will allow the EU to re-
direct the funding dedicated to the region towards regions or cooperation areas 
that are more in-need or that are more relevant for the EU. In this case the EU 
will not be interested in advancing a particular norm or instruments, but will 
make a strong point for a general advancement of the policy. Following Manners 
(2002) suggestions, here the EU can influence the process via procedural or 
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transference diffusion of goals during high-political discussions. Second, 
following an historical reading of the EU-ASEAN cooperation, the hypothesis 
that the EU could act as the leader in the process of institutionalization of 
ASEAN disaster management is based on the idea that the 40 years of inter-
regional relations between the EU and ASEAN, as well as the existence of 
several programmes (such as DIPECHO and READI) aiming at reinforcing 
ASEAN disaster management could have influenced the ASEAN Secretariat or 
ASEAN member states is pursuing certain goal instead of others. Finally, linked 
with an organizational reading, the explanations that sees the EU being a pro-
active proponent of the regional solution on disaster management as a less 
contested policy then others (or the most appropriate one) to advance further 
regional integration in the region.  
 
The EU it is not expected to exercise any type of coercion on ASEAN member 
states, but rather to use other forms of influence including manipulation of utility 
calculation, socialization or persuasion. Firstly, the EU can propose incentives to 
ASEAN or ASEAN member states to further strengthen their cooperation for 
example by proposing itself also as a sponsor or implementer (manipulation of 
utility calculation). Secondly, the EU and ASEAN have a long-standing 
cooperation and they regularly meet in different inter-regional settings and at 
different levels (ASEM meeting, regular invitation of EU representatives to 
ASEAN Ministerial meetings, etc.). It can be argued, therefore, that there are 




2.3.2 The Reference 
The role of the reference is assigned to the actor(s) that act as a model for the 
norms or instruments firstly proposed by the leader. The reference provides a 
good model from which to take inspiration. In the case of disasters 
management’s norms adopted by ASEAN, the role of reference is represented by 
another regional or international organization. The reason is simply that these 
norms better adhere to the needs of a regional organization. It would be hard for 
a regional organization to apply a norm conceptualize for a nation states. Yet, in 
terms of instruments ASEAN member states, as well as nation-states dialogue 
partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and US), can also be a valid reference 
for the instruments adopted. In fact, a technical instrument can –more easily than 
a norm- both fit a national, an international, as well as a regional setting. An 
actor can directly present itself as a reference or the receiver(s) can indirectly 
choose it.  
 
An actor pro-actively proposes its norm or instruments for different reasons. 
First, as proposed by rational-choice Institutionalists, the reference considers its 
norm or instruments the most appropriate for the said policy (calculation logic). 
Second, as suggested by an historical reading, an actor that is often a reference 
for the receiver will keep propose its solution to the receiver, following the 
historical path of their relation. According to this historical logic, an actor that 
has act as a reference in the past, will try to replicate this role also in the future 
for other norms and instruments. Finally, as an organizational reading would 
suggest, if the norm proposed by the referent is chosen this reinforces the 
legitimacy of the norm or instrument proposed by the reference. In this case the 
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reference will also try to convince the leader that its norms/instruments are the 
best available to achieve the objective set by the leader. The actor pro-actively 
acting as the reference proposes its norm or instrument as the best available by 
adopting direct modes of influence, including coercion, utility’s manipulation, 
socialization or persuasion (Börzel and Risse 2012b; Lenz 2013). 
 
On the other hand, the reference can also exercise its role indirectly. In this case, 
the actor exercises an indirect influence, voluntarily auto-perpetrated by the 
receiver (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). The receiver takes inspiration for a norm or 
instrument already adopted by the reference. Overall, the reference can be a 
completely passive actor, not even aware of the mechanism is part of. Looking at 
the reasons why the receiver adopts the norms or instruments of a certain actor as 
its reference, new-Institutionalist approaches propose three explanations. First, a 
rationalist view suggests that as the receiver wants to improve its efficiency and 
efficacy, in a process of learning (Rose 1991) it adopts a policy that is recognised 
as the best available. Second, according to an organizational understanding, the 
receiver aim is to gain legitimacy, in a mimic process, it adopts the norm or 
instruments implemented by an actor that is recognize as legitimate. Finally, the 
receiver chooses the reference based on a long-standing history of cooperation 
between the two actors. The receiver does not look too much around to select the 
most appropriate norm or instruments but adopts the one from a long-standing 
cooperation partner. Overall, this indirect influence of the Reference can be of 
different types (Rose 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Chapter 1, 16). First, it 
can be a fully copying of the norms or instrument adopted by the Reference. 
Second, it can be an emulation of the norm and instrument, meaning that the 
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norm or instrument adopted by the Reference is then adapted to the local 
realities. Third, the receiver picks and chooses parts of the norms of instruments 
from a set of other actors acting as references. The difference with the previous 
one being that there are more than one actor playing the role of the reference. 
 
Why would we expect the EU to act as a reference? 
The European Union is the most integrated regional organization; therefore, the 
system developed by the EU to respond to crises and disasters (see Chapter 3) 
can act as a reference for the other regional organization wishing to implement a 
similar regional system.  
 
Following the three institutional explanations, the EU could be expected to 
directly act as a reference providing the necessary contents to advance the norms 
of instruments at ASEAN disposal. First, because the EU rationally believes that 
its own model is the most efficient and effective to deal with disaster. Second, 
historically the EU as a long tradition of cooperation in the domain of disaster 
response, in particular with ASEAN member states, therefore it makes sense to 
imagine that the EU will remain involved in sharing its model. Finally, the EU 
seeks for legitimacy could justify the pro-active search for influencing the 
ASEAN process. Similarly, the EU might also be perceived as a valid reference 
from the receiver. First, as the norm or instrument is indeed the most efficient as 
it is already tested in a regional setting. Second, the EU is a long-standing partner 
with several projects launched in the area of disaster management; therefore, it 
makes sense to imagine that before looking at other potential actors that could act 
as reference, ASEAN will look at the EU. Finally, ASEAN is also seeking for 
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legitimacy; therefore, it is reasonable to think that ASEAN will adopt a norm or 
instrument similar to the one adopted by the EU to increase its legitimacy as 
regional organization. 
 
The debate about the EU role as a model -or as a reference- of regional 
integration is quite advanced. As discussed in the first chapter of the thesis the 
literature discussing the EU as a potential (non-)model, or reference, for other 
regional organization is quite widespread (Polillo and Guillén 2005; Telò 2007; 
Börzel and Risse 2012a; Jetschke and Murray 2012). With authors arguing that 
the EU actively promotes its model to other regional organizations via acts of 
socialization and persuasions, with other authors arguing that also if the EU does 
not pursue acts of self-promotion it is still considered an important reference by 
the other regional organizations. Some authors explored the potential role of the 
EU as a model for ASEAN by looking at the institutions (Jetschke and Murray 
2012), some others by looking at disaster management policy in particular 
(Pennisi di Floristella 2012). Yet, these studies often lack a comparative 
dimension with the other actors involved. By not providing a comprehensive 
assessment of the context in which the EU would be supposed to exercise its 
influence, they de-facto provide picture of the process that is partial.  
 
2.3.3 The Sponsor 
The role of the sponsor is given to the actor(s) that financially sustained the steps 
that led to the further institutionalization. The sponsor funds both norms and 
instruments. This support can be direct, meaning financing directly the 
instruments analysed, or it can sustain the process by sponsoring the meetings, 
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the workshops and –more in general- the activities in which the norm is 
discussed. The sponsor might streamline its financial support in a multi-annual 
cooperation planning, or it might simply use some remnants from other projects 
or actions for giving an ad-hoc support to the process.  
 
There are different reasons why the sponsor financially supports the adoption of 
certain norms or instruments. First, in line with a more rational-choice 
institutionalism perspective, the sponsor might have some internally inspired 
interests in showing it is supporting the process, for example because its own 
public opinion is pushing for it. In this case ASEAN’s leaders might see an 
interest in concretely contributing to the institutionalization process. In addition 
to that leaders from ASEAN’s dialogue partners might also be pushed to 
concretely support the process for example in response to the emotional wave 
generated in the public opinion by particularly severe disasters. This has been the 
case for the many countries sponsoring various projects in the aftermath of the 
2004 Tsunami. Complementary to this is the organizational view according to 
which the sponsor wants to contribute to reinforcing the ASEAN regional system 
to respond to disasters, or more in general, it wants to reinforce ASEAN as a 
regional organization as it believes in the regional solution for the global 
governance. In addition to this, an organizational explanation would also suggest 
that the sponsor is interested in financially supporting the institutionalization 
process as this will legitimate its role in the region as a dialogue partner or as a 
key actor among other ASEAN member states. Finally, an historical 
understanding would suggest that the sponsor support a certain norm or 
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instrument as this is the logic consequence of a previous action taken by the 
sponsor.  
 
The type of influence that the sponsor exercises is a vertical pressure (coercive 
isomorphism) towards the actors involved (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). It is not 
necessarily the result of an explicit imposition, but it can also result of what 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) defined as ‘resource dependence’. The demand 
to adopt specific practices to fulfil eligibility criteria can also be understood as a 
form of vertical pressure. 
 
 
Why would we expect the EU to act as a sponsor? 
The EU is among the biggest investors in the ASEAN region. The declared 
interest of the EU in supporting the ASEAN institutionalization of a disaster 
management policy that could ‘reduce the EU [humanitarian] interventions in the 
South-East Asia area’ (European Commission Official 2017d) would suggest that 
the EU would be rationally interested in also financially supporting the steps 
towards a further institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management policy. 
Second, during the 40 years of inter-regional cooperation the EU launched a 
series of programme to sustain the development of disaster management in the 
South-East Asia region (see Chapter 3). Starting with the ten years 2006 
DIPECHO programme, following with the even stronger cooperation announced 
after the 2004 Tsunami and the launched of the ASEAN-EU Emergency 
Management Programme in 2012, the EU invested various billion Euro in their 
20 years support in building an ASEAN regional disaster management 
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mechanism. Therefore, following an historical reading, the EU would be 
interested in further sponsoring existing norms or instruments as a consequent 
logic of previous actions. Finally, the continuous research for ways to sustain the 
further integration of the ASEAN region, explains why the EU would be 
interested in sponsoring the adoption of norms or instruments.  
 
For the EU that traditionally does not have means to exercise vertical pressure on 
ASEAN, sponsoring is the activity that might potentially assures more vertical 
influence. The EU funds are recognised among the strictest in terms of eligibility 
criteria.  Indeed, the actor that would aspire to receive this founding will be 
asked to comply to a long series of criteria set by the EU. Although this might 
result in the actor simply looking for alternatives, in case the EU would be able 
to act as sponsor this might give it the best possible entry to exercise (some 
degree of) vertical pressure.  
 
2.3.4 The Implementer 
The role of the implementer is ascribed to the actor that is in charge of the 
technical, implementation of the norm or of the instruments that will advance the 
institutionalization process.  The implementer can influence the technical set up 
of the norms, by for example (co-)drafting the text of the norm, or the 
instruments, by taking care for example, of the design of the tool and the drafting 
of the job-descriptions.  
 
In the analysed case we should expect the implementation part of the mechanism 
to be potentially done by ASEAN member states, by dialogue partners or by 
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public or private institutions linked to one of the two (ASEAN member states or 
dialogue partners).  
 
The reasons why the implementer is interested in being involved in the 
institutionalization mechanism are three fold. First, as a rational-choice 
understanding would suggest, the implementer is interested in receiving the 
funding linked to the implementation of the phase. Second and sometimes 
complementary to the first one, is the organizational explanation, which would 
argue that receiving these funds also add to its legitimacy as a credible 
implementing actor capable of managing this type of project. Overall, it is just 
another project to have on the list of accomplished results. Third, from an 
historical point of view, when the leader directly suggests the sponsor, this one 
aims at keeping good relations with the proponent actors (leader or sponsor) and 
would therefore implement an instrument in line with the past expectations of the 
leader or sponsor.  
 
The type of influence exercise by the implementer is a direct influence often 
translated into almost full copying of an instruments or norm already 
implemented somewhere else (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Indeed, the 
implementer is often chosen as it has already an experience in implementing 
similar instruments. Therefore, we should not be surprised if what will be 
proposed by the implementer it will be slightly different version of what 
someone else already implemented. The implementer is active in proposing itself 
as the best available option in implementing the agreed norm or instruments. By 
adopting socialization or persuasion’s behaviour (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a) 
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it convinces the involved actors that the presented option is the best possible 
solution. Quite often the leader, the reference and/or the sponsor, already knows 
the implementer for their previous cooperation in similar projects. In this case, 
they directly propose the Implementer as the best actor to implement valuable 
solutions.  
 
Why would we expect the EU to act as the implementer? 
The EU would also be expected to act as an implementer. The capacity of the EU 
to influence the process via the technical assistance it provides to regional 
partners has been widely discussed. According to Lenz (2013) this way of 
influencing can be linked back to the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian 
power (Duchêne 1972, 1973). 
 
According to a rationalist logic, EU’s departments are interested in directly being 
involved in the implementation of the projects because this is perceived as a 
rational choice to do to implement the most efficient norm or instrument in 
details. Following an historical logic, several EU financial programmes are 
designed in a way that, when the EU act as a sponsor, it is inevitably an EU 
department that deals also with the implementation. In this case the EU’s 
department act as implementer because it had already a role as one of the other 
three actor’s types. Finally, EU departments might act as active implementers to 
legitimate its actions also within the EU. 
 
By supporting the technical implementation of norms or instruments the EU can 
directly influence ASEAN institutionalization process (Mattheis and Wunderlich 
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2017). As demonstrated by Allison (2015) the technical assistance provided by 
the EU to ASEAN in other domains, such economic integration with the APRIS, 
ARISE and TREATI programmes, demonstrated a high level of transference. In 
these cases, the EU influence towards the receiver would be a technical 
knowledge transfer done via the direct organization of (not sponsorships only) 
and participations to workshops, seminars and trainings directly targeting 
ASEAN officials directly dealing with the technical element of the issue. In the 
case of the ASEAN cooperation advancements in disaster management, the main 
target of the implementer would be ASEAN Secretariat for the norms’ 
component or the AHA Centre’s officials for the instrument’s component.
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Table 2. The Analytical Framework 
 Objective of influence Logics behind influence Modes of influence 
Leader Goals (RCI) More efficient, effective and/or economically convenient 
(HI) The natural next step in the institutionalization process 
(OI) A way to advance ASEAN regional integration  
Direct influence via: 
• Coercion 
• Manipulation of utility calculations 
• Socialization 
• Persuasion 
Reference Content of norms or instruments Direct: 
(RCI) Reinforce the efficacy and efficiency of receiver  
(HI) The actor has already acted as a reference in the past in the same 
domain 
(OI) Reinforce reference’s legitimacy 
 
Indirect: 
(RCI) The norm/instrument is the most efficient  
(HI) The reference is a long-standing partner (trust) 
(OI) The chosen reference is recognised as legitimate  
Direct: 
• Coercion 








Sponsor Financial support to norms 
(workshops, events, exchanges)  
or instruments (providing direct 
funding) 
(RCI) In response to public opinion’s requests 
(HI) It has already sponsored previous actions in the same domain 
(OI) Reinforce ASEAN regional integration & be perceived as a legitimate 
actor in the region 
Vertical pressure (coercive transfer) via  
• direct imposition  
• resource dependences 
Implementer Technical implementation of 
norms (drafting of text,..) 
or instruments (design of tool, job 
descriptions, ..) 
(RCI) Interested in receiving the funding to implement the project  
(HI) involvement linked with already existing relations with the leader, the 
reference or the sponsor 
(OI) what to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the domain of its actions 





2.4 A Process tracing methodology 
This third section of the chapter is dedicated to introducing process tracing 
(George and Bennett 2005; Gerring and Thomas 2007; Checkel 2008; Beach and 
Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014) as the methodology used in the 
research. This in-depth qualitative method makes possible to highlight the role of 
the actors involved and their logics, providing the methodological tool to explore 
the institutionalization process under analysis. Process-tracing has been only 
recently formalized as the qualitative method ‘to study causal mechanisms within 
a case study’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 2) and that allows for in-depth case-
study analysis. As case study is here defined as the ‘work that focuses its 
attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon’ (Gerring and Thomas 
2007, 241), ASEAN disaster management is chosen as the case study to analyse 
a larger phenomenon: the influence of actors on the institutionalization of a 
regional policy. In particular, the research, as discussed in the previous section, 
explores the role of four typologies of actors: the leader, the reference, the 
sponsor and the implementer. 
 
The section starts by discussing the ontology of causality and the debates 
surrounding it, in order to justify the choice of understanding causality in its 
mechanistic and deterministic nature. As the concept of causal mechanism is 
central to the process tracing methodology, a definition of what is a causal 
mechanism, as well as some reflections on how to observe it are also presented in 
this section. The choice of using interpretative process-tracing will be justified, 
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its main challenges will be discussed, and the precautions adopted in the thesis to 
overcome them will be presented. 
 
After giving a general overview of the understanding of process-tracing that will 
inform this research project, the actual theory-building process-tracing design 
will be presented: after defining the key theoretical concepts (X and Y), empirics 
will be collected and the existence of evidence and causal mechanism assessed. 
Finally, the importance of cross-verification with the most similar cases will be 
presented. 
 
2.4.1 Ontology of Causality 
When discussing the use of the Process-Tracing method, the debates surrounding 
the nature of causality cannot be avoided. On one hand, the question whether we 
should understand a causal relationship as a pattern of regular empirical 
association (X produces Y, provided that we controlled all possible other 
variables), or whether causality refers to the deeper connection between cause 
and effect (opening the black box that explains the mechanism that show how X 
produces Y) affect the ontological and epistemological foundations of the 
research. On the other hand, the debate between a deterministic or probabilistic 
understanding of the causal relations should also be addressed.  
 
Causality: Regularity understanding vs. Mechanistic approach 
The most prevalent understanding of causality in Social Science is the one based 
on David Hume’s assumptions. He defines a cause as ‘…an object, followed by 
another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects 
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similar to the second, or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the 
second never had existed.’ (Hume 1975). The consequence of this definition is 
that we should define causes in terms of correlations between factors and that 
causation should be understood as the regular association between X and Y, once 
other relevant possible causes are controlled (Chalmers 1999; Marini and Singer 
1988; Beach and Pedersen 2013). This means that when X increases, Y increases 
too (directly proportional) or that when X increases, Y decreases (inversely 
proportional). According to this understanding X and Y are in fact variables. A 
typical example of this is the set of studies that conceptualize democracy as the 
dependent variable that varies (in a scale that goes from the negative pole 
autocracy to the most positive pole full democracy) according to selected 
independent variables, such as corruption, economic situation, etc.  
 
In opposition to that some scholars recently argued that the regularity 
understanding of causality does not explain the causal process that shows how X 
produces Y. The process in the neo-Humean understanding of causality still 
remains a black-box, and do not permit scholars to have a deep explanatory 
knowledge of the analysed phenomenon (Salmon 1998). Going back to the 
previous example on democracy, this means posing the question: “how does 
corruption affects the state of democracy in a given country?”. Scholars such as 
Bhaskar (1978), Bunge (1997) and Glennan (1996) argue that the mechanistic 
understanding of causal mechanisms, which was introduced prior to Hume by 
Descartes, should be reintroduced, after addressing the main critics moved by 
Hume, which was the inability to empirically verify that X caused Y.  
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The two different understandings of causality (regularity vs. mechanistic) can be 
linked to the discussion on regionalism. A regularity understanding is the one 
that looks at explaining the variation in the regional integration or cooperation, 
answering to a ‘what question’ such as: ‘What influence a deeper 
integration/cooperation among a group of states?’. Differently, a mechanistic 
approach to the studies on regionalism, is the one that looks at answering to the 
‘hows’ with questions such: ‘How are these set of factors influencing the 
integration of a given region?’.  
 
Causality: Probabilistic vs. Deterministic  
Another ontological debate is the one between probabilistic and deterministic 
understanding of causality. Beach and Pedersen (2013) define a probabilistic 
causality the one used mainly by King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 89), in which 
‘the researcher believes that we are dealing with a world in which there are 
random properties, often modelled using error terms’. In the probabilistic 
approach to causality, the variation of Y is directly linked with the variation of 
X. We are not focused on the process, but on the variation (Y decrease if X 
decrease and vice-versa). The probabilistic approach is mainly used in large-n 
quantitative statistical methods. On the other hand, qualitative scholars have a 
more deterministic understanding of causality when examining whether X is 
either a necessary and/or sufficient cause of Y in an individual case and not 
whether a given X tends to co-vary with Y in a population (Mahoney 2008; 
Collier, Brandy, and Seawright 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2013). The 
deterministic approach is mainly applied in case-oriented approaches using 
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small-n comparison, case study or set-theoretic methods, such as QCA (Della 
Porta 2008). 
 
To conclude, the ontological assumption of the use of a process-tracing 
methodology in this thesis is that causality is understood as been mechanistic and 
deterministic. The purpose of using a process tracing methodology is in fact on 
one hand, to open that black-box, explaining the causal process that shows how 
X produces Y (mechanistic approach) and to the other hand to examine whether 
X is either a necessary and/or sufficient cause of Y (deterministic view).  
 
2.4.2 What is a Causal Mechanism? 
The use of a process-tracing methodology and the consequent understanding of 
causality as a mechanistic element makes necessary to spell out the debates and 
the positions surrounding the nature of causal mechanisms and the observability 
of the mechanism should also be discussed as different understandings have 
different consequences on the ontological stance. The following section will 
discuss how causal mechanisms are identified, observed and understood in the 
thesis.   
 
Defining Causal Mechanisms 
Glennan (1996, 52) defines a mechanism as ‘a complex system, which produces 
an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’. Bennett (2008, 207) defines 
a causal mechanism as ‘a process through which agents with causal capacities 
operate in specific context to transfer energy, information or matter to other 
entities’. More recently, together with Checkel, he addressed the observability 
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issue made by neo-Humean scholars, arguing that ‘Causal mechanisms are 
ontological entities and process in the world, and theories and hypothesis are in 
our heads; we theorize about mechanisms. Such mechanisms are ultimately 
unobservable, but our hypotheses about them generate observable and testable 
implications’ (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 12). 
 
In their machine analogy, Beach and Pedersen (2013, 29) explain that each of the 
parts of the causal mechanism can be conceptualized as composed of entities that 
undertake activities that produce the change. Each part of the causal mechanism 
(the sum of an entity doing an activity) is not self-sufficient to explain the 
outcome Y. Yet it should only be understood as part of the whole mechanism. 
Even more, each part is vital for the mechanism to work. Considering the part of 
the mechanism as individually necessary, we avoid the risk of infinitive 
digression of the parts. In the framework proposed by this thesis the mechanism 
is composed of four entities (the leaders, the reference, the sponsor and the 
implementer). Each of this entity undertakes an activity that contributes to 
explain the analysed outcome (the institutionalization of a regional policy). 
Entities are not self-sufficient in explaining how the mechanism works, but they 
are all necessary for the outcome to happened3. 
 
Observing Causal Mechanisms 
The discussion whether causal mechanisms are observable (or not) divides 
scholars using the methodology of Process Tracing. Some argue that 
‘mechanisms are ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
                                               
3 This is what (Mackie 1980) called the INUS condition: the condition that is insufficient but necessary part 
of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.  
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processes through which agents with causal capacities operate’ (George and 
Bennett 2005, 137) and that ‘causal mechanisms are merely analytical constructs 
that do not have a real-world existence’ (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). In 
contrast, other scholars argue that ‘mechanisms are not pieces of reasoning but 
pieces of the furniture of the real world’ (Bunge 1997, 414). Beach and Pedersen 
suggest that ‘some types of causal mechanisms can be conceptualized and 
operationalized in a manner that permits quite close observation of actual 
mechanisms and where plentiful evidence exists that enables us to measure the 
mechanism quite closely’ (2013, 44). This view suggests that causal mechanisms 
are quite directly observable, meaning that when operationalizing we look for the 
fingerprints left by the mechanism in the empirical record. The methodological 
consequence of accepting the idea that causal mechanisms are observable is that 
for each part of the causal mechanism we should expect to find observable 
evidences.  
 
Before discussing how these fingerprints will be find, measured and tested in our 
process tracing, it is necessary to clarify the epistemology that we intend to use 
in this research as this have strong implications on how the proposed mechanism 
will be tested.  
 
Interpretative vs. Bayesian process-tracing  
The popularity of the process-tracing method has increased in political science. 
Both positivist and constructivist approaches claim that process tracing can be a 
valid methodology to capture and explain causal mechanisms in action. 
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However, the two approaches are clearly different in their epistemology (Bennett 
and Checkel 2014).  
 
Interpretative process-tracing is based on the assumption outlined by Wagenaar 
(2011, 243) that ‘the key heuristic moment consists of making sense of raw 
empirical data. This process of sense making always consists of entering into a 
dialogue between the preconceptions we bring to the study and the empirical data 
we have collected’. It is defined by Guzzini (2012, 251) ‘not in terms of a linear 
scheme, but as the intermeshing of several parallel processes’. 
 
Interpretative process-tracing is presented as an alternative to what is considered 
a ‘too’ positivist-approach, as the method that better combines deductive and 
inductive approaches, and that is able to operationalize discourses. Against 
criticisms from positivist researchers qualifying interpretative work as a soft or 
unsystematic way of doing research, Wagenaar (2011, 251) responds that 
interpretative methods are ‘systematic, methodical, empirically driven activities 
that, when done well, set up conditions for a generative, critical confrontation of 
theory and the empirical world’. This definition provokes the inevitable question 
of ‘when is process-tracing properly done then?’. 
 
Scholars with a positivist approach to process-tracing argue that interpretative 
process-tracing fails the struggles of verifiability or reliability which are the only 
standards available to scholars applying process-tracing methodology to avoid 
the story-telling trap (Beach and Pedersen 2013). In contrast, they propose a 
Bayesian approach to process-tracing, which provides a clear set of logical tools 
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for evaluating evidence that, might confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Yet, they 
are the first recognising that due to the uncertain nature of empirical observation 
we cannot claim to be 100 per cent confident about our theory –not even by 
using a Bayesian approach to process-tracing-.  
 
Beach and Pedersen (2013, 83) summarise the Bayesian logic with the following 
words: ‘Our belief in the validity of a hypothesis is, after collecting evidence 
(posterior), equal to the probability of the evidence conditional on the hypothesis 
being true relative to other alternative hypotheses (likelihood), times the 
probability that a theory is true based on our prior knowledge. Here, we use the 
term hypothesis to refer to hypotheses about the existence of each part of a 
theorized causal mechanism’. 
 
Although the adoption of a Bayesian logic to process-tracing would sounds very 
attractive for a scholar aiming at producing a verifiable and reliable research, it 
should be also recognised that adding too many boundaries to the way in which 
the research is conducted might cause the opposite effect: as there is no research 
that is good enough, there is not research at all (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 
2015).  For all these reasons, in this thesis an interpretative process tracing is 
adopted. Yet, a strong awareness of the risk of this approach counterbalanced the 
risk of falling into a story-telling exercise. Even more, in order to avoid the risk 
of reducing the analysis to a simple story-telling, the analysis will be based on 
the ten best-practices proposed by Bennet and Checkel (2014, 21) for a 
systematic, operational and transparent application of process-tracing. These ten 
best practices can be summarised in four main points. First, alternative 
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explanations should be seriously taken into consideration while conducting the 
empirical analysis. Second, the empirical analysis strongly benefits from 
inductive insights. Third, the investigator should always be aware of its bias on 
the topic researched, as well as the ones of the sources used to gather primary 
data. Finally, a good process-tracing is the one that clearly justify when the 
analysis starts and when it ends.  
 
2.4.3 Main challenges of Process-tracing 
Comparative or large-n analyses give more confidence in the relationship 
between the analysed variables, but as discussed so far, they not provide 
information on the causal mechanism linking the dependent with the independent 
variable. Therefore, using a process tracing methodology can, on one hand, 
provide light to the black box of the mechanism linking the analysed outcome 
with its explanatory causes, but on the other hand, the main challenges face by 
scholars using this method should be spelled out and addressed.  
 
Schimmelfennig (2014, 102) categorizes the four main challenges face by 
scholars using process-tracing: resource problem, the measure-of-fit problem, the 
storytelling problem and the problem of generalization.  First, how do we know 
when to stop? It is generally agreed that process tracing requires an in-depth 
knowledge of the analysed case and an enormous amount of information (George 
and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014). The 
number of steps identified, as part of the process is potentially infinite. 
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify our limit, when are we going to stop? The 
need to include in the mechanism only the individually necessary part for the 
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mechanism to work already sets a clear limit to avoid ‘infinite regression’. 
Second, how do we evaluate our evidence? As process-tracing methodology is 
based on the collection of qualitative data, the only way to be sure that 
observations are properly evaluate and transformed into reliable evidence is by 
being clear and transparent about the collecting and evaluating process. Third, 
how do we know our research is scientifically grounded? The risk of 
transforming the analysis in a way that appears plausible to the reader is quite 
high if a scientific test method is not applied. In this research making explicit 
how and why certain evidence is relevant to the analytical framework proposed 
will overcome the risk of reducing the analysis to basic story-telling. Meaning 
constantly asking the question: “what does this observation tell us about the 
identified actor according to the definition advanced in the analytical 
framework?” Fourth, how can we generalize our mechanism? Meaning, how can 
we propose a mechanism that can be then applied to similar cases? The 
generalization of the process is possible in the theory-oriented typologies of 
process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Observations and evidences will 
always be peculiar of the analysed case, but it will be possible to extend the 
identified mechanism to other similar cases (i.e. to other regional organisations, 
or to other institutional processes within ASEAN), providing that different 
observations and evidences will bring the same conclusions. 
 
2.4.4 Building a theory by using process tracing  
Theory building process-tracing will be chosen as the main research design. The 
following paragraph will justify this choice, as well as consider the alternatives. 
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One method, three possible designs 
Process tracing has been discussed so far as a single method, but it is 
fundamental to differentiate among the three different uses of this method (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013) as this has profound consequences for the operationalization 
of the method and the overall objective of the research. 
 
A first differentiation in the use of process-tracing is the one between theory-
centric and case-centric process tracing. Case-centric process tracing starts with 
the assumption that the complexity of the social world makes the ambition of 
producing knowledge that can be generalized almost impossible. The objective is 
to find a plausible explanation for a puzzling outcome. Based on this assumption, 
explaining outcome process tracing ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient 
explanation of a particular outcome. Due to its case-specific focus, this method 
has been attributed mainly to historical scholarship, although social science 
researchers also apply case-centric process tracing (see Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004). Differently from case-centric process tracing, theory-centric 
process tracing is based on the assumption that the identified mechanism can be 
generalised to other cases. Two different process-tracing designs derive from this 
assumption: theory-testing and theory-building process tracing. Theory-testing 
process tracing, as suggested by the name, deduces a mechanism starting from an 
established theory to open the black box that explains the correlation between the 
dependent and independent variable. This design is mainly used to test existing 
theory and to enlighten the process that link X and Y. Theory-building process 
tracing aim is to build a midrange theory that can be generalized, starting from 
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the empirical observations to design a causal mechanism that can explain how X 
is linked with Y.  
 
This research will be based on a theory-building process-tracing design. The 
overall objective is to provide strong inferences about a specific phenomenon 
with the objective ‘to build a theory about a causal mechanism that can be 
generalised to a population of a given phenomenon’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
11). On the one hand the ambition to design a mechanism that can be 
generalised, and on the other hand the lack of a single theory that can explain the 
correlation between the two variables, exclude the use of explaining-outcome 
and theory-testing process tracing as possible design for this research. 
 
A theory-building design 
This research is based on a theory-building process-tracing design. In theory-
building process-tracing facts are used before theories to build hypothesis, but 
differently from the explaining-outcome process-tracing, the overall goal is to 
build a midrange theory that can be generalised outside the single analysed case. 
Theory-building process tracing can be used in two different situations. First, we 
know that there is a causal link between X and Y, but we are unsure about the 
mechanism that link the two. The most famous example here is Janis’ work on 
Groupthink where Groupthink is described as the causal mechanism that links 
policy failures (Y) with poor decision-making practices by small and cohesive 
groups of policymakers (X). Second, we know the outcome (Y), but we want to 
explore what caused it to happen, meaning we want to identify one or more Xs 
that could be related to Y. This research is part of the first group as the Y is 
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identified (regional policy institutionalization), as well as the X (actor’s 
influence). In this case, Beach and Pedersen (2013, 168) suggest choosing a 
typical case as this will allowed the causal mechanism to be tested empirically in 
subsequent research.  
 
After defining the identified outcome (Y), this research has been divided in three 
main steps: collection of empirics, existence of evidence and existence of causal 
mechanism. The first step is dedicated to the collection of empirics. The focus is 
on collecting case-specific ‘facts’ about the first empirical case-study: the 
creation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on 
disaster management (AHA Centre) in the ASEAN HQ in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
The black-box of the process the leads from the establishment of the first 
ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) in 1976 to the 
inauguration of the AHA Centre in November 2011 and its first five years of 
existence, are unpacked. The second step assesses the evidence. Existing theories 
on Diffusion mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2012a) and Institutional 
Isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) merged with local-focused literature 
(Acharya 2004, 2009) will be used to detect systematic patterns in the empirical 
material. The third step identifies the causal mechanism as a ‘theory that can be 
generalised’. The different parts of the investigated causal mechanism are 
identified. For each parts an entity that engage in an activity that transmit causal 
forces will be identified. Raw material data (observations) will be collected and 
assessed to be used as evidence that update the confidence in the presence of the 
hypothesized causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013).  
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Generalizability of the mechanism 
The question: ‘how can we be sure that the theory we built is externally valid, 
meaning exportable?’ arise. Indeed, this research aims at proposing a mechanism 
that is valid not only for the ASEAN disaster management policy, but that is also 
applicable to other similar cases. In this respect the analysed case in this thesis is 
a revelatory case, where the ‘investigator has an opportunity to observe and 
analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation’ (Yin 
2009, 48). For example, by exploring other policies institutionalized at ASEAN 
level to assess the EU influence, or by investigating other EU inter-regional 
relations on similar subjects such as: the creation of the African Union (AU) 
Situation Room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, within the Peace and Security 
Directorate in 2009 and; the creation of the League of Arab States (LAS) 
Situation Room in Cairo, Egypt, in November 2012. In this second example, as 
the analysed regional organisations differ in terms of structures and scope from 
ASEAN, we expect the observations and evidence to be different, but the 
mechanisms to remain the same. 
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2.5 Data gathering 
The methodology of process-tracing deeply relies on primary sources (ranging 
from meeting notes to official documents), supplemented by interviews and a 
wide range of secondary documents (press releases, press articles, policy 
analyses, scientific articles, etc.). In this thesis, the empirical analysis is mainly 
based on a combination of document analysis and elite, semi-structured 
interviews conducted in Brussels and Jakarta. 
 
Following the assumptions of what Beach and Pedersen (2013, 16) define as 
‘Theory-Building Process Tracing’, data has been collected in three main steps. 
The first step focused on collecting the facts about the analysed events. Facts 
have been chronologically assembled to build a first structure containing the 
sequence of events that produced the analysed outcome (the institutionalization 
of a regional policy). The second step focused on collecting the observable 
manifestation, what Beach and Pedersen (2013, 178) define as evidence, 
meaning the ‘the proofs that a part of the hypothesized causal mechanism exists’. 
Both parts have been based on both primary and secondary sources. 
 
In order to improve the reliability of data, triangulation both across different 
persons and between different kinds of sources have been applied. Moreover, the 
conduct of field research has been run according to specific protocols and rules. 
All phases of the research have been done considering the ethical implications 




2.5.1 Document Analysis and Elite interviews as a core 
Document analysis and elite semi-structured interviews are at the core of this 
research. In an iterative process, they informed each other, as well as the first two 
phases of the research: building the empirical analysis and the collection of 
empirical observations.  
 
The first step of the research focused on building a first empirical narrative of the 
process. Here a combination of primary and secondary documents, including the 
existing literature on the case, have been used together with the first 
informational and exploratory interviews conducted in Brussels in September 
and October 2015. These interviews helped familiarize with the topic and case, 
to inquire about available resources and to reinforce the basic knowledge on the 
topic acquired during an internship conducted at the European External Action 
Service between March and July 2012. These first interviews proved to be very 
effective in identifying the relevant actors within the EU (both EEAS and 
ECHO), as well as within ASEAN. After building the historical blocs that since 
the Concord I Declaration (1976) lead to the institutional establishment of an 
ASEAN regional cooperation in disaster management and the establishment in 
2011 of the AHA Centre, the second phase of the data collection started.  
 
During this second phase of the research dedicated to the collection of empirical 
observation, the dialogue between documents and elite interviews was 
maintained. Interviews at this stage targeted more senior and less available 
actors, starting with the relevant policy-makers and ASEAN and EU officers in 
Jakarta and Brussels, following with the ambassadors to ASEAN and 
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ambassadors of ASEAN member countries and their colleagues in charge of the 
disaster management cooperation dossier. Information gained through interviews 
were integrated with other primary information coming from written sources. 
Minutes from meetings, project reports and general brochures (both from internal 
and external use) filled the gap in information and helped in triangulating 
information obtained via interviews. Here the Knowledge Series Books produced 
by ASEAN to celebrate the first five years of the AHA Centre proved to be 
particularly helpful, as were the annual report produced by the AHA Centre and 
collected during the filed-work in Jakarta.  
 
Overall, the thesis is based on a total of 23 interviews (see Annex 1) and the 
analysis of over 115 documents. Some of the interviewees have been interviewed 
twice, both in the first and in the second phase of the data collection. Secondary 
sources, in particular academic literature and interviews with academics have 
also complemented the data collection.  
 
Data gained through interviews contributed to illuminate the causal process, and 
thus helped the building of the theory. Interviewees’ answers have been used to 
generate and develop the argument. The type of interviews that have been run in 
the field (both in Brussels and Jakarta) can be classified as ‘elite interviews’, not 
because of the status of the interviewee, but more in terms of his/her expertise. 
Elite interviews provided information of what happened, which were the actors 
involved and their roles. In particular, in this research elite interviews helped 
identifying, for each parts of the mechanism, the entity that engage in an activity 
that transmit causal forces. The danger of selection bias is always present in elite 
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interviews, but in process-tracing is particularly relevant because of the key role 
that the interviewed elite plays in informing the mechanism. This risk has been 
mitigated in this research by triangulating all sources and by being conscious of 
possible bias. Moreover, in this research the possible bias link to the selection of 
elite interviews was minimised by trying to interview the vast majority of 
officials directly involved in the process. Officials from both EU and ASEAN 
were interviewed, as well as representatives from other countries involved in the 
process. All their accounts were assessed and triangulated. Even if it would have 
been maybe ideal to interview a much greater number of actors involved in the 
analysed case to grasp all the micro-components of the process, the choice of 
focusing on the very specific case of disaster management facilitated the 
‘snowball technique’ of building an exponentially increasing network of 
respondents (Guterson 2008, 98; Warren 2002, 87). The ‘snowball technique’ 
was not possible when planning interviews with representatives of actors 
different from the EU, and not based in ASEAN (i.e. Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and the US). The turnover of staff and the very specificity of the subject 
(no more than one attaché is assigned to this issue) made it rather hard to 
schedule interviews. Yet, the lack of interviews with this category of national 
experts was compensated by analysing national documents often provided by the 
embassy in response to the interview’s request. 
 
Interviews with the European Union officials have been run in Brussels and in 
the EU delegations to ASEAN in Jakarta. In Brussels headquarter elite 
interviews have been run with the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Department (EEAS), the relevant EEAS and EU Commission geographical desk 
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officers, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the EU’s 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (DG ECHO), and the 
Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (EEAS/DG DEVCO). Interviews 
with the ASEAN officials have been run in Jakarta in February 2017. In the 
ASEAN headquarters the relevant officers from the Secretariat were interviewed, 
as well as officials from the AHA Centre. These interviews have been 
complemented by interviews with the ASEAN member states representatives, as 
well as with some of the representatives of the so-called ASEAN Dialogue 
partners involved in the institutionalization of ASEAN Disaster Management 
policy. Overall, around 35 officials were approached for an interview, but they –
in particular the ones based in Jakarta- were not always available during the 
proposed time (February 2017) or via Skype. When an interview was not 
possible, other primary sources, such as original documents, brochures and 
official reports were used to collect the necessary data.  
 
All elite interviews have been run in English, French or Italian depending on the 
mother tongue of the interviewee. English was used for all interviewees which 
mother tongue was not Italian or French. Overall, all interviewees have an 
advanced knowledge of English, as this is one of the vehicular language used 
among EU officials, as well as the recognised working language of ASEAN and 
between ASEAN officials and their partners.   
 
In order to avoid misunderstanding that can undermine the data collected, as well 
compromise future interactions, all interviews carefully balanced empathy and 
neutrality. In line with this, although recognising that recording provides a 
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trustful record of everything said, in order to strength empathy and in the hope to 
gain more insights, interviews were not recorded, but hand notes were collected 
during the interviews and re-taped into electronic form. In order to increase the 
transparency of data, a table containing the name, affiliation, function, contact 
details, date and time of the interviews, as well as the topic of the interviews has 
been regularly updated. 
 
2.5.2 Field research as a must 
As Philippe Schmitter said, “Fieldwork continues to be the most productive and 
exciting part of what we do” (Munck and Snyder 2007, 337). Although more 
developed in other disciplines, like anthropology, sociology and history, field 
research has been used also in political science since the 1950s. Fieldwork is 
here understood as the research conduct by ‘leaving researcher’s home institution 
in order to acquire data, information, or insights that significantly inform the 
research’ (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015). In this respect, fieldwork has 
been conducted both in Brussels and in Jakarta.  
 
Debates between advocates and sceptics about the value of field research are on-
going. Sceptics argue that fieldwork produced bias that undermined the data 
collection and therefore question the entire research. According to these scholars, 
researchers that immerge themselves in the field risk not only to lose objectivity, 
but also to influence the context they are studying (Shaffir and Stebbins 1990; 
Munck and Snyder 2007). On the other hand, fieldwork advocates suggest that 
going into the field allow a researcher to gather more data, to gain more 
information about the context that inform interviewee believes and to test 
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researcher’s hypothesis more thoroughly (Becker and Geer 1970; Kapiszewski, 
MacLean, and Read 2015).  
 
This research benefitted from an informed and well-prepared fieldwork and from 
the access to policy makers and to the environment within which they operate 
that was possible thanks to the period devoted to collecting data from the field. 
Taking advantage of the ULB location in Brussels, as the second institution of 
the GEM Programme that sponsored this research, the data collection on the 
EU’s role in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management was 
relatively long and spread across the three years. In comparison the fieldwork in 
Jakarta was a short, but intense period of two weeks. During those two weeks 




This chapter presented the research design, the analytical framework and the 
methodology of the thesis. It started by providing an overview of the outcome 
explored in the thesis, as well as the chosen explanatory cause to be further 
investigated. The institutionalization of disaster management as an ASEAN 
regional policy is set as the outcome (Y) analysed in this thesis. In order to 
enable the analysis of this process, three key moments have been selected as 
representing topical phases of this multiphase process: the adoption of a regional 
programme (Chapter 4), the adoption of a regional binding agreement (Chapter 
5) and the launch and implementation of a regional instrument (Chapter 6). The 
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influence that national, regional and international actors have on this process is 
set as the explanatory factors this research aims to explore (X). The chapter 
proposes an original analytical framework based on the interaction of four actors: 
the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. After introducing the 
main features of each actor, the chapter advanced the hypothesis that the EU 
could potentially play a role in each of the four identified roles. This original 
framework is informed by neo-Institutionalist theories (to explain the logics of 
actors) and the conceptualization of influence proposed by scholars in both IR 
and Public Policy (to explain modes of influence). It is a contribution to the 
debate on the EU’s influence on regional processes as it proposes a framework to 
go beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor advancing an 
analytical instrument to systematically explore EU’s actorness in a comparative 
way. The proposed analytical framework will be applied in the three following 
empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) to answer the research 
question.  
 
The chapter also introduced interpretative theory building process-tracing as the 
methodology used in the thesis. It discusses its main ontological stands, as well 
as how the challenges of this methodology have been approached in the thesis. In 
its final part the chapter presents the data gathering phase of the study and how 
document analysis and elite interviews have been used as the main way to gather 





Providing the context of Crisis Management: global 
norms, the EU disaster management system and 
ASEAN’s dialogue partners policies 
 
The aim of this third chapter of the thesis is to set the scene for the three 
empirical chapters that follow. It provides the context in which the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management took place and it introduces 
the evolution of the disaster management policy at national, global and regional 
level, it presents the EU as a relevant actor in this field and the cooperation 
between ASEAN and other partner’s countries to show how theoretically the EU, 
as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States, could have 
played a relevant role in this process, as leader, reference, sponsor or 
implementer. 
 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the evolution 
of disaster management policy. It argues that disaster management evolved first 
at the national, then at the global, and finally at the regional level. It presents the 
two waves that triggered the institutionalization of disaster management centres 
at the national level by noticing how the civil defence instruments mainly 
evolved within European states during the Cold War, whereas the discussion 
started among ASEAN member states in the 1970s. The norms adopted at global 
level were instrumental in guiding the regional initiatives both within the EU, as 
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well as within ASEAN. Therefore, the chapter presents the pivotal stages of the 
global reflections on disaster management. Starting with the UN International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990-2000); following with the 
Yokohama Strategy (1994), and the UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (1999) -and the consequent creation of the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR)-; the section concludes by presenting the main 
features of the Hyogo Framework first (2005), and the following Sendai 
Framework (2015). Understanding these global stages is fundamental to put the 
development of regional disaster management into perspective. This first part 
concludes by showing how the development at the regional level was encouraged 
by the global discussions and how it was embedded within the global norms 
adopted.  
 
The second part of the chapter zooms into the European project to the evolution 
of the EU as a relevant crisis manager. The EU Civil Protection mechanism is 
presented in detail, understanding its evolution and features is important to 
understand the potential model proposed to ASEAN during the three institutional 
phases discussed in the following three empirical chapters. Moreover, this part 
introduces the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department 
and its main features (the Crisis Platform, the Situation Room and the Consular 
Crisis Cooperation). This EEAS post-Lisbon initiatives represented a potential 
alternative model to the Civil Protection Mechanism already proposed to 
ASEAN representatives. Overall, this section argues that the EU system to 




The third part starts by recognising that the EU is not the only partner for 
ASEAN. Quite the contrary, since the mid-1970s ASEAN has strengthened ties 
with the so-called ten Dialogue Partners, meaning Japan, China, Republic of 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, US, Canada, Russia, US, as well as the EU. 
Therefore, the third part of the chapter is dedicated to the other ASEAN’s 
dialogue partners that beside the EU played a key role in the institutionalization 
of ASEAN disaster management until 2016, date in which the AHA Centre 
celebrated its first 5 years of existence, as well as the conclusion of the first 
implementation part. In particular, the chapter focuses on Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and the US 4 . After providing an overview of disaster 
management in the dialogue country, the third part of the chapter illustrates the 
cooperation of the analysed country with ASEAN, in particular in disaster 
management. 
 
3.1 The emergence of Disaster Management: the policy 
context 
Disasters of all types have accompanied human history since its beginning. 
Disasters have influenced and shaped history. Pandemics have decimated entire 
populations and contributed to the perished of entire civilizations. Similarly, 
historians attribute the end of entire empires to natural disasters. The catastrophic 
eruption of Vesuvius and the consequent destruction of Pompei in 79 AD, the 
                                               
4 The cooperation between China and ASEAN on disaster management has been approved on 6 October 
2014. The cooperation agreement includes the provision of 50 million grant assistance in three years to 
support the implementation of AADMER work Programme, operationalization of the AHA Centre and 
ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity building on disaster management. Yet, this provision did not impact the 
institutionalization of the ARPDM programme, of the AADMER Agreement or of the AHA Centre within 
the period analysed in this study. Therefore, China has been excluded from this study. 
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enormous floods along the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal in 845AD that 
contributed to the decline of the Tang dynasty in China, or the change in the 
monsoons resulting in severe droughts and famine in 850AD that contributed to 
the fall of Maya empire in Mexico are just few examples among the many (see 
Fagan 2009). The development of measures to reduce the impact of catastrophes 
is part of the daily human survival battle. The building of the river control project 
promoted in Egypt by Amenemhet III (1817-1722 BC) to control the annual 
floods of the Nile River, or the first professional fire department, the Corps of 
Vigiles, founded in ancient Rome following the great fire that almost destroyed 
the city in 64AD (Coppola 2006; Quarantelli 1998) are just some examples of 
this. In modern years, disaster management evolved as a policy at state, global 
and regional level. In the following parts the section will discuss this evolution.   
 
3.1.1 Disaster Management at state level 
Modern disaster management, understood as the implementation of measures to 
better respond and mitigate disasters, was developed within the authority of 
national states. The development of disaster management can be conceived in 
two consequent waves in the 50s and in the 70s. The first wave is link to the 
evolution of modern civil defence (Quarantelli 1998). Systems to provide early 
warning systems, rescue teams and local coordinators were developed since the 
Great War (1914-18). Initially developed to coordinate civilians during air raids, 
civil defence departments move their focus on planning the response to a 
potential nuclear attack during the Cold War. Modern Civil Protection evolved 
from the Civil Defence provisions established during the Cold War. Among the 
most famous examples the Britain Civil Defence Act of 1948 that led to the 
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creation of the Britain’s disaster management agency; or the establishment of the 
Canadian Civil Defence Organization in 1948 from which developed the 
Canada’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency 
Preparedness (OCIPEP). Even more the US Federal Civil Defence Act of 1950 
led to the creation of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
(Quarantelli 1998). Finally, the French Ordinance of 1950 and the consequent 
Decree Relating to Civil Defence of 1965 (Rum 2016) provided the basis for the 
implementation of the France’s civil protection.  
The second wave was inspired by the 1970’s environmental movements, and by 
the new awareness of the consequences of the climate change. In the developed 
countries this was reflected in the reforms that led the evolution of the national 
civil defence institutions in the new civil protection mechanisms. For the 
developing countries this second wave meant the establishment of their first 
disaster management agencies. This move was inspired by the new sensibility 
towards the environment, but it also followed the criticism received by the 
national governments for the poor management of big disasters, such as the 
earthquakes in Peru (1970) Nicaragua (1972) and Guatemala (1976) (Coppola 
2006). Or the case of Jamaica that one-year after the devastating floods of June 
1979, established the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Relief 
Coordination (ODIPERC). Similarly, in South East Asia reflections about the 
fact that disasters are not inevitable and that their tragic consequences could be 
mitigated via adequate preparedness and response initiatives started in this 
period. A clear consequence of this new perspective was, for examples, the 
establishment of the Philippines’ National Disaster Coordinating Council in 
1978, or the establishment of the Indonesian BPBP and the Thai National Civil 
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Defence Committee (NCDC) in 1979. 
 
3.1.2 Disaster Management at international level  
The increasing attention given to the management of disasters at national level 
was well reflected in the international debate. The International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) was launched by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1987. On December 22, 1989, the UN Resolution 44/236, 
established the objectives and goals of the IDNDR, which officially started on 1 
January 1990. With the overall objective of ‘reducing through concerted 
international action, especially in developing countries, the loss of life, property 
damage and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters’ (United 
Nations 1989).  
 
The Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World was launched in 
May 1994 during the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction organised 
in Yokohama, Japan. By recognising the increasingly interdependence of the 
world, the strategy called for increasing the partnership among countries, as well 
as to enhance the regional and international cooperation (United Nations 1994). 
Overall, the Yokohama Strategy provided the first global norm on natural 
disaster management.  
 
Building on the lessons learned during the IDNDR decade and the 
implementation of the Yokohama Strategy, the UN launched the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). The new strategy was launched in July 
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1999 in Geneva and it represented a shift in the emphasis from disaster response 
to disaster reduction by encouraging a culture of prevention. The UN Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) was established as the secretariat of the 
International Strategy and mandated by the UN General Assembly to ensure its 
implementation. In 2001 its mandate was expanded to serve as the focal point for 
all disaster risk reduction activities promoted at UN and regional level (United 
Nations 2001).  
 
On 18-22 January 2005 the UN organised in Kobe, Japan the Second World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction. The conference was attended by 168 
governments out of 195 countries and produced the Hyogo Framework for 
Action. The 10-years framework set the initiatives to substantially reduce losses 
in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and 
countries by 2015 (HFA 2005). The Kobe World Conference represents the 
moment in which the world not only recognizes the importance of disaster 
management globally, but it also makes it a top priority of the international 
policy agenda. After ten years, the pivotal role of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action was recognized. The HFA was instrumental in raising public and 
institutional awareness, and in generating political commitment and support to 
actions implemented by a wide range of stakeholders (SFA 2015). 
 
Ten years after the launch of the Hyogo Framework, the Third World Conference 
on Disaster Risk Reduction was organised by the UN in Sendai, Japan on March 
2015. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was 
adopted as the new 15-years plan outlining the new global priorities on disaster 
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management. The priorities outlined in the new Sendai Framework focus on the 
need to further reduce the exposure and vulnerability of population, in particular 
by enhancing the resilient capacities. If the Hyogo Framework link disaster 
management with development, the Sendai Framework asked for more dedicated 
actions to tackle the root causes of the dramatic effects of disasters on the 
population, such as poverty and inequality, climate change, unplanned and rapid 
urbanization and poor land management. The role of international and regional 
cooperation in supporting States’ initiatives was confirmed a priority for the 
framework. Yet, the need to strength and further developed these instruments 
was set as one of the Sendai’s priority.  
 
In summary, the recognition of disaster management as a global norm was a 
fundamental step towards the implementation of concrete initiatives both at local, 
as well as at regional level. The initial focus on disaster response slowly shifted 
to a culture more focused on prevention and resilience as more effective ways to 
reduce losses in lives and assets. The global discussion on the need to better 
coordinate the management of disaster concluded by identifying regional 
organizations among the best available institutions to enhance the coordination 
among states. In the years that followed several emerging regional organisations 
started a discussion about the regional coordination of disaster as a way to 
sustain affected member state(s). 
3.1.3 Disaster Management at regional level 
The international initiatives to promote disaster management as a global priority 
were accompanied by a range of regional initiatives. The need to develop the 
disaster management cooperation at regional level was already set in the 
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Yokohama Strategy as a key element to enhance the capacity of states to better 
respond to disasters. The need to create and reinforce regional mechanisms to 
manage disasters was also a priority for the Hyogo Framework. Even more, the 
attention to regional organisations as key institutions enhancing the capacity to 
prevent and respond are reinforced in the Sendai Framework. Initiatives to 
implement regional policies do deal with disasters have been implemented by 
various regions in the world, with different level of integration. Overall, disasters 
and crises of all types, like floods, hurricanes, earthquakes and conflicts, affect 
all regions of the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that regional cooperation 
on disaster management has advanced globally.  
 
Among others, the Governments of the Caribbean have recognised the 
importance of implementing a regional cooperation on disaster management 
already in 1973. The Treaty of Chaguaramas, establishing the CARICOM, 
included disaster risk management as one of the key pillars of the cooperation 
(Kirton 2013). In 1991 the first regional inter-governmental agency for disaster 
management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established. The 
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), was renamed in 
2009 CDEMA (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency) to cover 
not only the response to disasters, but all phases of the management (CDEMA 
2017). Initiatives advanced also in the African continent. Africa not only is 
confronted with extreme weather conditions, such as excessive rainfall, severe 
windstorm and heat-wave, but African countries are also located in a area that is 
more and more vulnerable to the impact of natural disasters (UNISDR 2017). 
Yet, the development of disaster management policies at regional level has 
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slowly progressed. ECOWAS disaster management initiatives have been driven 
mainly by the aim of fulfilling its peace and security mandate, by including the 
management of the humanitarian consequences of conflicts. In December 2003 
the 51st ECOWAS Council of Ministers established a Technical Committee on 
Disaster Management. In 2010 ECOWAS launched a 4 years strategic 
programme to develop and strengthen the response of the regions to extreme 
weather conditions, as well as to follow the objective of the Hyogo Framework 
(UNECA 2015). Yet, five years later ECOWAS disaster management experts 
noted that only a few ECOWAS member states have dedicated National Disaster 
Management Institutions. Therefore, in October 2015 ECOWAS Ministers 
adopted a 15 pages Model for the member states’ adoption of National Disaster 
Management Agencies (NDMA). According to the model Member States are 
expected to establish a National Disaster Management Agency in their respective 
states within two years (ECOWAS 2015). 
 
The European Union, facing both natural and man-made crises, is one of the 
most developed regional organisations in terms of its response system. At the EU 
level different instruments have been put into place to provide a better response. 
Starting with the 2001 Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which was 
revised after the 2004 tsunami and then again after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. All 28 EU member states are part of the mechanism, as are 
Iceland, Norway, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (since 2012), 
Montenegro (since 2014), as well as Serbia and Turkey (since 2015). Since 2013 
the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) coordinates the 
mechanism from Brussels and it is 24/7 operational. The ERCC monitors the 
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situation and it matches countries’ requests and offers for assistance. Since 2001, 
the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has monitored over 400 disasters and has 
received over 250 requests for assistance. Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the 
consequent launch of the European External Action Service, other instruments 
have been created with the similar objective of supporting a better EU 
coordination in response to man-made and natural disasters.  
 
Finally, Southeast Asia is located in one of the most disaster-prone regions of the 
world. In between two oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and at the cross-road 
of several tectonic plates, the ASEAN region regularly experiences tsunamis, 
floods, volcano eruptions, typhoons, cyclones and earthquakes. Since the 
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 
August 1967, the region has been hit by more than 1550 natural disasters (EM-
DAT 2016). Overall, in the last 50 years more than 460 million people were 
affected, out of which more than 430.000 lost their lives. The total economic 
damage for the same period (1967-2016) is estimated being more than 124 
billion dollars (EM-DAT 2016), which is why since the early days of ASEAN 
establishment, the ASEAN Member States have initiated discussions to enhance 
their disaster management cooperation. A Committee on Disaster Management 
(ACDM) was established in 2003. On 26 July 2005 Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN Member States signed the Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER) with the aim of providing effective 
mechanisms to achieve a reduction of disaster impact and to jointly respond to 
disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional 
and international cooperation. On 17 November 2011, in the framework of the 
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AADMER agreement, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was created. 
 
Overall, all these regional initiatives to coordinate the management of disasters 
reflect the discussion at global level, as well as the recognised need to increase 
the cooperation between states and organizations to effectively respond to crises 
that do not look at political borders. Yet, the ways in which this regional 
coordination was -and is- implemented is different in each region. On one hand, 
it reflects the priority and declared needs of the different member states, with 
some member states more willing than others to partially limit their sovereignty 
in favour of a regional coordination. On the other hand, the ways in which each 
region organise its disaster management policy is also linked with the relations of 
these regions with other countries, as well as regional and international 
organisation. If a growing literature explores these regional initiatives to manage 
disasters from an internal point of view (Coppola 2006; Boin, Ekengren and 
Rhinard 2013; Kirton 2013; Morsut 2014; Rum 2016), the exploration on the 
differences and similarities between these regional institutions, as well as the role 
that other external actors have in influencing the institutionalization process of 
disaster management initiatives in another region is still underdeveloped. For 
example, looking at the EU, in the past fifteen years it has developed a quite 
advanced system to respond to both natural and man-made disasters. This has 
encouraged some scholars (Pennisi di Floristella 2015), as well as some 
practitioners to suggest that the EU could potentially be consider a role model for 
other region interested in implementing a regional system to coordinate the 
management of crisis. Yet, a systematic analysis of the influence of the EU, as 
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well as of the other relevant external actors, on regions such as ASEAN, in the 
field of disaster management is still missing and it will be the contribution of this 
thesis. In the next section the different instruments implemented by the EU to 
better respond to crisis will be introduced to present what is considered to be the 
EU model to respond to crises. 
 
3.2 The evolution of the EU as a crisis manager: a 
relevant actor 
The following section presents the evolution of the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism since its first development in the 1980s, as well as the EEAS Crisis 
Response and Operational Coordination Department, introduced by Catherine 
Ashton following the Haiti disaster in 2010. The aim of this section is to present 
the EU as a relevant actor in the crisis management field. Understanding the 
evolution of the EU as a crisis management actor is important to understand the 
overall contribution of this thesis, which starts from the assumption that the EU 
is a relevant regional actor in crisis management, but aims to assess if this 
relevance was reflected in influencing another regional organisation, namely 
ASEAN. 
3.2.1 The beginning of the European cooperation on Civil Protection 
(1980-2000) 
Civil protection was initially developed in the early 1980s within DG 
Environment as an attempt to manage environmental disasters such as 
earthquakes, fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil spills within Europe. Italy was one 
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of the key drivers of the process. Following the Friuli (1976) and the Irpinia 
(1980) earthquakes, Italy developed its own Civil Protection in 1982 (Strassoldo 
and Boileau 1978; Alexander 2002). Two Italian Commissioners for 
Environment Carlo Scarascia-Mugnozza (1973-1977) and Lorenzo Natali (1977-
1981) actively promoted the creation of an informal group to encourage 
European institutions to discuss civil-protection issues (Wendling 2010). 
Following these initiatives (European Commission 1988), the foundations of the 
European civil protection cooperation laid in the ministerial meeting held in 
Rome in May 1985 promoted by Giuseppe Zamberletti, the first Italian Minister 
for the Civil Protection (1981-82 and 1984-87).  
 
The Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards set the responsibility of EU member states to ‘ensure the safety on their 
territory (in the home, at the workplace, etc.) of persons, domestic animals and 
goods, or the respect of other essential protection requirements in the general 
interest such as health, consumer or environmental protection etc’. (European 
Council 1985). 
 
Between 1987 and 1994, six resolutions operationalized the European regional 
cooperation by implementing instruments to prepare for and respond to different 
types of disasters (Morsut 2014). In 1987, the Council invited the Commission to 
finalize within six months a ‘Guide to Civil Protection in the European 
Community’ with the help of a committee of experts from the EU member states. 
The main aim of the 1987 Guide was to map the existing instruments at member 
states level by creating a list of liaison officers, but it also encouraged member 
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states to share information, exchange personnel and promote joint trainings 
(European Council 1987). Overall, the 1987 resolution represented the starting 
point of a more coordinated management of crisis at European level. Several 
initiatives were proposed and in 1988 the Commission created a new budget 
heading with an initial allocation of 500.000 ECU to support these initiatives 
(European Commission 1988). The 1989 resolution focused on the integration by 
tasking the Commission to compile a multilingual glossary to facilitate the 
exchange among different national civil protection offices and to encourage 
member states to create a single national number for emergencies. The 1990 
resolution, promoted by the Italian Presidency of the European Council in 
September 1990 (European Council 1990b), focused on drafting an agreement 
for the mutual cooperation in the event of natural or technological disaster. It 
started by discussing the possibility to create an advanced telecommunications 
system to meet civil protection requirements coming from EU member states 
(European Council 1990b). The 1991 resolution focused on improving the 
mutual aid between European member states and set some of the elements of the 
future Civil Protection mechanism (European Council 1991). The 1994 
resolution was already focused on strengthening the member states cooperation 
on civil protection. The joint European exercise organised in 1993 (Europe 93) 
reiterated the need to improve the communication among national focal points as 
a mean to strengthen the cooperation. The 1994 resolution followed the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty (November 1993). The Article 3 of the 1957 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), was 
emended by the Treaty of Maastricht which not only introduced the European 
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Community (EC), but it also listed, for the first time, civil protection as one of 
the activity of the newly created European Community. 
 
In December 1997 a Council Decision established the Community action 
programme in the field of civil protection (European Council 1997a). The 
programme was initially set for two years (1 January 1988 – 31 December 1999) 
and then prolonged for other five years (2000-2004) (European Council 
1999a)and finally extended for an extra year until 20 December 2004. The 
programme set four priority areas for the cooperation both in terms of 
preparedness and response (Article 3). In terms of prevention, the priority was to 
both decrease the risks and damages to persons, environments and properties. In 
terms of preparedness, the aim was to professionalize the expertise on civil 
protection at member states level.  In terms of response, the programme 
encouraged pilot projects to improve the techniques and methods of response. In 
terms of awareness, the programme insisted on the engagement with the public, 
helping citizens to learn how to best protect themselves. The programme also 
established the first committee composed of representatives of the member states 
(Article 4). In the incoming years the Committee on Civil Protection Issues 
(ProCiv) played an instrumental role in overseeing the Commission work 
(Morsut 2014).  
 
3.2.2 The development of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
(2001-2004) 
The already existing marine pollution framework inspired the evolution from 
cooperation among states to the creation of a regional mechanism. Indeed, the 
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concept of Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) was mainly 
developed by officials from DG Environment previously involved in the 
production of the marine pollution framework in a case of isomorphism 
(Wendling 2010). In March 1978 the Amco Cadiz incidents on the costs of 
France resulted in a large oil spill disaster. This incident triggered the creation of 
an action programme on the control and reduction of pollution caused by 
hydrocarbons discharged at sea (European Council 1978). In December 1999, the 
Erika cargo incident happened on the costs of France, accelerating the setting up 
of a community framework of cooperation in marine pollution for the period 1 
January 2000-31 December 2006 (European Council 2000). The framework on 
marine pollution already introduced elements that were then reproduced by the 
CCPM, such as the need of sharing information, of implementing an instrument 
to coordinate the response from different member states and of sharing national 
expertise.  
 
It was only in 2001 that the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) 
was officially established. The 9/11 attacks accelerated an already on-going 
process. The 2001 Council Decision (European Council 2001a) created a 
mechanism to facilitate and reinforce the cooperation in civil protection 
assistance interventions among EU member states. The aim of the instrument 
was ‘to provide, on request, support in the event of such emergencies and to 
facilitate improved coordination of assistance intervention provided by the 
Member States and the Community, taking into account the special needs of the 
isolated, outermost and other regions or islands of the Community’. The CCPM 
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was set to respond both inside and outside the EU, and to both natural and man-
made disasters.  
 
The 2003 Decision (European Commission 2003a) further institutionalized the 
CCPM and established the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) and a 
Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS).  The 
MIC represented the main coordination hub of the CCPM by matching the 
request coming from any affected countries (outside and inside the mechanism) 
with the offer of assistance put forward by participating states. It also acted as a 
centre for collecting and sharing up to date information of on-going crisis. The 
2003 Decision also set up training programme covering civil protection 
assistance interventions and clarified the procedure to respond inside and outside 
EU borders. The civil protection unit of DG Environment was in charge of 
managing the MIC. The Between 2002 and 2007 the CCPM was used to respond 
to different types of crisis. Starting with the floods in Czech Republic (August 
2002), following with the Prestige oil spill in Spain (November 2002) and 
continuing with the floods in France (December 2003) and in Romania and 
Bulgaria (May 2005), the forest fires in Portugal (Summer 2003, 2004 and 2005) 
and Greece (Summer 2007). Outside EU the mechanism was also activated to 
respond to disasters, such as the earthquakes in Algeria (May 2003), Iran 
(December 2003), Morocco (February 2004) and Pakistan (October 2005), and 
the Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) and Rita (September 2005) in the United 




3.2.3 The Community Civil Protection Mechanism in the post-tsunami 
(2004-2009) 
In 2004 the MIC was activated in response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
(European Commission 2005e). The first request for assistance arrived from Sri 
Lanka, and was followed by requests from Thailand, Indonesia and the Maldives. 
The MIC remained active until the second half of January 2005 matching offers 
to needs, facilitating the assistance coming from participating countries and 
providing information on the situation on the ground. Overall, the 2004 Tsunami 
represented the first unprecedented disaster that saw the involvement of the 
CCPM (European Commission 2004) with 230.000 human losses, out of which 
around 1.400 Europeans mainly from Sweden, Finland, the UK and Germany 
(Niederlaender 2006), and economic damages estimated at more than 10 billion 
US dollars (UNISDR 2009).  
 
The 2004 Tsunami represented a political momentum for the CCPM. During the 
extraordinary Council meeting in January 2005 (European Council 2005b), the 
need to reinforce the mechanism was recognised. Following the political 
decision, the EU Commission produced three documents that push the 
institutionalization of the CCPM further5. In the EU Council held in December 
2005 the three initiatives were welcomed and the Commission was tasked to 
‘submit as soon as possible, and at the latest by October 2005, further legislative 
proposals for improving civil protection cooperation’ (European Council 2005a). 
                                               
5 I. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness 
Instrument for Major Emergencies, 6 April 2005, Reference No. COM (2005) 113 final. II. Commission 
Communication on Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, 20 April 2005, Reference No. 
COM (2005) 137. III. Commission Communication Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in Third 
Countries, 20 April 2005, Reference No. COM (2005) 153 final. 
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The 2004 tsunami showed how the European response was still based on a mix 
of multilateral and bilateral arrangements. The CCPM was more perceived as 
‘enabler’ then ‘driver’ of the EU response, the light coordination role was 
leavening space for duplication and confusion and the assistance offered not 
always matched the needs of the recipients (Ekengren et al. 2006).  
 
These identified gaps in the EU response to the 2004 tsunami triggered the 
proposal to reform the 2001 Council Decision presented by the Commission in 
January 2006 (European Commission 2006). The civil protection was high in the 
political debate at that time. In January 2006, the Barroso Commission and the 
Austrian Presidency tasked Michel Barnier, former Commissioner on regional 
policy and former French minister of European and Foreign Affairs, to examine 
the EU’s ability to manage large-scale crises. The famous Barnier report (2006) 
and its propositions for the development of cooperation on civil protection within 
the EU were presented in May 2006 and discussed by the EU Parliament. In 
November 2007 the Council adopted the revised version of the 2001 Council 
Decision (European Council 2007a). In the revised Decision on the Community 
Civil Protection Mechanism the new tasks assigned to the commission were 
clearly divided between preparedness and response. In terms of preparedness 
initiatives such as reinforcing the sharing of information and communication 
system (MIC and CECIS) among member states, developing an early warning 
system and setting up training were included. The response was left in the hands 
of the participating states and the role assigned to the Commission was mainly to 
assure the coordination, while avoiding overlaps. Interestingly enough the new 
Council decision also recognised the UN as the overall coordinator for relief in 
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third countries, while the CCPM should ensure the effectiveness, coherence and 
complementarity of the Community response.  
 
3.2.4 The post-Lisbon EU Civil Protection Mechanism (since 2009) 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and after the Commission’s 
reorganization that followed (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), the Civil 
Protection Mechanism moved under the former European Community 
Emergency Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). Created in 1992 under the 
auspices of Commissioner Bonino, ECHO was renamed in February 2010 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis 
Response broadening de-facto its scopes and dimensions. With the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty, decisions on civil protection issues started to be taken by 
qualified majority, and not as previously by consensus. Since 2012, the aim of 
the civil protection component of ECHO is to act as a coordination mechanism to 
respond, both inside and outside the EU, to all types of natural and man-made 
crises. It is used by member states to ask for and receive assistance in the case of 
an emergency. This assistance might be provided in the form of equipment 
and/or personnel.  
 
In 2009, Kristalina Georgieva took over as Commissioner for International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response and in 2010, the civil 
protection and its Mechanism were transferred under DG ECHO in an attempt to 
exploit synergies between humanitarian aid and civil protection and enhance the 
coherence of EU response operations. Since then, Civil protection has become a 
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formal shared policy area governed by article 196 of TFEU, meaning that the 
European Commission is given the competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate and complement actions undertaken by the Member States, while the 
Member States continue to exercise their policies at national level.  
 
The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in these two areas meant 
organisational changes in the structure of DG ECHO. During Georgieva’s office 
(2009–2014) the main challenge for DG ECHO was represented by the EU’s 
quest for more coherence with the risk to subordinate the humanitarian 
imperative to overriding security, development, and trade goals (Orbie and del 
Biondo 2015). In particular regarding the security component, the battle of DG 
ECHO to prove its legitimacy was a fight at the leadership, institutional and 
instruments levels (Tercovich 2018). 
 
The Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council No 1313/2013/EU 
on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism in December 2013 and the respective 
Implementing Decision further developed the Mechanism into a comprehensive 
framework for European cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness and 
response. 
 
The EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 
The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) was established in 2013 
and it upgrades the functions of the previous Monitoring and Information Centre 
(MIC), created in 2001. The ERCC operates within the European Commission's 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) -re-named in 2014 
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‘Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management’-. The ERCC was set up to support a 
coordinated and quicker response to disasters both inside and outside Europe 
using resources from 31 countries participating in the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism6. The participating states pool resources that can be made available 
to disaster-hit countries and share best practices in disaster management. The 
ERCC is operational on a 24/7 (European Commission 2016b). 
 
It collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, monitors hazards, 
prepares plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment, and works 
with Member States to map available assets and coordinate the EU’s disaster 
response efforts by matching offers of assistance to the needs of the disaster-
stricken country. The ERCC also supports a wide range of prevention and 
preparedness activities, from awareness rising to field exercises simulating 
emergency response. Overall, the ERCC provides civil protection assets made 
available by the participating states. It acts as a coordination hub between 
participating states, the affected country and dispatched field experts. Any 
country inside or outside the EU affected by a major disaster can make an appeal 
for assistance through the ERCC. In response, the ERCC matches offers of 
assistance with the needs of the disaster-stricken country. 
3.2.5 The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Department as a post-Lisbon competitor 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 brought significant changes in 
the development of the EU crisis management capacity. The pillar division (the 
                                               
6 The 28 EU Member States, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, 
Serbia and Turkey. 
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supranational Community; and the two intergovernmental pillars ESDP and 
Police and Juridical Cooperation) established in the Treaty of Maastricht 
disappeared. This had direct influence on the coordination of crisis management, 
as the creation in 2010 of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Department (CR&OC) within the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The department was created by the former High Representative Catherine 
Ashton with the aim of assuring an effective horizontal Comprehensive 
Approach (Sherriff 2013; Wilton Park 2012) in responding to natural and man-
made crises, by involving both Member States’ representatives and EU 
institutions services in order to ensure an efficient information flow between 
them. Following the heavily fragmented and delayed response of the EU to the 
Haiti Earthquake in 2010, Ashton decided that more rapidly deployable 
capacities were needed within the EEAS to address similar crises in the future. 
She appointed Agostino Miozzo, a medical doctor by training with a 30-year 
career in various humanitarian and crisis response assignments within the Italian 
Civil Protection Department, as Managing Director of the CR&OC (Tercovich 
2014).  
 
The EEAS Crisis Platform 
Among the different instruments developed within the department, the creation 
of the EEAS Crisis Platform has been significant. This Platform is a flexible and 
agile institutional coordination arrangement activated during the outbreak of an 
acute crisis in order to coordinate all relevant EU actors and to provide a clear 
political or strategic objective for the management of a given crisis, including 
guidelines and assessment of constraints to, and needs for, planning. In times of 
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acute crisis, it brings together all major actors across Council and Commission 
institutions dealing with security-related policies, in particular CSDP institutions, 
such as the EU Military Staff, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, the 
Civilian Planning Conduct and Capability as well as EEAS geographical desks 
and Commission-led institutions, such as DG ECHO, DG Development and 
Cooperation and DG HOME. This cooperation represents the most far-reaching 
institutionalized tool for inter-institutional coordination and information 
exchange; it also places the CR&OC and EEAS firmly at the forefront of the 
management of crisis (Tercovich 2014). 
 
First, activated during the Libyan crisis in 2011, the Crisis Platform has become 
a key EU’s instrument to manage crises. The success of this instrument is 
testified by its survival to the change of management. With the appointment of 
Federica Mogherini as High Representative/Vice President, the Crisis Response 
Department gained even more centrality in the EEAS structure. The department, 
led initially by the Italian medical doctor Agostino Miozzo (2010-2014) as 
Managing Director, is now led by Pedro Serrano, a EU official with a long work 
experience within different EU foreign policy department (CSDP, delegation, 
etc.). While the first one was directly responding to HR/VP Ashton, but without 
a formal authority over the CSDP structure, the current Deputy Secretary 
General for CSDP and Crisis Response Serrano is directly responsible for all 
crisis management instruments within the EEAS: Security and Conflict 
Prevention, EU intelligence and Situation Centre, Crisis Management and 




The EEAS Situation Room, SitRoom 
The EU Situation Room mainly supports the EEAS’s Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination Department (CR&OC) and the activity of the Crisis 
Platform7.  The civil-military ‘EU Situation Room’ is 24/7 operational. The aim 
of the Situation Room is to act as the EEAS switchboard for all information 
provided by EU actors, including EU delegations, member states, EU CSDP 
operations, and missions as well as information coming from other regional and 
international organizations. 
 
The EU Situation Room was formally established on 15 June 2010 by merging 
elements of the EU Situation Centre, the watch-keeping capability, the former 
Commission RELEX Crisis Room, and the Council Crisis Coordination 
Arrangements (CCA) team. Back in 2010, it already represented a certain level 
of integration from previously autonomous departments dealing with situational 
awareness and crisis information analysis. On 18 July 2011 the former HR 
Ashton inaugurated the new EU SitRoom and placed it under the overall 
responsibility of the newly created position of Managing Director for Crisis 
Response and Operational Coordination (MD CR&OC) (Tercovich 2014).  
 
The aim of the EU SitRoom, as implemented by MD CR&OC Miozzo in 20128, 
was to ensure to the High Representative, the EEAS and other EU actors 
                                               
7  The EEAS Crisis Platform is a flexible institutional coordination arrangement activated during the 
outbreak of an acute crisis in order to coordinate all relevant EU actors and to provide ‘a clear political or 
strategic objective for the management of a given crisis, including guidelines and assessment of constraints 
to, and needs for, planning’ (Tercovich 2014).  
8 Since the arrival of the new HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2014 and the nomination of Pedro Serrano as 
Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and crisis response, the CR&OC Department has been restructured and 
integrated within the CSDP and Conflict Prevention structures. The EU Situation Room has been 
incorporated to the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre. 
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(European Commission, General Secretariat of the Council, EU Agencies, 
Member States, etc.) a continuous support through continuous worldwide 
situation monitoring, primarily based on information available in the public 
domain (open source information).  By being the main EU focal entry point of 
information, the three main priorities of the EU SitRoom in face of a particular 
external situation were: (1) To protect EEAS staff, assets, and interests by 
ensuring that the lines of communication and command would be activated for 
proper action and provide situational awareness for events and situations 
potentially affecting EU Delegations and EU CSDP Missions and Operations; (2) 
Use the information collected to support more detailed analysis; (3) to ensure 
operational liaison and international cooperation with dedicated crisis structures 
from Member States, International Organisations and Third Countries. 
 
In 2012 the EU SitRoom was working under the Standard Operating Procedures 
(SoPs) that divided the work between three main operational structures (for a 
total of four teams) mirroring the three main priorities outlined before (support to 
CSDP Operations and EU Delegations, monitoring relevant political and security 
events, and cooperation with member States and other organisations) (EEAS 
2012). 
 
First, the function of Monitoring 24/7 CSDP Missions and Operations, as well as 
of acting as a switchboard for EU Delegations was carried on by two Duty 
Teams, working 24/7 under the authority of the Head of the Watch Keeping 
Capability of the EUMS. The first Duty Team was in charge of monitoring all 
CSDP Missions/ Operations and EUSRs activities, mainly supervising civilian 
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and military CSDP Missions/Operations, EUSRs, and EEAS staff travelling on 
missions in crisis areas from a duty of care perspective. The second Duty Team 
was in charge of all staff and assets of EU Delegations, with the aim of 
immediately alert the Security Directorate for security related issues. The tasks 
related to EU Delegations were limited to a switchboard function with a single 
phone number.  
 
Second, the function of Monitoring 24/7 Relevant Political and Security Events, 
and support EEAS Senior Officials, was carried on by another Duty Team 
working 24/7 to provide timely, relevant information regarding worldwide major 
political and security events, focusing on priority and crisis areas, acting as an 
alerting body, and providing communications support to HR and EEAS Senior 
Officials. Members of this team were also expected to be deployed in crisis areas 
to ensure communications support. In case of crisis, they were expected to 
inform the Crisis Response Planning and operations division, who will 
coordinate the elaboration of Country Fact Sheets and the necessary support to 
the Crisis Platform.  
 
Third, the function of Ensuring Operational Liaison and International 
Cooperation was carried on by a section operating on office hours, but on call in 
case of major crisis. The main task of this section was the promotion of relations 
with crisis centres of EU Member States, Third Countries, and International, 
Regional, and Non-governmental Organizations. The Section was also the focal 




In case of crisis (both identified in Brussels or reported by a Delegation) the duty 
officers in charge of the 24/7 monitoring in Brussels were expected to classify 
the crisis according to an event matrix: Negligible - Low –Medium – High – 
Critical. Three different call lists were set according to the classification and type 
of event (Negligible-Low, Medium, and High-Critical). Although the duty 
officers of the SitRoom were expected to call directly the MD CR&OC in case of 
incident, events ranked from Negligible to Medium do not necessarily led to the 
information of top managers and to the HR/VP. On the other hand, for events 
considered High or Critical (Major event or issue considered to be of high or 
exceptional importance; events likely to have significant media impact), the 
direct call list of level 3 was activated, either by SMS or direct call (EEAS 2012).  
 
The Consular Crisis Coordination  
The EU member states acknowledged the importance of strengthening their 
cooperation in consular protection and assistance during crisis with the Article 20 
of the Treaty of Maastricht: 
 
(Art.20) Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled 
to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on 
the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall establish 
the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations 




The 1995 Council Decision (European Commission 1995) provided the 
necessary legal framework, clarifying the conditions under which the protection 
should be issued and the practicalities of the support. Since then several large-
scale crises triggered the cooperation forward. The 2004 South East Asia 
Tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 2006 Lebanon crisis, the 2011 
earthquake in Haiti and the 2011 Japan nuclear disaster in Japan 2011 were 
instrumental in developing non-binding guidelines to facilitate the cooperation. 
Already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU consular crisis 
coordination implemented different tools in all stages of the crisis. In the 
prevention phase the cooperation mainly focuses on the exchange of travel 
advices. Each member state produces its own travel advices on countries in crisis 
providing advices that range from act with caution in the country, avoid travel to 
certain areas, avoid travel completely and leave the country immediately. The 
language as well as the advices varies among EU member states, yet a webpage 
has been created to keep all EU member states updated on the changes in travel 
advices triggered by one or the other member states. The tools developed within 
the preparation phase are mainly focus on sharing information and develop 
contingency plans that include the protection and evacuation of all EU citizens, 
including the one without consular representation in the country. The 
contingency plan includes the designation of the ‘Lead State’ in charge of 
coordinating the EU consular response. The response phase is driven by the 
Presidency, which coordinate the information sharing on the actions promoted by 
the EU member states to protect their citizens, both at capital level, as well as on 




3.2.6 The EU as a multifaceted, complex and evolving crisis manager 
This section was dedicated to present the EU as a relevant actor in crisis 
management. It shows as the EU system to manage crises has profoundly 
evolved in the past years. Starting with the initial cooperation of the 1980s, 
moving to the first Community Civil Protection Mechanism implemented in 
2001 and then revised following the reforms triggered by the 2004 Tsunami and 
finally presenting the EU Civil Protection Mechanism as a post-Lisbon 
instrument under the coordination of DG ECHO. The numerous components and 
revisions that contributed to the building up of the EU mechanism to respond to 
crisis are complex and not easy to navigate, a product of years of negotiations 
among EU member states. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, 
Catherine Ashton added a new component to the EU system to respond to crises: 
the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department. Overall, 
the multifaceted, complex and evolving model developed by the EU is not easy 
to understand and even more complicated to replicate.  
 
After presenting the EU as a crisis management actor, the following section will 
start by introducing the inter-regional relation between the EU and ASEAN in 
the field of crisis management. As this research aims to explore the role played 
by the EU in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management by also 
looking at the other relevant actors, after presenting the main steps of the 
ASEAN-EU cooperation, the section will continue by introducing the other 
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ASEAN dialogue partners cooperating with ASEAN in the field of disaster 
management, meaning Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US9. 
 
3.3 ASEAN strategic partnerships in disaster 
management 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 
by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Other five 
countries joint the regional association in the following years: Brunei in 1984, 
Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Yet, 
already the ASEAN at five recognised the importance of establishing a friendly 
and mutually beneficial dialogue with external partners. In fact, since the mid-
70s the ASEAN Foreign Ministers conferred the status of Dialogue Partner to the 
external partners with whom they wanted deeper relations. The initial goals of 
the ASEAN founding members’ external relations were to secure technical 
assistant for regional cooperation projects; to promote trade and economic 
relations; and to strengthen political relations with third countries and regional 
groupings. Based on these aims the first wave of Dialogue Partners started with 
Australia in 1974 and included in the following years also New Zealand (1975) 
and Japan (started in 1973 and formalised in 1977), as well as the United States, 
Canada and the European Union (1977) which were ASEAN’s major trading 
partners. Following the end of the Cold War and the consequent move to a 
multipolar world, ASEAN included among its dialogue partners also South 
                                               
9 The other ASEAN Dialogue partners, meaning Canada (1977), Republic of Korea (1991), Pakistan (1993), 
India (1995), China (1996), Russia (1996), Norway (2015), Switzerland (1996) did not have disaster 
management among the area of their cooperation with ASEAN during the analyze period (1967-2016). 
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Korea, India, China and Russia. Progressively, with the reinforcement of 
ASEAN the relationship with its dialogue partners has moved from a donor-
client relation to a more balanced cooperation (Pushpanathan 2003). As we will 
see in the following section, disaster management has increasingly become an 
issue for discussion and an area in which foster the cooperation.  
 
3.3.1 The European Union 
ASEAN & EU interregional cooperation: an overview 
The EU has been sometimes perceived as an anti-model of regional integration 
for ASEAN (Yeo 2010; Ba, Kuik, and Sudō 2016). Yet, informal contacts were 
established between the European Economic Community (EEC) and ASEAN 
already in 1972. In July 1977 the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting 
formalised the relation by agreeing that the EEC was among the partners with 
whom to consolidate and expand a formal cooperation in July 1977 (ASEAN 
1977) The ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement was focused on commercial, 
economic and development cooperation and it was signed in March 1980. In the 
first phase of the ASEAN-EU cooperation the main focus was on enhancing the 
dialogue on trade and investments and to negotiate a bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with ASEAN member states.  
 
After 40 years the areas of cooperation expanded considerably in all three 
domains of ASEAN Communities. Since the 1980s the ASEAN-EU partnership 
has grown and is considered thoroughly multi-layered and comprehensive. In the 
ASEAN Economic Community, issues such as internal markets, customs, 
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standards, statistics, trade liberations and energy are at the core of the EU-
ASEAN cooperation. In the ASEAN Political-Security Community the relatively 
recent cooperation between the two regional organisations covers areas such as 
border management, confidence building, international peace and mediation, 
parliamentarian diplomacy and asymmetric risks. Within the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community ASEAN-EU cooperation includes issues such as education, 
biodiversity, media, climate change, science and technology, as well as relief and 
disaster management.  
 
The two regional organisations’ highest-level meeting is the biennial ASEAN-
EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) where the strategic priorities are discussed, 
and projects of cooperation are developed. Other area-specific dialogues take 
place annually (Khandekar 2015).  Since 2012, there has been an increase in 
high-level bilateral visits and the initiation and completion of various agreements 
between the EU and ASEAN member countries (EEAS official 2017a). The 20th 
EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held on 23 July 2014 under the theme of 
“Towards Strategic Partnership for Peace, Stability and Prosperity”.  
 
 EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management 
Despite South-East Asia having one of the highest levels of vulnerability to 
disasters in the world, it was only in 2007 and following the tragedy of the 2004 
Tsunami, that disaster management officially become one of the areas of 
cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. Disaster management was not 
included in the 1980 Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN, in the 2001 
Commission’s Communication “Europe and Asia” (European Commission 2001) 
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and in the 2003 Communication on a “New Partnership with South East Asia” 
which sets out a comprehensive strategy for future European Union (EU) 
relations with the region and which outlined specific sectors in which the 
cooperation between the two regions could be reinforced, namely issues related 
to economic and trade, justice and home affairs, environment, science & 
technology, research & development, higher education and culture, energy, 
transport, information society and statistics (European Commission 2003b). 
Indeed, the EU mechanism of Civil Protection was still moving its first steps and 
was not (yet) considered the successful instrument that it is now.  
 
Although not initially listed among the strategic areas of EU-ASEAN 
cooperation, disaster management was part of the EU initiatives in the South-
East Asia region under the development and humanitarian aid umbrella. The 
initial legal framework for these initiatives was provided by the 1996 Council 
Regulation 1257 (European Commission 1996). By outlining the aims and 
objectives of the European Community’s Humanitarian Aid, stated that ECHO’s 
activities in the field of Disaster Preparedness shall be ‘to ensure preparedness 
for risks of natural disasters or comparable circumstances and use a suitable 
rapid early-warning and intervention system’. In this framework the European 
Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) initiated in 1996 the Disaster 
Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) program targeting Central Asia, the Andean 
Community, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, as well as South 
and East Asia. This initiative was part of Commissioner Bonino’s strategy to 




Overall, the DIPECHO program in South East Asia started in 1998 by 
sponsoring short-term projects targeting Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. Since 2001, the ASEAN regional disaster 
management was mainly targeted with the launch of the Partnerships for Disaster 
Reduction – South East Asia (PDR-SEA) project. Overall, the DIPECHO 
program could be seen as the vehicle used by the EU to act as a leader or as a 
reference by influencing ASEAN via socialization and persuasion, but also as a 
sponsor, via resource dependences, or implementer via copy and emulation (see 
Chapter 2).   
 
For around ten years the EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster related issue was 
limited to the DIPECHO programme. It was only in December 2004, with the 
9.15 magnitude earthquake, which triggered the Indian Ocean tsunami, that the 
EU started paying more attention to the management of disasters in South East 
Asia. The 2004 Tsunami affected both regions. Four ASEAN member states 
(Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar) were severely hit with 230.000 
human losses and an economic damage estimated by UNISDR at more than 10 
billion US dollars, and over 1400 Europeans lost their lives in the disaster.  
 
The 2004 Tsunami represented a critical juncture for both the EU and ASEAN 
ways of dealing with crisis and disasters. At EU level, as presented in the 
previous section, it pushes the further institutionalization of the community 
instruments, and in particular the Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
(CCPM). At ASEAN level the Indian Ocean Tsunami acted as an accelerator for 
the adoption of the AADMER agreement, as it will be discussed in the next 
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chapter. Yet, the initial European and ASEAN Leaders’ reaction to the 2004 
Tsunami focused more on the importance of strengthening the respective 
regional cooperation and not much attention was given to the potentials for the 
EU-ASEAN cooperation. A Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of 
Earthquake and Tsunami was held immediately after the disaster on 6 January 
2005 in Jakarta (ASEAN 2004). The ASEAN Heads of State and Government 
committed to strengthen the coordination and cooperation among ASEAN 
countries and to finalize a regional mechanism on disaster prevention, mitigation 
and response, and to accelerate the creation of the AHA Centre. Immediately 
after the Tsunami, European Leaders expressed their support, mainly in terms of 
financial aid, to the ASEAN population with EC President Barroso speaking at 
the January Special ASEAN Summit (European Commission 2005c). At the end 
of the month the December Tsunami was used to urge the reinforcement of the 
existing EU instruments, such as the ECHO emergency response centre and the 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism (European Commission 2005d).  
 
Only two months after the Tsunami, the 15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation 
Committee was held in Jakarta on February 2005, followed in March by the 15th 
ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meeting. The outcome of both meetings was an 
endorsement to the new European Commission’s strategy ‘On A New 
Partnership with Southeast Asia’ published in July 2003 and the opportunity to 
enhance their commitment ‘through a more comprehensive and balanced agenda’ 
(ASEAN 2005b). Although disaster management was not mentioned in the joint 
statements and in the partnerships’ strategy as a potential area of cooperation, the 
Minister left the door open ‘to work out necessary practical arrangement in order 
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to further strengthen and to reinvigorate the ASEAN-EU process’ (European 
Commission 2005a).  
 
In March 2005 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, visited Indonesia to attend the 
ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers Meeting (AEMM). The visit was the opportunity 
to discuss how to intensify the cooperation in other areas different from trade. In 
her speech she referred to the tsunami and the support pledged by the EU, but 
when mentioning potential area of cooperation disaster management was not 
listed despite the existing cooperation (European Commission 2005b), showing 
how DG Relex did still not perceive disaster management as a potential area of 
cooperation. Overall, the 2004 Tsunami triggered a reflection on the possibility 
to enhance the EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation in disaster management. 
Yet, it took three more years to include disaster management among the non-
trade strategic areas of cooperation between the two regions.  
 
It was the Nuremberg Declaration on ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership signed 
at the 16th Ministerial Meeting on 15 March 2007, which firstly mentioned 
disaster management as an area of cooperation between ASEAN and EU. The 
two regional organisations committed in ‘cooperate at regional and global levels 
on disaster management including supporting the ASEAN Regional Programme 
on Disaster Management and foster closer cooperation at the regional and global 
levels on disaster management, preparedness, mitigation and emergency 




In the 70 million Euros Plan of Action (European Commission 2007) for the 
period 2007-2012 that followed the Nuremberg Declaration disaster management 
and emergency response were identified as one of the key priorities within the 
Socio-Cultural pillar of the cooperation. The focus of the cooperation was on 
improving the information sharing and the exchange of know-how, as well as in 
assisting ASEAN in ‘accelerat[ing] the implementation of the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), 
especially on risk identification, assessment and monitoring, prevention and 
mitigation, disaster preparedness, and risk reduction, emergency response, 
rehabilitation, and technical and research cooperation and consider support for 
the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre)’ (European Commission 
2007, para. 4.15) 
 
Since 2007, disaster response was always mentioned as one of the priority area 
of cooperation between the two regions by ministers during the 17th, 18th, 19th 
ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings, respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2012 (Council 
of the EU, 2009; 2010; 2012). Yet, the progresses are mainly mentioned in terms 
of ‘enhanced dialogue’ (European Council 2010b) and ‘share of best practices’ 
(European Commission 2014), suggesting for the EU the role of leader of 
reference, via socialization and persuasion of goals and norms and instruments.  
 
On 27 April 2012 the EU and ASEAN adopted the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan 
for Action (2013-2017). The EU-ASEAN Plan of action still emphasised the 
focus on sharing of experiences and best-practises, raising awareness, as well as 
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support in the  ‘implementation of the Work Programme for the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and 
strengthening of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance 
on disaster management (AHA Centre), through activities such as development 
of a monitoring and evaluation system for AADMER and the Work Programme, 
comparative studies on ASEAN’s and EU’s disaster management set-up, 
knowledge sharing and institutional strengthening, joint exercises, and 
networking among the two regional disaster management mechanisms.’ 
(European Council 2010a, para. 3.3.1) 
 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the creation of the 
European External Action Service and the organizational structural changes that 
followed, EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster management was mainly 
supported by two, almost parallel, initiatives: the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue 
Instrument (READI) and the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme 
(AEEMP).  
 
The Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument READI aimed at supporting the 
policy dialogue of the European Union with ASEAN. ‘The objective of READI 
is to support ASEAN integration through the support of the ASEAN community 
blue prints, drawing on European experience and know-how through sectoral 
policy dialogue and knowledge development, thereby supporting the policy 
development process in non-trade related areas.’ (READI 2017). The 4-years 
initiative has run between 2011 and 2015 with a budget of 4 million euro. 
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READI focused on ten components, one of which was disaster management10. 
The disaster management component of READI focused on two elements. First it 
supported the development of a system to conduct monitoring and evaluation of 
the AADMER Agreement. Second, it sustained the development of a strategy to 
facilitate the exchange of knowledge between ASEAN member states, as well as 
between ASEAN and other regional and national bodies.  
 
The project was managed by the EU Delegation in Jakarta and the ASEAN 
Secretariat, was led by the Spanish Altair Asesores, a consortium of technical 
experts.  In June 2012 a study visit was sponsored by READI. During this 
occasion, the ASEAN ACDM committee’s members together with 
representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre visited the EEAS 
Crisis Response Room, as well as ECHO’s Emergency Response Centre (ERC) 
in June 2012. The visit was organised by the EU and represented the opportunity 
to discuss possible areas of cooperation (AHA Centre 2012, 34). 
 
Overall, two main areas of possible cooperation were identified during this first 
exchange: knowledge-sharing and capacity-building. The main focus of the 
knowledge sharing was for the AHA Centre ‘to learn’ (AHA Centre 2012, 24) 
how the EU manages the information sharing among its member states. The main 
outputs of this exchange would have been the creation of a Manual containing a 
set of procedures for the AHA Centre and its cooperation with National Situation 
                                               
10 Initially four areas of cooperation were identified: Information and Communication 
Technology, Energy, Science & Technology, and Disaster Management. In the following years 
READI added other areas to the cooperation: education, human rights, capacity building, climate 
change, maritime cooperation and election observation. The project managed by the EU 




Rooms. The capacity-building component was focused more on the possibility of 
providing specific trainings and technical assistance within the framework of the 
AHA Centre Work Plan, suggesting for the EU the role of sponsor or even 
implementer. During 2013 the discussion on the implementation of these 
provisions continued. A preliminary meeting to define the joint programme was 
organised in July 2013, together with a Belgium-organised workshop on 
Belgium’s perspective on disaster management.  
 
The ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme (AEEMP) started in 
2013. The project has been funded for three years by the EU Instrument for 
Stability with around € 2.2 million (European Commission 2016a), and 
implemented by EUNIDA, The European Network of Implementing 
Development Agencies. The declared aim was to reinforce the cooperation 
between ASEAN emergency response actors, including the AHA Centre, 
ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member States, as well as connecting them 
with similar EU bodies, namely the EU Emergency Response Coordination 
Centre (ERCC) and the EEAS Situation Room. In particular, as mentioned in the 
AHA Centre Annual Report 2015, ‘among major activities under AEEMP are 
reviews and improvements of the organizational structure and design, strategic 
planning capabilities, as well as guidelines and SOPs of the AHA Centre, 
learning from the regional standby arrangement operation best practices in the 
EU, and enhancing capacity in financial administration in line with the 




The AEEMP ended in October 2016 and was not renewed (ASEAN Secretariat 
2015; EEAS Official 2015). Between March 2013 and June 2014 it supported 
Myanmar to set up a fully equipped crisis response centre, as well as an 
introductory training for 20 police officers. The Myanmar crisis centre was 
inaugurated on 12 June 2014. The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational 
Coordination Department coordinated the implementation of this first part of the 
AEEMP, which saw a limited participation of ECHO, only represented at the 
inauguration by the regional field rapid response coordinator, Bernhard Jaspers 
Faijer. Overall, the initiative towards Myanmar was inspired more by the new bi-
lateral EU-Myanmar phase inaugurated by Catherine Ashton in April 2012, when 
EU sanctions against Myanmar targeting trade, economic and individual were 
suspended (European Council 2017). The necessity of implementing a more 
efficient crisis centre in Myanmar to reinforce the cooperation with the AHA 
Centre was not the main driver behind this part of the project (European 
Commission Official 2017e).  
 
On May 2015 the AEEMP programme funded a study visit in Paris and Brussels 
dedicated to the ASEAN representatives of the National Disaster Management 
Offices (NDMOs), the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre. The one week visit 
(2-8 May) included the French Crisis Centre COGIC, the Paris Fire School, 
several EU Departments, and OECD. It also represented the opportunity for 
ASEAN regional and national representatives to participate in the EU Civil 
Protection Forum. The bi-annual event brings together the European civil 
protection community to discuss the field of disaster risk management, to share 




According to ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Alicia Bala, the declared aim of 
the visit was ‘to gather information about the European emergency management 
set-up and environment in order to identify best practices which can contribute to 
building a better regional emergency management system for ASEAN’ (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2015). One month later, in June 2015, an ASEAN-EU Joint 
Workshop on Regional Emergency Management Mechanisms and Cooperation 
was organised in Jakarta, Indonesia. The workshop followed up on issues and 
questions raised during the ASEAN EU Civil Protection Workshop to Europe in 
May 2015. Although the workshop was attended once again by ASEAN 
representatives of the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs), the 
ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre, the EU was represented only by Stavros 
Petropoulous from the Crisis Response Department of the EU External Action 
Service (EEAS) and Muamar Vebry, from the EU Delegation to ASEAN in 
Jakarta (EEAS 2015).  
 
Overall, the AEEMP project is not considered among the most successful project 
of the EEAS Instrument for Stability (European Commission Official 2017e). Set 
up in Brussels by the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Department, it was not a product resulted from the ASEAN-EU dialogue. The 
AHA Centre had initially a hard time in placing this project in its multi-annual 
planning. Overall, the most successful project was the inauguration of the 
Myanmar crisis Centre, yet it was more driven by a bilateral interest then by the 
genuine will to support the AHA Centre. All other initiatives sponsored by the 
AEEMP project were focused on the exchange of experiences and practices, 
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suggesting the EEAS was keen to play the role of the reference, more than the 
one of leader, sponsor or implementer. Indeed, the AEEMP project was part of 
the quest for legitimacy that characterised the EEAS Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination Department in its first years. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that its main aim was not to give a concrete support to the AHA 
Centre, but more to show the presence of the EEAS Department on the global 
scene of the management of disasters. 
 
In summary, this section showed the evolution of the ASEAN-EU cooperation 
and how the crisis management component became part of the dialogue only few 
years after the 2004 Tsunami. It also showed how the project implemented as 
part of this dialogue proved to be less supportive to the ASEAN regionalization 
then the previous DIPECHO development programme. The context of the 
ASEAN-EU Dialogue on crisis management provided by this section will be 
complemented by an overview of the other ASEAN dialogue partners that played 
a role in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management: Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and the US. This following and complementary section will 
provide the necessary context to the empirical analysis. It will overall show how 
the EU is not the only actor playing a role in the ASEAN institutionalization of 
the disaster management policy, but that other actors also have the necessary 






Disaster Management in Australia 
Australia is located in one of the most disaster-prone area of the world. The 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is the institution 
that builds and maintains emergency response capacities with international 
partners, ensuring emergency relief supplies and standby arrangements are in 
place to deliver humanitarian responses. It coordinates Australian’s capabilities 
such as the Australia Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Medical Assistance 
Team (AusMAT) and the Search and Rescue (SAR) capability, which provided 
logistical and medical support during international and domestic events. In case 
of request for Australian assistance passed by the disaster-affected country, 
DFAT tasks the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) division to coordinate 
the response (CFE-DM 2016a).  
Australia was among the countries that developed a volunteering system of civil 
defence during the World War II. Although inactive during the period 
immediately after the end of the war, the civil defence organizations were 
reactivated from 1948 to deal with the nuclear concern that characterised the 
Cold War. If the nuclear concern –fortunately- remain only a concern, a series of 
natural disasters hit Australia in those years. A series of cyclones, floods and 
fires keep Australia civil defence busy during the Cold War. The 1967 
Tasmanian so-called Black Tuesday bushfires represented a turning point in the 
Australian management of disasters. The 62 victims and 900 injured people 
triggered a process of revision on the way in which disaster management was 
coordinated at local and national level. The revision process culminated in 1974 
with the establishment of the Natural Disaster Organization (NDO) (Jones 2007). 
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In the afterwards of the Cold War the NDO went under a significant series of 
reforms and was finally substitute by the Emergency Management Australia 
(EMA) (Peters and McEntire 2010). 
 
The EMA is the agency in charge of the management of disasters. It provides 
programs, policies and services that strengthen and maintain Australia’s national 
security and emergency management capability. Moreover, EMA maintains 
bilateral partnerships with national agencies dealing with disaster management 
and assures the Australian bilateral and multilateral cooperation on the issue. 
Overall, EMA is the main Australian partner in the development of ASEAN 
capabilities in disaster management. The core of EMA is the Australian 
Government Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC), an all-hazard 24/7 facility that 
provides situational awareness and provides reports used to inform the decision-
making process during a crisis (EMA 2017). EMA is not only the Australian 
national agency assuring the development of emergency management 
capabilities and the coordination between the state and local territories on 
disaster management issues, but it also coordinates the government response to 
overseas disasters in cooperation with –and often by using the founding provided 
by- AusAID (Peters and McEntire 2010).  
 
ASEAN & Australia interregional cooperation: an overview 
In 2016, Australian total trade with ASEAN countries amounted to over 93 




Australia became ASEAN’s very first Dialogue Partner in 1974. Since the late 
1970s the approach of Australia towards the ASEAN region moved its focus 
from defence to economics. The first Australia Labor Government since the 
Second World War come to office in 1972, de facto marking the end of the Cold 
War era in the country and starting a new phase in the relations with South East 
Asia. Although the Australia’s membership of ASEAN was not an option at that 
time, the Australian Government led by Whitlam promoted the reinforcement of 
the cooperation with Australia’s neighbourhood. After a series of talks, the 
partnership with ASEAN was formalised in 1974 and received the support of 5 
million Australian dollars (around 3.3 million Euro) for the capacity building and 
technological development of the region. Overall, Australia supported the 
regional integration of the region by being one of the founding members of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 
2005.  
 
Since the establishment of the partnership the development of the region has 
been one of the Australia’s priorities. The first cooperation programme was 
already established in 1974. The ASEAN-Australia Economic Cooperation 
Program (AAECP) was established to promote the cooperation between 
Australia and ASEAN in areas of agreed regional development priority 
(AustraliaAid 2017). In August 2002 the ASEAN-Australia cooperation moved 
to the next phase with the establishment of the ASEAN Australia Development 
Cooperation Program (AADCP). Australia committed 45 million AUD to the 
six-year programme (2002-08) to address development challenges requiring 
regional solutions with the overall aim of strengthening ASEAN as a regional 
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group (Barber and Collett 2009). The programme entered its second phase 
(AADCP II) in 2008. The new 57 million AUD programme will support the 
development cooperation until 2019 (AustraliaAid 2017). 
 
In 2007 Australia and ASEAN enhanced their historical partnership by signing in 
Manila, Philippines the first Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia 
Comprehensive Partnership. The Joint Declaration was the first step towards the 
commitment of both entities in areas of political, economic and socio-cultural 
cooperation. Moreover, the Joint Declaration already call for a greater 
cooperation in disaster preparedness, mitigation and emergency response as well 
as rehabilitation and reconstruction (ASEAN Secretariat 2007, pt. 17). A Plan of 
Action to implement the Joint Declaration (2008-2013) was subsequently 
adopted in the same year and was later extended until 2014. A new Plan of 
Action for 2015-2019 to implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia 
Comprehensive Partnership was adopted in August 2014. 
Australia-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management  
The area surrounding Australia is prone to disaster. Overall, Australian 
Governments has invested a considerable amount of resources in disaster risk 
reduction. Australia’s support towards initiatives aiming at reinforcing disaster 
management policy targets different levels. Starting with supporting international 
initiatives, such as the UNISDR’s Asia Pacific Program or the World Bank’s 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, as well as community-
based activities, such as preparedness and recovery programmes. Australia is 





Since 2011, Australia contributed with a total of around 3.5 million USD (4.56 
million AUD) mainly through ASEAN-Australia Cooperation Arrangement for 
the Implementation of AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015. Australia played 
a key role in providing the initial 1 million AUD transitional gap fund for the 
operationalization of the AHA Centre, agreed by the Special ACDM Meeting on 
20-21 December 2011. The Australian transitional fund was mainly used to 
recruit the 13 staff members of the AHA Centre. In addition, Australia supported 
the ASEAN-ERAT capacity by providing Induction and Refresher Courses.  
 
In 2013, the Australian Government increased its contribution to around 1 
million USD (1.4 million AUD). Following the Typhoon Haiyan, further 50.000 
USD were allocated from the existing Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster 
Reduction (AIFDR) to the AHA Centre to support the ASEAN-ERAT team in 
the Philippines. In 2014, additional AUD 549.000 were mobilised by Australia 
for the operationalization of the AHA Centre covering the period January-June 
2015. In 2015 the Cooperation Arrangement between Australia and ASEAN on 
the AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015 was amended again to provide 
additional AUD 928.365 for the period July 2015- December 2016.  
 
Overall, Australia has developed an advanced system to respond to disasters. 
Australian EMA is the agency that not only coordinates the prevention and 
response to disasters, but that also leads the programmes to develop the capacity 
to respond of the ASEAN region at both local, as well as regional level. Disaster 
management is a formal component of Australia-ASEAN cooperation since 
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2007, yet several development programmes addressed the issue in the previous 
years. The implementation of an effective way to respond to disaster is seeing by 
Australia as a key element to ensure South East Asia is a prosperous and 
peaceful neighbour region. 
 
3.3.3 New Zealand 
Disaster Management in New Zealand  
New Zealand does not experience the same number of deadly disasters as some 
of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. Yet, as noticed by Geoffrey Palmer, the 
Former Prime Minister of New Zealand ‘Sometimes it does us a power of good 
to remind ourselves that we live on two volcanic rocks where two tectonic plates 
meet, in a some-what lonely stretch of windswept ocean just above the Roaring 
Forties’ (Webb and McEntrie 2008, 1). As for many other first world states, New 
Zealand’s Civil Defence developed during the World War II. The 1932 Hawkes 
Bay earthquake was the event that triggered the first act dealing with the 
management of emergencies: The Public Safety Conservation Act signed in 
1932. In 1959 New Zealand established the Ministry of Civil Defence and in 
April 1962 the Civil Defence Act was formalised.  
 
The focus of New Zealand shifted from nuclear risk to natural and man-made 
emergency management following the events occurred in 1968. In April, a storm 
hit the North and South Island causing damages, as well as 51 human losses in 
the incident of the Wahine ferry in the Wellington Harbour. In May, a severe 
earthquake hit the West Coast of the South Island causing major damages and 
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likely only few casualties. These two events triggered the amendments to the 
Civil Defence Act introduced in 1968. Among the others the word “disaster” was 
changed in “emergency” to reflect the limited effects of the natural events (Webb 
and McEntrie 2008). Following a landslide in Abbotsford, Dunedin that in 1979 
caused several damages to home and forced the authority to evacuate 640 people, 
the Civil Defence Act was revised in 1983.   
 
The 1 July 1999 the Ministry of Civil Defence was renamed Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management. Under the Ministry, the National Crisis 
Management Centre is in charge of coordinating New Zealand’s response in case 
of emergency. In 2002 the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act replaced 
the 1983 Civil Defence Act and it refocused the emergency management of New 
Zealand towards the building of resilient communities (Britton and Clark 2000).  
 
ASEAN & New Zealand interregional cooperation: an overview 
New Zealand became ASEAN’s second Dialogue Partner in 1975. After the end 
of World War II New Zealand faced a new phase in the relations with Asia 
mainly focused on security. The risk of having the entire continent supporting 
communist ideas led New Zealand to support stability actions in the region. In 
particular, the initial relation between New Zealand and Southeast Asia in the 
post-war period pointed in two directions. The first one was the signature of a 
series of regional defence arrangements, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand, US Security Treaty 
(ANZUS). The second was the implementation of development assistance 
programme directed to Southeast Asia countries, and in particular the non-
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communist ones. The Colombo Plan was the main example of this. It offered 
development aid projects in South and Southeast Asia to sustain the emerging 
nations in the region both socially and economically. New Zealand aid 
programme continued well also after the end of the Cold War (Smith 2005).  
 
From the mid-1970s New Zealand relations with Southeast Asia changed its 
focus from a merely security concerned to broader engagement. First, the Kirk-
Rowling Labour Government (1972-75) supported a broader regional 
cooperation as a mean to contrast the historical dependence of New Zealand 
from the US policy both in security, as well as in trade issues (Lodge 1975a). 
Until then New Zealand approach to regional grouping was the one of a first 
world powers with development countries. Existing regional institutions, such as 
SEATO11 were created by first world powers concerned by the communist risk in 
the region and saw a limited involvement of the Southeast Asian countries. 
Thinks changed in 1967 with the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The Southeast Asian countries were the main driver of the 
process of regionalization and New Zealand moved from being in a driving 
position to a be an equal partner (Rolfe 2005). Since the Kirk-Rowling 
Government new ways to engage with ASEAN were explored and the interest 
for previous regional grouping diminished as shown by the end of SEATO in 
1977.  Moreover, the shift in New Zealand relations with Southeast Asian 
countries also changed following the Britain access to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973. This event urged New Zealand to start looking for 
new trade partners and Southeast Asia was identified as one of the natural trade 
                                               
11 The members of SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East Pakistan, now 
Bangladesh), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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partners for New Zealand (Lodge 1975b). This process led to the creation in 
1995, together with Australia, of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This 
change reflected also in development assistance of New Zealand towards 
Southeast Asian countries. Since 1950 and for around ten years New Zealand’s 
development aid was channelled via contribution to the Colombo Plan. New 
Zealand contribution was characterized by the provision of technical assistance 
to the targeted countries and not much about direct capital provided to local 
governments with the aim of containing communism. Yet, the shift of focus 
started by New Zealand in the mid-70s was also reflected in the development aid 
that becomes part of New Zealand’s bilateral aid programme.  
 
Following New Zealand’s shift towards its relations with the Southeast region 
and the new dialogue between New Zealand and ASEAN, a formal dialogue 
relationship was established in 1975. The key milestone of the signature of the 
ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership was 
reached in 2010 together with a Plan of Action covering a five-year period. In 
November 2015 ASEAN and New Zealand celebrated 40 years of cooperation 
and launched the new Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Statement for 
ASEAN-New Zealand Strategic Partnership (2016-2020).  
New Zealand-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management 
Disaster management is part of the New Zealand’s Development Assistance 
towards Southeast Asian countries. It gives country-specific support to countries 
such as Indonesia and Myanmar (New Zealand MFA 2017), and it also support 
regional ASEAN-led initiatives such as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance 
(AHA) Centre. The support is both in the form of direct funding, as well as by 
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providing the technical expertise for enhance specific capacities and by 
supporting initiatives such as the AHA Centre Executive Programme. Yet, the 
New Zealand-ASEAN cooperation on disaster management is relatively recent 
and subsequent to the 2004 Tsunami. The Joint Declaration signed by New 
Zealand, Australia and ASEAN leaders in November 2004 –one month before 
the Tsunami- did not mentioned disaster management among the priority of the 
cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat 2004b). The need to strengthen the disaster 
management cooperation among the two partners was mentioned in 2010 in the 
Joint Declaration establishing the Comprehensive Partnership (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2010d, sec. 21). Even more, the need to deepen the ASEAN-New 
Zealand cooperation on disaster risk management and to support the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) also 
by assisting the ASEAN Secretariat in the operationalization of the ASEAN 
Coordinating Centre for the Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management 
(AHA Centre) was clearly stated in the 2010 Plan of Action (ASEAN Secretariat 
2010c, 6).  
 
New Zealand was the first AHA Centre partner (AHA Centre 2016b, 30). During 
the phase of the establishment of the AHA Centre, the Government of New 
Zealand provided two advisors for the development of the AHA Centre Strategic 
Work Plan and a short-term advisor for the drafting of job descriptions. 
Moreover, New Zealand Aid Programme allocated funding for NZD 600.000 for 
the period 2013-2015. The funding was used establish standard operation 
procedures, staff training, and for buying equipment for the AHA Centre. New 
Zealand engaged with the ACE Programme by providing various training such as 
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‘Leadership in crisis’ provided in cooperation with the University of 
Canterbury’s Centre for Risk, Resilience and Renewal (UCR3). Moreover, New 
Zealand supported technical and training support to the AHA Centre by hiring a 
private company: The Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG). 
 
In summary, New Zealand is less prone to disasters than Australia, yet it was the 
first dialogue partner signing an official partnership with the AHA centre. New 
Zealand support to the development of an ASEAN regional mechanism to 
respond to disasters is explained by the traditional support of New Zealand to the 
ASEAN regional institutionalization. A strong ASEAN is considered by New 
Zealand a key element for its peace and prosperity. Similar to Australia, disasters 
affecting the ASEAN region are recognized by New Zealand as a serious threat 
to a strong ASEAN. The 2004 tsunami reinforced this fear and pushed further the 






Disaster Management in Japan 
Japan is among the most affected countries by natural disasters. Catastrophic 
events such as typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis recurred 
in the history of Japan. In September 1923 a devastating earthquake hit the cities 
of Tokyo and Yokohama. Around 100.000 people dead and the two cities were 
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devastated. Yet, Japan re-built the two cities and started a conscious path towards 
awareness, preparedness and response that makes Japan one of the world leader 
in disaster prevention and response (Rauhala 2011). The end of World War II in 
Japan was characterized by a series of major typhoons and earthquakes during 
which around 1.000 lost their lives. It was the Ise Bay Typhoon that in 
September 1959 killed over 5.000 people, which triggered the establishment of a 
planned and comprehensive disaster prevention administration system in Japan. 
The Japanese Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was established in 1961 
(MOFA 2017).  
 
The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act provided the institutional framework 
for disaster prevention and management in Japan. It established the central and 
local disaster prevention councils, including provisions for their organization, 
functioning and responsibilities. Since then Japan actively implemented a series 
of measures to prevent a respond to disasters. These actions cover all spectrum of 
disaster management. Starting with the investments in the technological research 
to reinforce the ability to prevent disasters. Going to the capacity building both in 
terms of expertise and facilities. Culminating with the improvement of 
information and communication systems (Government of Japan 1961).  
 
In Japan disaster management is based on a three levels system: national, 
prefectural and municipal. At the centre of each level there is a disaster 
management council responsible for the overall coordination of its level. The 
Central Disaster Management Council coordinates the response at national level. 
It consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of State for Disaster Management, 
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together with all concerned ministers and heads of major public institutions and 
experts (Nazarov 2011). 
 
Since the second half of the 70s Japan started international emergency assistance 
activities. Since the Act on the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team was 
signed in 1987 and revised in 1992, Japan started dispatching relief teams, 
medical teams, expert teams and Self-Defense Force units overseas to help 
disaster-stricken countries.  
 
ASEAN & Japan interregional cooperation: an overview 
The dialogue between ASEAN and Japan started informally in 1973 and was 
formalised in 1977 with the first ASEAN-Japan Forum.  
 
Japan has always been the most important economic partner of ASEAN 
(Japanese Diplomat 2017a), therefore it is not surprising that it was also a 
pioneer in starting a more structured dialogue in 1973. The ASEAN-Japan 
relations have since then focused on three main elements: trade and investment, 
development assistance and political support (Severino 2013). ASEAN become 
the principal beneficiary of Japanese development assistance under the leading 
role of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), not coincidentally 
established in 1974.  By implementing these initiatives Japan aimed at 
overcoming ASEAN bitter memories of the Japanese initiatives during World 
War II and at supporting the development of the countries that would then 
become its main trade partners in the following years. The new established bond 
was reinforced following the financial crisis that affected ASEAN countries in 
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1997-1998. Japan assisted ASEAN countries with the 30billion USD programme 
called the New Miyazawa Initiative (Government of Japan 2017).  
 
In December 2003 the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan signed the Tokyo 
Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the 
New Millennium. The declaration together with its Plan of Action served as a 
road-map for the relations between the two. In November 2011 the Joint 
Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering 
Together (called Bali Declaration) was issued in Bali together with a new Plan of 
Action covering the period from 2011 up to 2015. 
 
In 2013 ASEAN and Japan celebrated 40 years of Dialogue Relations. The 
Commemorative Summit held in December 2013 in Tokyo, gave the opportunity 
to leaders to adopt the statement “Hand in hand, facing regional and global 
challenges”. It underlined ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation and it was 
accompanied by an implementation plan that provided a framework to straighten 
ASEAN-Japan relations and support ASEAN Community-building beyond 2015 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2017b). 
 
Japan-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management 
The ASEAN-Japan dialogue on disaster management cooperation started after 
the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake that triggered the tsunami 
causing the nuclear accident in the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March 
2011. A special ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Meeting was organised in April 2011 
in Jakarta, Indonesia. The meeting represented the opportunity to discuss the 
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strengthening of the ASEAN-Japan cooperation in disaster management. The 
Japanese support was until then mainly devoted to ASEAN member states as part 
of the bilateral cooperation. Yet, the 2011 ministerial meeting agreed to a set of 
initiatives to support ASEAN in the establishment and reinforcement of disaster 
management capacities (ASEAN Secretariat 2011). The first initiative was the 
Japan-ASEAN Disaster Management Seminar held in Tokyo in December 2011. 
The seminar co-organised by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
and the AHA Centre that highlighted the potential area of cooperation between 
ASEAN and Japan (JICA 2011). Since then, disaster management is become one 
of the key priorities on the ASEAN-Japan dialogue agenda. Yet, although the 
aim of the partnership is to go beyond the typical development assistance logic, 
the set of collaborative activities that were so-far carried on under the ASEAN-
Japan partnership saw ASEAN mainly acting as receiver of Japan financial and 
technical support.  
 
Since 2011, Japan contributed with a total of USD 24 million. The Japan-
ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) was already used to support the initial study on 
the establishment of the AHA Centre. In the following years the JAIF sponsored 
the implementation of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) of 
the AHA Centre, as well as DELSA and the ACE programme.  
 
The first phase (2011-2012) of the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) project was sponsored with a total of 1.6 million USD mainly used to set 
up the AHA Centre Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) by buying equipment, 
software and hardware, such as computers, laptops, screens, teleconference 
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facilities (See AHA Progress Report, August-December 2012, annex G.3). A 
second phase of the project started in 2012 and was sponsored with further 4.92 
million USD. It focused on connecting the AHA Centre with National Disaster 
Management Offices (NDMOs) in ASEAN Member States and filed teams. In 
addition, JAIF also provided two experts on ICT and on Disaster Monitoring and 
Analysis (AHA Centre 2012). 
 
In July 2012, the Government of Japan also approved the project on the 
Establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA) 
with a provision of 12.3 million USD. The project was divided in three 
components. Firstly, the establishment of an ASEAN Emergency Stockpile, an 
internal ASEAN asset to provide emergency relief items in case of medium and 
large-scale disasters to ASEAN member states. DELSA was inaugurated in 
December 2012 in Subang, Malaysia. Secondly, the implementation of a capacity 
development programme, aiming at building both the AHA Centre capacity, as 
well as the one of young officers in the ASEAN member states. The ACE 
Programme took place for the first time between January and June 2014 and was 
attended by 13 officials from 7 ASEAN countries. Thirdly, the project included 
the development of a communication and awareness strategy on AADMER and 
AHA Centre. In 2014 the Government of Japan funded with 137.391 USD the 
Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI) as ICT advisory company to support the 
AHA Centre in the development of a five-years ICT blueprint and strategy. 
Finally, in July 2015 Japan also funded with 380.431 USD a Feasibility Study 
for the Establishment of Satellite Disaster Emergency Logistic in ASEAN 
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Member States. The main objective of the project is to identify the best approach 
to establish the satellite warehouses to complement DELSA.  
 
In summary, although the Japan-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management 
started only in 2011 following the Japanese Earthquake and the consequent 
nuclear disaster of Fukushima, Japan is currently sponsoring the biggest projects 
so far implemented by the AHA Centre. The 2011 shift marked the change in the 
Japanese support towards ASEAN from a mainly bilateral cooperation to an 
inter-regional one. Yet, the Japan-ASEAN cooperation still sees ASEAN acting 
as a receiver of Japan aid, not (yet) in a position to reciprocate. Still, the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the AHA Centre –as we will see in detail in the next chapter(s)- 
are in a driving position, deciding the projects that Japan could support.  
 
3.3.5 United States (US) 
Disaster Management in the US 
The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 
by an executive order signed by President Carter. It coordinates the federal 
government in preparing and responding to domestic natural or man-made 
disasters. FEMA was created to solve the concerns raised by the National 
Governor’s Association about the excessive fragmentation of emergency and 
disaster activities among more than 100 different federal agencies (FEMA 2017). 
FEMA coordinates the US internal response. The first response comes from the 
local government. A federal response follows a major disaster or emergency 
declaration issued by the U.S. President and it unlock up to USD 5 million (Cara 
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Labrador 2018). The U.S. also provides support to foreign countries hit by 
disasters. The U.S. provides relief to over fifty countries per year (USAID 2017). 
In addition, the experience accumulated in responding internally to disaster is 
reflected also outside U.S. borders. The U.S. Department of Defense conducts 
assistance missions under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid 
(OHDACA) programs, which funds around 200 projects annually (Drifmeyer 
and LLewellyn 2003). The U.S. State Department assists disaster’s refugees. 
Moreover, USAID supports activities linked to disaster management outside U.S. 
soil and it coordinates the federal response to disasters (Perry, Travayiakis 2008). 
In addition to the actual relief provided by oversees, the U.S. also supports the 
knowledge transfer of good practices. These activities involve the deployment of 
experts and contractors that advice the local authorities (Cara Labrador 2018).  
 
ASEAN & US interregional cooperation: an overview 
The United States became ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1977, two years after the 
end of the Vietnam war. It took quite sometimes to normalize the relations 
between U.S. and ASEAN and it was only in November 2005 that ASEAN-U.S. 
decided to enhance their partnership. Following the Joint Vision Statement 
produced during the meeting in New York, the 2006 Plan of Action to 
Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership and the 2009 Revised 
Priorities for Cooperation under the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership. Yet, it 
was after the election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States 
in 2009, that the U.S. attention toward ASEAN –and the Asia Pacific in general- 
changed gear. In fact, since Obama’s election and its ‘re-balance’ policy the US 
commitment towards ASEAN increased (Huang 2016). The First ASEAN-U.S. 
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Leaders’ Meeting was organised in November 2009 and in June 2010, the US 
became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to 
ASEAN in Jakarta and one year after the first resident Ambassador to ASEAN 
was appointed (Ambassador Nina Hachigian). Indeed, the US-ASEAN relations 
were not a priority for the Bush Presidency. The dialogue was characterized by a 
series of postponement of summit, not attendance of ministerial conferences and 
cancellation of meeting (Limaye 2007). Yet, the cooperation continued at a lower 
level and it was instrumental in the subsequent enhancement of the partnership 
led by President Obama. 
 
In 2015, the United States – ASEAN relationship was elevated to a Strategic 
Partnership. ASEAN-US partnership focuses on five areas, such as economic 
integration, maritime cooperation, ASEAN emerging leaders, promoting 
opportunity for ASEAN women, and addressing transnational challenges. 
Overall, the US attention towards ASEAN focused on the political and security 
dimension, on issues such as the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, 
in particular regarding the South China Sea dispute and the threat of terrorism. 
Moreover, the Economic relations saw the establishment of the Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement.  Finally, the U.S.-ASEAN development 
cooperation has also focused on capacity building efforts in technology, 
education, food security, human rights, as well as disaster management (U.S. 




US-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management 
The U.S. has directly supported the development of the AHA Centre both in 
terms of decision-making process and capacity. The U.S. support has been 
mainly coordinated by the U.S. Government’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster 
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programme. The 2006 Plan of Action to implement 
the Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership identified 
disaster management among the potential area for ASEAN-U.S. cooperation in 
the social and development area. Yet, a more concrete support started during the 
Obama’s administration (Salazar 2016). Since 2011, the support of the U.S. 
Government mainly focused on the operationalization of the AHA Centre, as 
well as on capacity building for AHA Centre staff and the ACE Programme.  
 
The US Forest Services (USFS) played a key role in the development of the first 
AHA Centre Strategic Plan (2011). Trough ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance 
and Training Facility (USTATF), the US Government provided also an advisor 
for supporting the development of the AHA Centre Strategic Work Plan, as well 
as the development of the first job description for the AHA Centre staff 
members. The USTATF Advisor also worked on the 2013-2015 Programme. In 
January 2015 USFS supported the AHA Centre in the improvement of the 
Emergency Response Organization Guidelines. In 2012, The ASEAN Disaster 
Monitoring and Response System was developed by the AHA Centre in close 
cooperation with the team of international experts provided by the US 
Government. Since 2013, the US provided a total of 3 capacity-building trainings 
(November 2013, February and March 2014) both for the AHA Centre staff and 




In summary, U.S. support towards ASEAN is explained by the U.S. interest in 
maintaining a peaceful and stable region in the South-East Asia that could be a 
reliable economic partner. The increased cooperation in many areas including 
disaster management should be understood in a context of political shift with the 
Obama’s administration devoting much more attention to ASEAN then his 
predecessors. Moreover, the U.S. FEMA is the agency that coordinates one of 
the most advanced systems to prevent and respond to crisis. Although, different 
from a regional system, it clearly provides a model for ASEAN, if not at 
organizational level, at least as a provider of technical good practices.   
 
Overall, this third section provided an overview of the ASEAN dialogue partners 
with whom ASEAN has implemented a cooperation in disaster management. 
Although some of the countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and the U.S., 
developed their crisis management systems after the end of the Second World 
War, and others like Japan and ASEAN member states in the 70s, they all have a 
national system to coordinate the response to crisis. These national systems are 
the results of the different experiences of these countries in facing disasters. The 
implemented mechanisms to respond to crises depend on the level and type of 
vulnerability face by these countries. Yet, they all recognize the importance for 
the ASEAN region to increase its response to disasters. Not only disasters can 
irremediably hit the economic capacity of the region, but they can also create 
instability. What these four countries have in common is the goal of having a 
stable and peaceful South East Asia, as well as the support towards ASEAN 
regional organization to achieve this goal. Interestingly enough, all these 
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dialogue partners started by only supporting the development of local 
communities in coping with crisis, slowly incrementing their support towards 
ASEAN as a regional organization. The support towards ASEAN as a regional 
organization capable of coordinating the response to disaster was encouraged (as 
saw in the first section of this chapter) by the 1994 Yokohama Strategy, but it 
was also reinforced by a series of catastrophic events, such as the 2004 Tsunami 
or the Japanese Heart-quake, that similarly to the EU provided the necessary 
wake up call to mobilize the necessary means to reach the policy goal. Yet, as we 
will see in great detail in the next three chapters, the ways in which ASEAN 
dialogue partners supported the institutionalization of an ASEAN mechanism to 
respond to disasters follow different logics and modes of influence. For example, 
Australia provided direct funding to the AHA Centre to cover the current 
expanses, some other countries such as New Zealand provided direct technical 
assistance to ASEAN Secretariat first, and to the AHA Centre after. A way of 
supporting much more in line with their tradition. Other countries, such as Japan, 
generously sponsored specific projects proposed by the AHA Centre and finally 
a fourth way was the one proposed by the US that proposed the implementation 
of projects that they knew would fit the AHA Centre and its vision for the future. 
Overall, ASEAN dialogue partners intervened in the process by covering all 
actor types (leader, reference, sponsor and implementer), demonstrating the 
importance of these partnerships in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster 




This chapter aimed to show that the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster 
management did not happen in a vacuum. Since the 70s the increased frequency 
and intensity of disasters in the Southeast Asia region (EM-DAT 2016), as well 
as in the world, triggered national, global, and regional initiatives to better 
coordinate the preparedness and response to disasters. The chapter discussed how 
these national and global initiatives were reflected both at EU, as well as at 
ASEAN level. Understanding the evolution of the global norms regulating the 
issue of disaster management is essential to set the context in which the events 
that will be empirically analysed in the following chapters, took place. Similarly, 
a deep understanding of the EU instruments to manage crisis is key to picture the 
EU as an actor in this field. Moreover, an overview of the ASEAN relations with 
the other dialogue partners in disaster management is fundamental to support the 
argument that the EU was not the only actor influencing the institutionalization 
of ASEAN disaster management. Overall, the main aim of this chapter was to 
provide the context to the empirical analysis and to justify the decision to expand 
the analysis from the potential influence of the EU only, to the influence played 
by the other ASEAN dialogue partners active in disaster management.  
 
The EU, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US, started their 
cooperation with ASEAN on disaster management issues as part of their bi-
lateral development assistance with ASEAN member states. The development 
assistance formally evolved into a full cooperation with ASEAN as a regional 
organization after a series of events that directly or indirectly involved the 
ASEAN regions, such as the 2004 Tsunami, the 2011 Fukushima disaster or the 
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new attention of Obama’s administration towards ASEAN. Also important to 
notice is that it has been the ASEAN Secretariat that promoted the enhancement 
of disaster management cooperation with ASEAN dialogue partners thus 
facilitating the cooperation from the bi-lateral to the regional level.  
 
As for the EU, after the support provided to ASEAN member states via the 
DIPECHO programme, the cooperation with ASEAN on disaster management 
issues was triggered by the 2004 Tsunami, but it was formally established only in 
2007. The cooperation suffered from the internal post-Lisbon dynamics of the 
EU that saw the EEAS Crisis Response Department and DG ECHO proposing 
two different and competing models. The ASEAN cooperation with the other 
dialogue partners was based on different assumptions. The cooperation with 
Australia and New Zealand did not move away from the development assistance 
model with the two countries providing a flexible financial and technical support 
to ASEAN. This support is not embedded in any specific project with ASEAN, 
but it is derived from what remains available from the bi-later cooperation with 
ASEAN member states. Therefore, although substantial this support is not 
guaranteed in the long period. Differently, Japan support towards ASEAN 
disaster management is embedded in a series of long-term projects aiming at 
supporting the regional dimension of disaster cooperation in the ASEAN region. 
Finally, the US could be described as ASEAN ad-hoc partners in crisis 
management. The US initiatives could be mainly linked back to technical 
assistance in implementing organizational was the result of initiatives were 
triggered by the internal political situation. Overall, this chapter showed why the 
cooperation implemented by Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US contains 
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all the characteristics to present ASEAN’s partners as influential actors in the 
institutionalization process of ASEAN’s disaster management policy. The 
context presented, justifies the focus on these actors in terms of their 
involvement through various initiatives. It also allows for further nuanced 
analysis in the chapters that follow of their roles as leader, reference, sponsor or 
implementer in the different phases of this process. 
 
To conclude, the EU is not the exclusive partner of ASEAN in disaster 
management. Other ASEAN’s dialogue partners established cooperation on this 
issue with their characteristics and peculiarity. In particular, disaster management 
is a priority area for other dialogue partners different from the EU. The reasons 
behind this and the ways in which ASEAN cooperation with other dialogue 
partners on disaster management is built are different. Yet, this chapter provided 
the necessary background to justify the need to look at the role played by other 
dialogue partners in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management. In 
the next three chapters the three phases of the institutionalization will be 
analysed, and the roles played by the different dialogue partners and ASEAN 
internal actors (member states and Secretariat) will be explored to assess the 






The emergence of a regional approach to disasters: the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN Regional Programme 
on Disaster management (ARPDM) 
 
This first empirical chapter focuses on the initial stages of the process that led to 
the institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management: the adoption in 
2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM).  
The ten ASEAN countries are located in the most disaster-prone part of the 
world (EM-DAT 2016). Therefore, and although it was not among the core 
elements that led to the founding of the Association in 1967, the need to 
collaborate more on disaster response at ASEAN level emerged early on and 
became an increasingly pressing issue.  
The ASEAN Bangkok Declaration adopted in 1967 by the Foreign Ministers of 
the five founding countries did not mention the need to strengthen member state 
cooperation on responses to natural disaster. For historical and geo-political 
reasons, the focus was mainly on the need to strengthen the economic and social 
stability of the region, to ensure its peaceful and progressive development, as 
well as to maintain its stability and security against external interference. The 
need for the five ASEAN founding countries to cooperate in the area of disaster 
management was officially set for the first time in the article 4 of the Concord I 





‘Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development 
of member states. They [ASEAN member states] shall extend, within their 
capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress’. 
 
With the aim of accelerating the implementation of the article 4 of the Concord 
Declaration, set in Bali four months earlier, the ASEAN Declaration for Mutual 
Assistance on Natural Disasters was signed in Manila on 26 June 1976 in the 
framework of the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The ASEAN Expert Group on 
Disaster Management (AEGDM) was officially tasked to explore different 
options to increase the ASEAN coordination of the response to disasters, but due 
to the scarcity of their meetings (one every two years) and the frequent turnover 
of its representatives, it was only in 1996 that the ASEAN Secretariat first 
proposed the adoption of a Regional Programme on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM). The ASEAN programme on disaster management was finally 
adopted in May 2004. 
 
This development in the ASEAN disaster management domain is considered by 
some EU scholars and practitioners as the ASEAN replication of the EU Civil 
Protection Programme developed in 1997 (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Allison 
2015; European Commission Official 2017d). Therefore this chapter responds to 
the research questions ‘Who are the main actors in the process that have 
influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? 
Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?’ by looking at the 




The chapter is divided in two main parts in line with the definition of process 
provided by Glennan (1996) as a complex system where the outcome is the result 
of the interaction of actors that produce actions. First, the chapter presents the 
ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the 
outcome of the analysis to be explored and discusses its similarities and 
differences with the EU Civil Protection Action Programme. This comparative 
analysis of the two norms gives already a preliminary idea of the similarities 
between the EU and ASEAN programme. Second, the chapter discusses the 
mechanism, and by doing so the influence of the EU, by identifying the actors 
that played the role of leader, reference, sponsor and implementer. By doing so 
this first empirical chapter assesses the EU influence in the implementation of 
the first step towards the institutionalisation process analysed, in comparison 
with the other internal and external actors.  
4.1 The Outcome: the ARPDM Programme 
The ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was 
officially launched in May 2004 in Bali, Indonesia. It constituted the first 
ASEAN-wide strategy to develop regional cooperation on disaster management 
issues for the period of 2004-2010. 
 
4.1.1 The main features 
The six years programme (2004-2010) set the rationale, the objectives and the 
principles at the basis of the ASEAN cooperation on disaster management. The 
programme was structured around 29 activities categorised in five main 
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components. The first set component of the ARPDM was the establishment of 
the ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework. The aim of the 
framework was to promote the cooperation among ASEAN countries in all areas 
of disaster management, including joint projects, collaborative research and joint 
networking activities. The second component was the implementation of 
capacity building activities increasing the competencies of the officials working 
in the national disasters management agencies. The third ARPDM’s component 
was the promotion of the exchange of information, expertise, best practices and 
resources. The fourth component was the promotion of collaboration and the 
strengthening of partnerships among interested stakeholders, such as IOs and 
NGOs. Finally, the last component of the ARPDM programme was the 
promotion of advocacy, public education and awareness programmes on disaster 
management. Each component included a set of projects proposed by eight out of 
ten ASEAN member states (Annex 2). 
 
4.1.2 Similarities and Differences with the EU Civil Protection Action 
Programme 
The first EU Action Programme in the field of Civil Protection was established 
by the 1997 Council Decision one year after the 1996 AEGDM meeting started 
the discussion on the ARPDM (European Council 1997b). Differently from the 
ASEAN programme set for six years, the EU programme was initially set for two 
years (1 January 1998 – 31 December 1999), then prolonged for another five 
years (2000-2004) (European Council 1999b) and finally extended for an extra 
year until 20 December 2004. The EU programme set four priority areas (Article 
3) for the cooperation in terms of prevention, preparedness, response and 
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awareness. First, in terms of prevention, the priority was to both decrease the 
risks and damages to persons, environments and properties. Second, in terms of 
preparedness, the aim was to professionalize the expertise on civil protection at 
member states level. Third, in terms of response, the programme promoted pilot 
projects to improve the techniques and methods of response. Finally, in terms of 
awareness, the programme encouraged the engagement with the public, helping 
citizens to learn how to best protect themselves. Overall, the EU programme was 
organised around the principles of prevention, preparedness, response and 
awareness. In contrast, the ASEAN programme’s main objectives were not 
organised around the different steps of the crisis cycle, but more on the ASEAN 
member states’ declared priorities.  
 
Discussions about the need to elevate the level of ASEAN cooperation on 
disaster management and to implement a programme-oriented approach on the 
issue started eight years earlier, during the 9th AEGDM Meeting in 1996. As 
outlined in the next section, the discussion on the preparation of the regional 
programme was an intense process led by the AEGDM chaired by the 
Philippines and with the cooperation of the ASEAN Secretariat. The 1994 
Yokohama Strategy was the main reference norm for the ASEAN programme, 
but other regional experiences also inspired the work of the AEGDM and the 
ASEAN Secretariat. The implementation of the ARPDM process was 
coordinated by the ADPC with funding from ECHO (see Table 3). Overall, the 
ARPDM was developed as a bottom-up process. The 10 ASEAN Member 
Countries took an active part in the process, clearly stating their needs (see 
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ASEAN Secretariat 2004, 93–97) and listing their proposals that resulted in the 




Table 3. The implementation of the ARPDM 
Date and Location Meeting Outcomes 
1996, Manila (Philippines) 9th AEGDM Meeting Secretariat proposes a Regional Programme on Disaster Management. 
1998, Singapore (Singapore)  10th AEGDM Meeting Philippines appointed Referent for the project, in coordination with ADPC. 
August 2000, Chiang Rai (Thailand) 11th AEGDM Meeting  AEGDM requested the ASEAN Secretariat to assist the Philippines  
November 2000 1st (RCC) Meeting ADPC Regional Consultive 
Committee on Regional Cooperation in Disaster 
Management  
ADPC Agreed to provide technical support through its on-going programmes. 
Agreement on the process of for the development of a draft ARPDM.  
October 2001, Bangkok  1st PDR-SEA Working group. Partnerships for Disaster 
Reduction–South East Asia project. 
Organised by ADPC, founded by ECHO. With representatives from Lao, 
Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam, ASEAN Secretariat and 
Mekong River Commission  
November 2001 2nd (RCC) Meeting ADPC Regional Consultive 
Committee on Regional Cooperation in Disaster 
Management  
Endorsed the approach 
October 2001- March 2002 Compilation of Responses from ASEAN Member Countries to Questionnaire on national Needs and Regional Areas for Cooperation. 8 
Countries out of 10 responded.  
March 2002, Bangkok Workshop for the development of the ARPDM Jointly organised by ADPC and ASEAN Secretariat, founded by ECHO. 
Attended by Focal Points of 10 ASEAN countries 
 Request for Project Proposal sent to ASEAN Countries Request sent out by the ASEAN Secretariat 
5 countries responded:  
August 2002, Manila (Philippines) Regional Workshop on the definition of Sub-
components 
Conducted by ASEAN Secretariat with the support of the UNHCR and the 
Government of the Philippines.  
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May-September 2002 Drafting of the framework document The ADPC drafted this framework document. 
September 2002, Hanoi (Vietnam) 12th AEGDM Meeting Endorsed the ARPDM draft for approval of the ASEAN Standing Committee.  
The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003 
February 2003, Jakarta (Indonesia) Regional Workshop on Partnership for Emergency 
Preparedness 
Conducted by ACDM with the support of the UNHCR. 
October 2003, (Thailand) Regional Workshop on ‘Operationalising ARPDM’  Conducted by ACDM with the support of the UNHCR and the Thai 
Government. 
November 2003  ARPDM Endorsed by the ASEAN Standing Committee  
December 2003, Brunei D.  1st ACDM Meeting ACDM discussed the implementation of ARPDM  
March 2004, Luangprabang (Lao) 2nd ACDM Meeting Discuss the operationalization ARPDM’s priority projects into a full-fledged 
proposal. Supported by UNHCR.  





4.2 The Mechanism 
The second section of the chapter is dedicated to the mechanism that led to the 
implementation of the ARPDM Programme as the first step of the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN cooperation on disaster management. As 
explained in the analytical framework, the mechanism explaining the influence 
of internal and external actors in the institutionalization of disaster management 
as an ASEAN regional policy is composed by the interaction of four actors: the 
leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.  
 
4.2.1 The Leader 
The leader of the mechanism proposed in this thesis is the actor that first took the 
initiative of proposing a new step (goal) towards the institutionalization of a 
regional policy. As we will see in the next paragraphs the development of the 
ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was primary 
led by the ASEAN member states in cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat: 
the leaders of this phase. Initially discussed under the ASEAN Expert Group on 
Disaster Management (AEGDM), it was finally the ASEAN Committee on 
Disaster Management (ACDM) that launched the ARPDM programme in 2004. 
The ASEAN Secretariat supported the process and adjusted its own structure to 
better follow the ASEAN member states pro-activity.  
 
The ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) was created in 
1971 as one of the seven subsidiary bodies under the ASEAN Committee on 
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Social Development (COSD). AEGDM expert group met overall 12 times 
between 1976 and 2002. Initially focused only on natural disasters such as 
volcanic eruptions, floods, earthquakes, fires, etc. since 1990 has been broadened 
to include both natural and man- made disasters (ARPDM 2004-10). Although 
the working group was active since 1971, its impact in terms of policy outputs 
was minimal. This was mainly due to the scarcity of the meetings (every two 
years), the consequent high rotation of its members, the lack of planning, and the 
non-high-level, but technical profile of its members, which made difficult any 
advance on the cooperation (AHA Centre Official 2017a). 
 
A concrete discussion to elevate the cooperation and to have a dedicated 
committee started during the 9th AEGDM Meeting held in Manila in 1996 when 
the ASEAN Secretariat proposed the implementation of a Regional Programme 
on Disaster Management to the representatives of ASEAN member states as a 
way to prioritize the ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster management 
(AHA Centre Official 2017a). The Philippines, being the 9th AEGDM Chair, 
were tasked to work on a first draft of the ARPDM programme. Four years after 
no much advancement was registered. Therefore, the 11th AEGDM held in 
Chiang Rai (Thailand) in August 2000 tasked the Secretariat to support the 
Philippines in preparing the first draft of the regional programme to be submitted 
to AEGDM members and national experts for comments. The Asian Disaster 





Since the 2000s the drafting process accelerated. Cambodia, became the last 
member to join ASEAN in April 1999, following Vietnam in 1995, Laos and 
Myanmar in 1997, giving a new input to the ASEAN regional initiative. 
Moreover, the 1994 World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction produced 
the Yokohama Strategy that repeatedly called for a stronger regional response to 
natural disaster, providing additional legitimacy to those actors (the AEGDM 
working group and the ASEAN Secretariat) already in favour of increasing the 
regional cooperation in disaster management. Finally, the number of disasters 
hitting the region increased considerably so also those ASEAN member states 
not traditionally hit by catastrophic events felt the urge to move to the next phase 
(AHA Centre 2016g). 
 
Starting from reflecting on its own efficiency, the AEGDM promoted a series of 
changes that ultimately led to the launch of the ASEAN Regional Programme on 
Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the initial reflection of the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management at regional level. In a 
case of socialization, where certain expectations are set up in social situation, 
The AEGDM (and later the ACDM) acted as the socialization platform where 
ASEAN member states’ representatives exchanged ideas on how to boost the 
regional cooperation in disaster management further. The socialization effects of 
the platform were reflected in three main initiatives.  
 
The first step towards the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management 
was the creation of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) as 
the Committee in charge of the implementation of the ARPDM regional 
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programme. In September 2002, the 12th AEGDM Meeting recommended to the 
ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) to replace the bi-annual AEGDM meeting 
to an annual meeting in charge of monitoring the on-going projects and to adopt 
a programme-oriented approach. The ASEAN Committee on Disaster 
Management (ACDM) was established in 2003. It consists of ten heads of 
national agencies or government bodies responsible for disaster management of 
ASEAN member countries, known as the National Disaster Management Offices 
(NDMOs). Therefore, the ACDM is an expert committee, but because of the high 
level of its members (Director-level) it has the leverage to propose policies. The 
ACDM reports directly to the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), made up by 
the ten ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and is the ultimate responsible for the 
coordination and implementation of the activities related to disaster response, 
carried at regional level.  
 
Secondly, the increasing importance attributed to disaster management by 
ASEAN was not only reflected in the establishment of a dedicated committee 
(ACDM), but it was also reflected in the structural changes of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. The ASEAN Secretariat followed the emergence of a new need by 
changing its internal structure to better support ASEAN Member States (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a). The natural disaster management portfolio was always 
considered part of the ASEAN socio-cultural community. At the beginning, the 
management of natural disaster was part of the Health Unit portfolio. It was then 
moved under the responsibility of the Environment Unit, renamed because of this 
‘Environment and Disasters’. One full time officer was assigned exclusively to 
the disaster management component (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Although one 
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person does not seem to be a lot, it is important to keep in mind that the ASEAN 
Secretariat counts overall around 60 officials. In the following years the changes 
in the structure of ASEAN Secretariat well reflect how disaster response was 
progressively prioritized.  
Since the beginning of 2016, disaster response has a dedicated Unit (Disaster 
Management & Humanitarian Assistance) under the Sustainable Development 
Directorate.  
 
Finally, the increasing importance of disaster management in ASEAN region was 
reflected in the establishment -or evolution- of the national agencies dealing with 
the topic at national level. Less affected ASEAN member states were socialised 
to the idea promoted during the meeting by both other more affected ASEAN 
member states (i.e. Philippines and Indonesia) and the ASEAN Secretariat 
representative(s) that a regional cooperation on the issue was fundamental (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a). This is demonstrated also by the fact that between the 
90s and 2000 the majority of ASEAN countries created or transformed their 
departments dealing with disaster management into national agencies, de facto 
leveraging the attention given to the issue (See Table 4).  
 
In Cambodia, the National Committee for Disaster Management was established 
in 1994 and restructured between 1999 and 2001 (Bildan 2003, 26). Indonesia 
established its Advisory Board for Natural Disaster in 1966. In 1979 the 
Advisory board was elevated to a fully national board with the establishment of 
the National Disaster Management Coordinating Board. Its scope was enlarged 
in 1990 to include man-made disasters and again in 2001 to include complex 
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emergencies and IDPs. The current National Disaster Management Authority 
(BNPB) was established in 2008 as result of the lessons learned after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami (BNPB 2017). Lao PDR created its National Disaster 
Management Office in 1999 (UNDP 2010). Vietnam established its Central 
Committee of Storm and Flood Control in 1990 as the inter-ministerial 
institutions composed of representatives of all key ministers. The Department of 
Dike Management and Flood Control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development provided the secretarial support. Since 2015 the Department of 
Natural Disaster Prevention And Control (DNDPC) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development is in charge of the management of disasters 
in Vietnam (Vietnam Today 2015). Since 2000 disasters in Malaysia were 
coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) in accordance with the 
Directive No. 20 on the ‘Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster Relief and 
Management.’ The NSC facilitated activities that were implemented by the 
Disaster Management and Relief Committee, which comprised various agencies 
at federal, state and local levels (CFE-DM 2016b). In 2015 Malaysia launched 
the new National Disaster Management Agency (Nadma) to coordinate efforts to 
respond to disasters (Malaysia Insider 2015). Since 1992 Myanmar provides 
assistance to the victims of natural disaster and to implement actions to prevent 
people and economic losses via the Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) 
as part of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (CFE-DM 
2017). Singapore’s disaster management is a competence of the Singapore Civil 
Defence Force (SCDF) Agency established as an independent organisation under 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 1986. Thailand established its 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation as an Agency under the 
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Ministry of Interior in 2002 (Thai Ministry of Interior 2018). It substituted the 
National Civil Defence Committee (NCDC), the strategic body that since 1979 
coordinated the 17 different ministries responsible for disaster management 
(ADRC 2008b, 2008a). In the Philippines since 2010 the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) of the Office of Civil Defense 
is the national body in charge of coordinating disaster management. The 
NDRRMC replaced the National Disaster Coordinating Council NDCC created 
in 1972, the updated version of the National Disaster Control Center launched in 
1970. The Brunei National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) was 
established in August 2006, under the lead of the Ministry of Home Affairs and it 
ensures coordination in all aspects of disaster management. Before 2006 the 
Brunei focal point for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) 




Table 4. ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) 
Country Creation Current Form 
Brunei  
Darussalam 
Fire Service Department of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. 
National Disaster Management 
Centre (NDMC), 
Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Since 2006 
Cambodia National Committee for Disaster 
Management 
(1994) 
National Committee For Disaster 
Management (NCDM) 
Indonesia Advisory Board for Natural Disaster 
(1966), revised in 1979, 1990 and 
2001.  
National Disaster Management 
Authority (BNPB) since 2008  
Lao PDR National Disaster Management 
Office, 
Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare (1990) 
National Disaster Management 
Office, 
Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare 
Malaysia National Security Council (NSC), 
Prime Minister’s Department since 
2000 
National Disaster Management 
Agency 
Prime Minister’s Department since 
2015 
Myanmar  Relief and Resettlement 
Department, 
Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief 
and Resettlement. Since 1992 
Relief and Resettlement Department 
Philippines National Disaster Coordinating 
Council (NDCC). 
Created between 1970 (National 
Disaster Control Center) and 1972 
(NDCC) 
National Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council 
(NDRRMC),  
Office of Civil Defense since 2010 
Singapore Singapore Civil Defence Force 
(SCDF) 
Ministry Home Affairs. 
Since 1986 
Singapore Civil Defence Force 
(SCDF) Agency, 
Ministry Home Affairs 
Thailand National Civil Defence Committee 
(NCDC) since 1979 
Department of Disaster Prevention 
And Mitigation Agency, Ministry of 
Interior. 
Since 2002 
Vietnam Central Committee of Flood and 
Storm Control (CCFSC) (1990) 
Department of Natural Disaster 





Overall, the idea of advancing the ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster 
management was the result of the socialization and persuasion of the ASEAN 
member states representatives in the AEGDM working group first, and in the 
ACDM committee after. These committees presented a deeper cooperation in the 
field of disaster management as a more efficient and effective way to tackle the 
disasters affecting the region (rational-choice logic). The ARPDM was the 
regional reflection of a general effort of the ASEAN region to better manage 
disasters. Changes in the way disasters management was conducted were primary 
evident at country level with the establishment of national agencies dealing with 
disasters. The following step was the elevation of the discussion at the regional 
level and the launch of a process that led to the development of a regional 
programme in 2004 in line with the priorities set by the AEGDM expert group. 
In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat saw in this rational advancement the 
possibility to further advance ASEAN integration (sociological logic). Therefore, 
the ASEAN Secretariat distinguished itself for a proactive role in assisting the 
working groups and in reflecting on its own structure to better adhere the 
regional changes.  
 
4.2.2 The Reference 
The role of the reference is assigned to the actor(s) that act as a model for the 
norm first proposed by the leader in more general terms as objective. The 
ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was inspired 
by the Yokohama Strategy established in 1994 by the UN, as well as by the 




The 1994 Yokohama strategy was at that time the recognised global norm on 
natural disaster management (United Nations 1994). The ASEAN Regional 
Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was developed by ASEAN to 
implement the provisions established by the 1994 strategy. The five objectives 
(ARPDM, 10) reflect the principles stated in the Strategy (United Nations 1994, 
8) in a case of normative emulation (mimicry). Firstly, the ARPDM calls for the 
establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework 
reflecting the principle of implementing the instruments necessary to enhance the 
prevention and preparedness at all levels (United Nations 1994, para I.3). 
Secondly the ARPDM proposes the strengthening of capacities, exactly as done 
by the 1994 strategy (United Nations 1994, para I.4). Thirdly, the ARPDM aims 
at promoting the sharing of resources and information as proposed by principles 
5 and 6 of the strategy (United Nations 1994, para I5-I6). Fourthly, the ARPDM 
calls for enhancing the collaboration and strengthening of partnerships, as the 
Yokohama strategy in its point 8 (United Nations 1994, para I.8). Fifthly, both 
documents recognised the importance of raising awareness and educate the wider 
public on disaster management as a tool to prevent vulnerability of the 
population (ARPDM, 5 and United Nations 1994, para I.7). Finally, the ARPDM 
(p.9), as well as the Yokohama strategy (United Nations 1994, para I:8) both 
underline as disaster management efforts should be carry on primarily by the 
national state according to the identified needs. Yet, here is probably the biggest 
difference: who decides which are the population needs? In the ARPDM is 
clearly up to the state to define the population needs, whereas the Yokohama 




The ARDPM incorporated the norms provided by the 1994 Yokohama Strategy. 
Yet, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Philippines and the ADPC, inspired their work 
by looking at other examples of existing mechanisms of regional cooperation 
(AHA Centre Official 2017a). In fact, the ARPDM was not the first ASEAN’s 
attempt to improve the regional coordination on pressing issues related to 
disaster management. The ASEAN Secretariat developed its first proposal for a 
regional programme on disaster management to the AEGDM Meeting in 1996 by 
looking at the already existing experiences (AHA Centre Official 2017a) in a 
case of synthesis (Börzel and Risse 2012a) inspired by an historical 
Institutionalist logic.  
 
Cooperation bodies addressing specific trans-border hazards were already in 
place both at regional (ASEAN Environment-Haze Technical Task Force) and 
sub-regional level (Mekong River Commission and ESCAP/WMO Typhoon 
Committee) (Wilderspin and Casals 2007). In 1995 ASEAN established the 
ASEAN Environment-Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF). Two years later 
the HTTF produced the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP). The plan 
aimed at guiding the process of strengthening the ASEAN capacity to address 
transboundary haze pollution issue. In 2002 ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed by ASEAN member states and it 
entered into force five months later on 25 November 2003. Also established in 
1995, replacing the Mekong Committee already established in 1957, was the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). The MRC is an inter-governmental 
organisation directly working with the governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Thailand and Viet Nam to jointly manage the shared water resources and the 
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sustainable development of the Mekong River. Since its established in 1995, the 
MRC has implemented a series of procedures on data and information sharing 
and monitoring of the water use. Since 1968 the ESCAP/WMO Typhoon 
Committee coordinates the planning and implementation of measures required 
for minimizing the loss of life and material damage caused by typhoons. It is an 
intergovernmental body composed of fourteen members, out of which seven 
from South East Asia (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam)12. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) represents another 
experience of disaster management and relief cooperation implemented in the 
Asia Pacific region since 1993. The inter-sessional meeting is one of the four 
meetings composing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 13 . The ARF was 
established in 1994. It is a forum for security dialogue in Asia and it is composed 
of 27 members: the ten ASEAN member countries, the ten ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States), as well as Papua 
New Guinea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, 
Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. All these existing experiences means 
the discussion for a ASEAN regional programme on disaster management was 
not happening in a vacuum and that experiences at different levels already 
provided a good repository of lessons to be learned by the ASEAN Secretariat 
and the ASEAN member states’ working groups. The most important lesson here 
                                               
12 Non ASEAN members are China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Republic 
of Korea and the US. 
13 The other three inter-sessional meetings focus on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Maritime 




was the need to prioritize a bottom-up approach to assure the support of the 
regional initiative at national level (AHA Centre Official 2017a). For this reason, 
the ARPDM regional programme was more of a compilation of projects 
proposed by ASEAN member states, rather than a programme organised around 
agreed principles (as was the case for the EU Civil Protection Action 
Programme).  
 
In summary, discussions around the implementation of an ASEAN regional 
programme on disaster management cooperation started in ASEAN around mid-
90s. The ASEAN ARPDM Programme was mainly influenced by the UN 1994 
Yokohama strategy, as well as by other existing experiences in the regions, such 
as the Environment-Haze Technical Task Force or the Mekong River 
Commission. In the first case, the ASEAN Secretariat and the ACDM committee 
followed a more sociological institutional logic, emulating an example 
considered as legitimate by ASEAN member states because of its international 
support (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In the second case, the link with other 
lessons coming from other regional experiences was less direct and the result of a 
synthesis of various experiences inspired by a more historical logic demonstrated 
by the link of the ASEAN regional programme, with already existing sub-
regional initiatives. After the establishment of an ad-hoc committee, the creation 
of a joint programme was the consequent step to further increase the cooperation 
on issues related to natural events also in other sub-regional initiative (see the 
case of the Regional Haze Action Plan), showing how this was a clear pattern 
within the region (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In addition to that, many of the 
projects proposed by ASEAN member states under the ARPDM Programme 
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were the results of existing cooperation on specific issues from reducing the 
effects of haze pollution to the implementation of regional initiatives to reduce 
typhoon’s effects (ARPDM, 2014), demonstrating how the ARPDM was a 
regional initiative well linked with already existing sectorial initiative in the 
region.  
 
4.2.3 The Sponsor 
The sponsor is the actor(s) that financially sustained the steps that led to the 
further institutionalization. In the case of the discussion that led to the 
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM), ECHO played the role of the sponsor via the implementation of its 
DIPECHO Programme in South East Asia.    
 
In 1996 the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) launched 
the Disaster Preparedness ECHO Program (DIPECHO) aiming at promoting 
disaster preparedness as an approach to reduce vulnerability and exposure of 
people to risk and disasters, as well as the economic costs of them. South East 
Asia was identified as one of the targeted disaster-prone regions 14 . The 
DIPECHO programme was launched to support the United Nations International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The programme also helped 
fulfilling Article 2 of ECHO’s mandate (European Commission 1996), which 
states that its activities in the field should: ‘ensure preparedness for risks of 
natural disasters or comparable circumstances and use a suitable rapid early 
                                               




warning and intervention system’ (ECHO 2004). Although mainly focused on 
reinforcing community-based disaster management (CBDM), DIPECHO also 
promoted initiatives at national and regional level. In South East Asia DIPECHO 
sponsored short-term projects targeting Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Philippines, Vietnam and -from the second phase- Thailand (Wilderspin and 
Casals 2007). 
 
Although discussion about implementing a ASEAN regional programme on 
disaster management were on-going since the 1970s, and although ECHO only 
got involved in the region in 1997, its DIPECHO programme sponsored the 
workshops that led to the creation of the ASEAN ARPDM Regional Programme. 
It first sponsored an exploratory study that pointed on the main actors in the 
South East Asia region, and identified ASEAN as the best regional organization 
to invest in to reinforce the Southeast Asia regional coordination. The 
exploratory study also suggested ADPC as the potential implementer of ECHO 
projects in the region. Overall, the EU involvement in supporting the regional 
capacity building on disaster management issues was mainly done via the PDR-
SEA project coordinated by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC).  
 
The first exploratory diagnosis study was commissioned by ECHO and 
conducted by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 
of the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium (Vrolijks 1997). The 
study focused on Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam, as well as Bangladesh as ‘it was felt by ECHO that given its high 
vulnerability, it should be included in the first phase of the DIPECHO regional 
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programme’ (Vrolijks 1997, pt. Preface). The study identified the hazards, the 
response structures and the specific policies already in place at community, 
national and regional levels and the external support that was already in place in 
the region.  
Looking at the existing mechanisms for regional cooperation in the broad region, 
the CRED preliminary study analysed the existing regional programmes and 
exchanges mechanisms. The study explored possible cooperation with both 
ASEAN, as well as the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation 
(SAARC). Yet, the study recommended ASEAN as the preferred partner 
organization as ‘involvement of ASEAN could generate strong backing for the 
programme, and could further contribute to the co-operation between ASEAN 
and the EU’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2).  
The added value of cooperating with ASEAN was mainly due to the fact that 
three of the targeted countries were already ASEAN members (the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam) and that three more will have joined in the near future 
(Laos PDR and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999). On the other hand, 
Bangladesh was the only country member of South Asia Association for 
Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and not member of ASEAN.  
 
The preliminary study provided by CRED was also instrumental in mapping the 
potential interlocutors in the region and suggesting some of them as potential 
partners for ECHO. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) which will 
become one of the main implementer of the DIPECHO Programme and in 
particular a key actor in the establishment of the ASEAN ARPDM Programme is 
suggested by the CRED report as ‘the main specialised regional disaster institute 
 
219	
in the region, [which] can provide an excellent resource for disaster management 
programmes under DIPECHO.’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2). On the other hand, 
when presenting the Mekong Committee established in 1957, the CRED study 
clearly stated ‘its [technical] experiences may be valuable to the programme, but 
it is doubtful if the Mekong Committee as such would provide a feasible forum 
for the implementation of the DIPECHO programme.’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2).  
 
Overall, the CRED preliminary study pointed out ASEAN as a potential partner 
for ECHO programming on disaster management in the region and it also 
suggested the potential partner(s) as implementer of the DIPECHO programme. 
As a follow up to the CRED report, ECHO sponsored a regional consultation 
meeting in Bangkok, Thailand on March 1998 (ECHO 1998). The workshop 
organised by ADPC was attended by representatives of national administrations 
and regional organizations, NGOs and experts in the field of disaster 
preparedness and prevention. It provided a list of recommendations to the 
implementations of the DIPECHO Programme, but it also served as an important 
network event that facilitated discussions among EU representatives and the 
relevant stakeholders from the region. Different points were raised during the 
plenary discussion, including the need to interact with both the national and local 
levels, while supporting the efforts at regional level and the necessity to include 
Malaysia and Indonesia in the programme.  
 
The DIPECHO Programme in Southeast Asia was officially launched in 1998. 
Since then DIPECHO supported small short-term biannual projects at 
community level, as well as nine regional actions for a total of 3.2 million Euros 
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(ECHO 2007). The first two DIPECHO Action Plans were implemented in 1998 
and 2000 and covered countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. Since the third 2002 DIPECHO Action Plan Thailand 
was also included among the targeted countries (see Bildan 2003, 12). A regional 
dimension was present in all first three Action Plans (1998, 2000 and 2002). 
 
ECHO interventions at regional level were implemented in the framework of the 
Partnerships for Disaster Reduction – South East Asia project (PDR-SEA) 
(Bildan 2003).  The project was implemented by ADPC in collaboration with the 
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP). 
One of the main aims of the project was to reinforce the links between national 
disaster management offices (NDMOs) by sharing knowledge and experiences. 
During its three phases (2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006) the project created 
different opportunities for exchanging experiences and practices. Three 
practitioners’ workshops were organized in 1999, 2001 and 2004 to facilitate the 
knowledge sharing and regional newsletter and distribution lists created to 
facilitate the information sharing among the different stakeholders. Most 
importantly, under this project, the facilitation of ACDM’s ASEAN Regional 
Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was undertaken (Loy Rego and 
Le Huu Ti 2007).  
 
Overall, ECHO supported the initial phase of the institutionalization of ASEAN 
disaster management policy. It provided the necessary financial support to the 
workshops that led to the creation of the ASEAN ARPDM Regional Programme. 
Following a sociological Institutionalist reading, the overall logic behind 
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ECHO’s involvement in the region can be linked back to its willingness to be 
perceived as a legitimate actor in the region, as demonstrated by the preliminary 
study commissioned by ECHO to identify the most suitable counter-part(s) in the 
region. Nevertheless, the facilitation of the ARPDM programme was an 
unintended consequence of ECHO’s support that was initially targeting the 
national level more than the regional one. ECHO’s initial aim in the region was 
to influence the attention of ASEAN member states towards preparedness 
initiatives, streamlining disaster preparedness and moving beyond their 
traditional focus on relief (European Commission Official 2017d). On that, the 
influence of ECHO was limited. Although ECHO’s officials repeatedly 
advocated during the preparatory meeting sponsored by ECHO for the inclusion 
of ‘disaster preparedness’ as one of the components of the programme, the 
discussion within the ASEAN expert groups (AEGDM first and ACDM after) 
were focused more on disaster relief (Wilderspin and Casals 2007). 
 
4.2.4 The Implementer 
 
The implementer is the actor in charge of the technical implementation of the 
norm that will advance the institutionalization process. In the first step of the 
process, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) led the drafting of the 
ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM).  
 
Already in 1996 the Manila AEGDM noted the interest advanced by the Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in collaborating to the drafting phase of 
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the ARPDM Plan. The support received from other actors during the drafting 
phase is also explicitly mentioned in the ARPDM (2004, 5). 
 
The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) is an independent non-
governmental organization, established in 1986 as a technical capacity building 
center. Based in Thailand, it works in the Asia region, and in particular in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi-
Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam (ADPC 2018). In 
November 2000 ADPC launched the Regional Consultative Committee (RCC) 
on Disaster Management. The RCC is a regional dialogue platform to promote 
advocacy and exchange of experiences in disaster risk reduction (DRR) among 
its members. It was in its role of RCC’s Secretariat that the ADPC organised a 
meeting of disaster management officials from Lao PDR, Cambodia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Viet Nam as a way to establish itself as a legitimate local actor in 
the domain of disaster management in the region. The meeting, founded by EU 
ECHO, was held in Bangkok on October 2001 with the participation of 
representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat and Mekong River Commission. 
The meeting defined the process for drafting the ARPDM. The process was 
divided in three main steps.  
 
First, the ASEAN Secretariat conducted an assessment of regional needs and 
capacities, by sending a questionnaire to ASEAN member states. Eight countries 
responded by listing national identified needs and potential areas bilateral and 
multilateral areas of cooperation. The prioritised area of multilateral cooperation 
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included joint trainings and simulations, disaster information sharing and the 
implementation of an inventory of existing capacities in ASEAN region. 
Moreover, a bilateral cooperation proposal to strengthen the cooperation on flood 
mitigation and prevention was advanced Cambodia and Viet Nam. Second, an 
ASEAN workshop with representatives of all ten members states was organised 
in Bangkok on March 2002. The workshop was jointly organised by ASEAN 
Secretariat and the ADPC with funding support from ECHO. The workshop 
discussed the general principles, the objectives, the components and the priorities 
of the ARPDM. Third, between May and September 2002 the ASEAN 
Secretariat sent a call for projects to ASEAN member states. Five countries 
responded with project proposals that were integrated in the ARPDM. 
 
Based on the results of the March 2002 workshop and the project proposals sent 
by ASEAN member states, the ADPC drafted the ARPDM framework document 
emulating a process already implemented in other experiences such as the 
adoption of the Haze Action Plan (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The 12th 
AEGDM Meeting held in September 2002 in Hanoi (Vietnam) endorsed 
ARPDM. A series of three regional workshops were organised with the support 
of the UNHCR to discuss the operationalization of the ARPDM programme. The 
first workshop on “Partnership for Emergency Preparedness” was held on 
February 2003 in Jakarta (Indonesia). As the momentum was right for increased 
regional cooperation on disaster management, the ACDM decided to meet 
quarterly to discuss the advancement of the regional programme. The second 
workshop organised in Manila in 2002 decided to prioritize the sub-components 
of the ARPDM and give the possibility to discuss the programme with relevant 
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stakeholders. The third workshop on “Operationalising ARPDM” was finally 
organised in October 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. It set the priorities among the 
sub-components according to five criteria: the requirement of little or no funding 
assistance, the effectiveness of impact, a short-term duration, the regional scope 
and the no requirement of technical assistant for the implementation.  
 
After receiving the necessary endorsements from the relevant committees, the 
ARPDM was officially launched in Bali (Indonesia) in May 2004. The event was 
funded by the UNHCR15 and saw the participation of Government officials from 
ASEAN member states responsible for disaster management, as well as donor 
representatives and UN agencies officials (OCHA 2004). The purpose was not 
only to officially launch the ARPDM programme, but also to engage donors and 
partners in mobilizing financial and technical support for the ARPDM.  
 
Overall, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) was the key 
implementer in the process the led to the drafting of the ARPDM Programme 
tanks to its knowledge of similar processes already implemented in the region. 
Active since the initial phase in 1996, the ADPC supported the ASEAN 
Secretariat in establishing and respecting the different phases of the drafting 
process proving itself a legitimate actor in the disaster management domain. 
ADPC provided an overview of the existing experiences within ASEAN, 
highlighting the positive and negative aspects of the different initiatives and 
suggesting a way of proceeding for drafting the ARPDM. By doing so it 
                                               
15 The event was part of a to-day orientation workshop on UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) 
and International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) organized for the ASEAN Committee on 
Disaster Management (ACDM). 
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emulated similar processes already implemented in similar fields, such as the 
Haze Action Plan (AHA Centre Official 2017a). These consultation and drafting 
processes proved to be successful in finalising the regional programme in similar 
fields and where replicated also in the case of the ARPDM.  
Chapter conclusions 
The launch of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM) in May 2004 was the first step towards the institutionalization of a 
regional cooperation on disaster management.  
 
The chapter analysed this outcome by analysing the mechanism that triggered 
this development. After briefly discussing the similarities and differences of the 
ARPDM Programme with the EU Civil protection Action Programme, the 
chapter identified four main actors which by performing certain action(s) 
produces the analysed outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013). The ARPDM was 
produced thanks to the initiative and leadership of the ASEAN member states 
grouped in the Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and in the 
ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), and thanks to the 
ASEAN Secretariat (the leader(s)). In a case of socialization, the AEGDM and 
the ACDM acted as socialization’s platforms where the need of increasing the 
level of cooperation among ASEAN member states became a national priority 
for all ASEAN member states. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat saw in the 
further integration of disaster management, a potential advancement of the 
ASEAN regional integration and further supported this institutional advancement 
by implementing persuasive initiatives, such as the creation of a position 
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exclusively dedicated to disaster management. The process launched in 1996 was 
based on the norms contained in the Yokohama strategy established in 1994 
(United Nations 1994), as well as on the already existing experiences in the 
region (the reference(s)). The modes of indirect influence represent cases of 
normative emulation (mimicry) of a norm recognised as legitimate (the 1994 
Yokohama Strategy), and of synthesis of already existing initiatives in the 
region. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) performed the entire 
process as well as the actual drafting of the document, which was key in 
connecting the different actor of the mechanism (the implementer). With the aim 
of being perceived as a credible and reliable actor in the ASEAN region, the 
ADPC influenced the institutionalization process by emulating the process 
followed in similar areas of cooperation, such as the 1997 Haze Action Plan. The 
ADPC was also instrumental in involving ECHO in founding the set of meetings 
and workshops that finally led to the adoption of the ARPDM programme (the 
sponsor). ECHO aim was to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region. By 
sponsoring those workshops ECHO tried to influence the process by trying to 
impose a form of resource dependencies pressure.  
 
By analysing the mechanism that triggered the implementation of an ASEAN 
programme on disaster management, the chapter argues that the EU cannot be 
considered an influential actor in disaster management policy for ASEAN 
member states. Even if often forgot in the existing analysis (Pennisi di 
Floristella, 2015) the initial discussion about a regional approach to disaster 
management originated within ASEAN and was not triggered by any inter-
regional exchange. This outcome reinforces the idea advanced by scholars such 
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as Acharya (2004) that internal dynamics and local processes should be carefully 
analysed before advancing any claim of regional influence. Moreover, by 
analysing the actual programme, the chapter shows how the implemented norms 
were taken by the 1994 Yokohama strategy and not by the EU Action 
Programme in the field of Civil Protection launched in 1997, one year after the 
discussion has started within ASEAN member states. 
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Table 5. The ARPDM actors and mechanism overview 
  Objective of influence Rationale behind influence Modes of influence 
Leader ASEAN member states 
representatives via the 
AEGDM and ACDM 
Committees supported by 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Advance the ASEAN regional 
cooperation in the field of 
disaster management 
For ASEAN MS as a more 
efficient, effective way to 
respond to disasters (RCI); 
For ASEAN Secretariat as a 
way to advance ASEAN 
regional integration (SI); 
• Socialization 
• Persuasion 
Reference 1994 UN Yokohama Strategy 
and other existing regional 
initiatives 
ASEAN Regional Programme 
on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM) 
The Yokohama Strategy is 
recognised as legitimate (SI); 
Existing initiative provide a 
known and trusted example to 





Sponsor ECHO via DIPECHO 
programme and PDR-SEA 
project 
Financial support to norms 
(workshops and events)  
ECHO aim was to be perceived 
as a legitimate actor in the 
region (SI); 
• Failed resource 
dependences pressure 
Implementer Asia Disaster Preparedness 
Center (ADPC) 
Drafting the ARPDM 
Programme 
Wanted to be perceived as a 
legitimate actor in the region on 
disaster management (SI); 
Interested in receiving the 
funding to implement the 
project (RCI); 
• Emulation of previous 




From a plan to a framework: the institutionalization of 
the AADMER Agreement 
 
This chapter focuses on the second part of the process that led to the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster management: the signature in 
2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response (AADMER). The 2004 ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster 
Management (ARPDM), as discussed in the previous chapter, set the 
establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework as its 
first objective to be reached within one year. Therefore, following the adoption 
of the ARPDM Programme, the ten ASEAN member states, together with the 
ASEAN Secretariat, started a discussion on the adoption of an ASEAN 
framework on disaster management. The December 2004 Tsunami accelerated 
this process quite consistently. The AADMER was signed by the ten ASEAN 
member states on July 2005, only seven months after the catastrophic disaster, 
but entered into force four years later in December 2009.  
 
The chapter responds to the research question by looking at the mechanism that 
triggered the institutionalization of the agreement. The chapter starts by 
presenting the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response (AADMER) as the outcome to be explored. After introducing the main 
features of the AADMER Agreement, the chapter continues by providing a 
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comparative analysis between the 2005 AADMER (ASEAN 2005c) and the 
potential EU homologue: the 2001 EU Council Conclusion on the establishment 
of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (European Council 2001b). The 
AADMER agreement is compared with the EU Community Mechanism 
implemented by the European Union in 2001 with the aim of identifying the 
similarities and differences between the two regional agreements. The two 
agreements, considered as the basis of the two regional cooperation agreements, 
are compared in terms of objectives, principles and general obligations. After 
comparing the core elements of the two legal texts, the analysis focuses on the 
practices that follow the introduction of the two regional agreements. In 
particular, the chapter presents and compares the EU and ASEAN response 
cycle, the regional funding system and the regional exercises. The overall aim of 
this comparative analysis is to see if similarities exist between the EU and the 
ASEAN agreements. Similar outcome would be the first element to prove that 
some forms of influence happened between the two regional organisations, 
confirming what the EU centric literature (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Börzel and 
Risse 2009, 2012a) and EU discourses suggest.  
 
After assessing the potential effects of the EU influence on ASEAN by focusing 
on the outcome, the second part of the chapter is dedicated to unpacking the 
mechanism behind the adoption of the AADMER (the outcome). Following a 
process tracing analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2013) the mechanism is explained 
in terms of actor engaging in an activity. In line with the framework proposed by 
this thesis, the mechanism is unpacked by looking at the four intervening actors: 
the leader (which first advanced and lead the implementation of the norm), the 
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reference (an existing similar instrument that could have inspired the norm), the 
sponsor (which provided the means to implement the norm) and the implementer 
(which materially supported the writing process of the norm). The analysis looks 
at the institutional logics behind the interventions of the four actors, as well as at 
the modes implemented to influence the process.  
5.1 The Outcome: the AADMER Agreement 
The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER) is the single legally binding document that provides ASEAN with a 
framework for regional cooperation and coordination disaster management. The 
10 ASEAN Foreign Affairs Ministers signed the AADMER on 26 July 2005 in 
Vientiane, Lao PDR. With Philippines ratification of the agreement in September 
2009, the AADMER entered into force on 24 December 2009.  
 
5.1.1 The main features 
The AADMER Agreement is divided in eleven parts covering all phases of 
disaster management from before, during and after a disaster. The first part sets 
the general provisions of the agreement, including the objectives, principles, 
general obligations and use of terminology. The second part focuses on the 
Disaster Risk Identification, Assessment and Monitoring. The third part is 
dedicated to Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. The fourth part covers Disaster 
preparedness, and it includes an early warning component. This part contains 
also the provisions for the establishment of an ASEAN Standby Arrangements of 
assets and capacities. The fifth part is dedicated to the Emergency Response, the 
sixth one to Rehabilitation and the seventh one to the Technical Co-operation 
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and Scientific Research. The eighth part contains the provisions for the 
establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance. 
The ninth part clarifies the institutional arrangements, including the Conference 
of the Parties, the National Focal Points, the Secretariat and the Financial 
Arrangements. The tenth part covers the Agreement procedures and part eleventh 
the final clauses for the adoption.  
 
The AADMER Agreement is operationalized via the implementation of the 
AADMER Work Programmes (2010-15 and 2016-20). The first AADMER work 
programme was launched seven months after the adoption of the AADMER 
Agreement during the 15th meeting of the ACDM held in March 2010 in 
Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat 2010b). It was implemented in two phases (2010-
2012) and (2013-2015) and focuses on four components namely Risk 
Assessment, Early Warning and Monitoring (RAEWM), Prevention and 
Mitigation (P&M), preparedness and Response (P&R) and Recovery.  
 
The 2010-15 AADMER Work Programme is the action plan translating the 
provisions of the AADMER Agreement into concrete output. It substituted the 
ARPDM Programme adopted in 2004 (See Chapter 4 on ARPDM) but 
differently from it, the AADMER Work Plan is a top-down programme drafted 
by looking at the provisions established in the AADMER Agreement and not 




5.1.2 Similarities and differences with EU Community Mechanism 
At EU level, the civil protection mechanism is ruled by a multitude of legal text. 
Starting with the Council Decision of 23 October 2001 on establishing a 
Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection 
assistance intervention (European Council 2001b), recast by the 2006 proposal to 
the Council (European Commission 2006), and then by the 2007 Council 
Decision establishing the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (European 
Council 2007c). Yet, as the main scope of this chapter is to assess the potential 
influence of the EU towards ASEAN on disaster management, it seems logic to 
limit the analysis to EU decisions agreed before the signature of the AADMER 
Agreement (July 2005).  
 
Similarities can be found in the general objectives of the cooperation. In 
particular in the type of losses that the two regional mechanisms aim at reducing, 
as well as in the broad understanding of the types of disaster that should be 
addressed and prevent. Yet, these elements can be linked back to the general 
understanding within the disaster community, as set already in the 1994 
Yokohama guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and 
mitigation agreed by the first UN World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction, held in Japan in May 1994 (see Chapter ARDPM) and in the 
Concluding Forum of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR) held in Geneva in July 1999 (IDNDR 1999).  
 
The ASEAN regional cooperation agreement in disaster management set as its 
main objective the reduction of disaster losses in terms of both lives and social, 
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economic and environmental assets (ASEAN 2005, art.2). The differentiation 
between people and property is also present within the objectives set by the EU 
in the 2001 Council Decision (European Council 2001, art.1.2). Yet, this can be 
linked back to the Yokohama guidelines in which the rising impact of natural 
disasters was already set in terms of both human and economic losses (United 
Nations 1994, art.1). In terms of type of disasters that can activate the regional 
mechanism both regional organizations have a broad understanding. The 
AADMER agreement defines disaster as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning 
of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or 
environmental losses.’ (ASEAN 2005, art.1). Adding that hazards can be induced 
by natural events or human actions (ASEAN 2005, art.5). Similarly, the EU 
refers to ‘the protection in the event of natural, technological, radiological and 
environmental emergencies’ (European Council 2001, preamble 1). Although the 
1994 Yokohama guidelines refers only to natural disasters, already at the end of 
the proclaimed UN decade on Natural Disaster Reduction in 1999, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan stated in his closing address ‘No doubt there will always be 
genuinely natural hazards […] but today’s disasters are sometimes man-made, 
and nearly always exacerbated by human action or inaction’ (IDNDR 1999, 10).  
 
The two organizations differ in the basic principles of the regional cooperation, 
as well as on the potential area of action, in the openness of the response 
mechanism and in the identification of the provider of assistance. In short, they 





The two organisations based their initiatives on two different sets of principles, 
which reflect two different ways of conceptualizing the objective of the regional 
cooperation. The AADMER agreement emphasises the principle of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (ASEAN 2005, art.3.1), affirming how the overall 
responsibility for the co-ordination should remain in the hands of the affected 
member states (ASEAN 2005, art.3.2). The principles of solidarity and 
partnerships should guide the cooperation, yet this should be calibrated to the 
situation and possibility of each member state (ASEAN 2005, art.3.3). The EU 
decision put the emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, stating that 
‘Community mechanism would provide added value in supporting and 
supplementing national policies […] If the preparedness of the requesting 
Member State is not sufficient for an adequate response to a major emergency in 
terms of available resources’. The EU decision suggests a weakness of the 
requesting states that should therefore be helped, such language would sound 
simply unacceptable for ASEAN member states. 
 
Regarding the area of intervention, on one side the AADMER mainly refers to 
assistance that should be provided within the territory of the ASEAN member 
states that ratified the agreement. Article 11.1 set the provision of assistance as 
follow: ‘if a Party needs assistance in the event of a disaster emergency within its 
territory, it may request such assistance from any other Party, directly or through 
the AHA Centre, or, where appropriate, from other entities’, where ‘party’ is 
defined in the agreement as the ASEAN member state that signed up the 
AADMER agreement (ASEAN 2005, art.1.11). Differently, the EU set the area 
of intervention both inside and outside the union (European Council 2001, 
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art.1.2). In practical terms, all 15 ASEAN interventions between 2011 and 2016 
took place within ASEAN territory (see Annex 3). On the other hand, the EU 
mainly responded outside the union territory (European Commission Official 
2017a). 
 
The AADMER agreement involved ASEAN member states only, although 
listing among assisting entities ‘State, international organisation, and any other 
entity or person that offers and/or renders assistance to a Receiving Party or a 
Requesting Party in the event of a disaster emergency’ (ASEAN 2005, art.1.1). 
Differently, the EU mechanism for civil protection was since the beginning open 
to Central and Eastern Europe states that in 2001 have the status of candidate 
countries, as well as Cyprus, Malta and Turkey (European Council 2001, art.7). 
Yet, the mechanism is mainly directed in coordinating the assistance ‘provided 
by the Member States and the Community’ (European Council 2001, art.1.2). 
This difference is a clear example of how much previous experience influenced 
the AADMER agreement. ASEAN countries are often receivers of international 
assistance, therefore one of the main challenges for them is to coordinate the 
assistance coming from outside. On the other hand, EU member states did not 
experience big challenges in coordinating the assistance coming from outside 
Europe, as they are mainly provider of assistance.  
 
Overall, the two frameworks also differ in their emphases. The AADMER 
agreement gives equal attention to all phases of the crisis, such as prevention, 
early warning, preparedness, response, whereas the 2001 EU Council Decision 




 ASEAN EU 
Objectives Protect people & property from 
both natural and man-made 
disasters 
Protect people & property from both natural 
and man-made disasters 
Principles Sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and solidarity 
Subsidiarity 
General obligations:  
Which area? Within ASEAN country Inside and outside EU 
Which level of 
openness?  
ASEAN country only All EU Member States participate in the 
Mechanism, as well as Iceland, Norway, 
Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. 
Which assistance? Both coming from inside and 
outside ASEAN (State, IO, and 
any other entity or person) 




The response cycle 
The AADMER agreement set ASEAN emergency response cycle in its Part V. 
The ASEAN response is divided in four different steps visually presented as a 
big letter P. The so-called P Action Planning is composed of the first two phases 
–the leg of the P-which provide the situational awareness and establish the needs 
of the population. The second two steps are part of the operational phase –the 
circular O phase- of the operation that implies the execution of the plan and its 
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dissemination. The first phase focuses on understanding the situation on the 
ground. A rapid assessment is conducted by the AHA centre together with the 
ERAT team, as well as national representatives, as soon as the affected country 
request for help or authorizes the assessment. This first assessment provides 
information about the scale and impact of the disaster, the geographical spread 
and –most importantly- the populations’ needs and is used to priorities the 
objectives of the response. The second phase clarifies the objectives of the 
response and develops an Emergency Response Action Plan (ERAP). This plan 
is shared with the national focal points of ASEAN member states by the AHA 
centre with the aim of matching needs with offers. During the third and fourth 
phases the AHA centre coordinates the external assistance towards the national 
focal point of the affected country according to the ERAP Plan. The mobilisation 
to the disaster-affected areas is then directly done by the national NDMOs. The 
AHA Centre does not mobilise help directly to the affected areas of the receiving 
country. 
 
Overall, the ASEAN emergency response mechanism works under three main 
principles. Firstly, support can be mobilised only if the affected country makes a 
request or approve the offer of assistance. Secondly, the ultimate responsible for 
the coordination of mobilised resources is the receiving country. The AHA 
centre can only help the affected country in coordinating the offered assistance. 
Thirdly, assistance should be provided on the bases of the needs and not on what 
member states –or other donors- can offer. Based on this, the AHA centre carries 
on three main activities. First, it provides operational support to the NDMO of 
the affected country by sending AHA centre’s staff on the ground and by 
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mobilising ASEAN-ERAT teams. Second, once the affected country’s needs are 
set, it matches requests from affected member states with offers. Third, it 
facilitates the logistics by coordinating the transportation of relief items from 
ASEAN member states, as well as from the ASEAN warehouse Delsa.  
 
The EU 2003 Decision set the rules to implement the Community Mechanism 
and lay down the rules for interventions inside and outside the EU16 (European 
Commission 2003, art.28-34). Overall, the EU response whiting the territories of 
participating states is divided in five steps: alert, request for assistance, response, 
disengagement and lessons learnt. Firstly, during the Alert phase (European 
Council 2001, art.28) the affected participating state should inform the MIC 
about the potential transboundary effects of the emergency. Vice versa, if the 
MIC detects a potential emergency occurring in a participating state is required 
to take contact with local authorities. Differently from the AADMER provisions, 
which start the response phase with the request of assistance coming from the 
affected states, the EU includes the early warning component already as part of 
the response, whereas for ASEAN the early warning activities are part of the 
disaster preparedness phase (ASEAN 2005, art.7). Secondly, similarly to 
AADMER provisions, if assistance is required, the affected country should 
present a formal request to the ERCC. Yet, differently from the AADMER rules, 
this formal request to the ERCC should already include a needs assessment 
specifying the needs, the types of support requested, as well as the location. 
Thirdly, similarly to the AHA Centre, the ERCC has the role to match requests 
                                               
16 In order to compare the two regional instruments the following analysis will focus only on the emergency 
plan activated by the EU in case of a crisis within its territory or within the territory of a participating state.  
Moreover, the 2003 Decision refers to the EU centre as MIC. As the MIC was renamed ERCC in 2012 I will 
use to the most recent name.  
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of assistance with offers of assistance. Fourthly, EU provisions, differently from 
AADMER agreement, include disengagement and reporting and lessons learnt as 
phases of the response (European Commission 2003, art.33-34). 
 
Overall, the principles set in the AADMER agreement can be found back in the 
EU provisions (European Council 2001b; European Commission 2003a). As for 
the ASEAN case, the affected state should request the EU mechanism support 
and it remains the only responsible for the intervention (European Council 2001, 
art.5.3). The based-needs principle is also present in both regions (European 
Commission 2003, art.13.d). These principles are not exclusively coming from 
the two regions, but can be traced back to the principles set by the 1991 United 
Nations Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations (United Nations 1991).  
 
Funding the regional coordination 
 
 ASEAN EU  
Budget • AADMER Fund (2005) 
• AHA Centre Fund (2011) 
• Partners contributions 
• EUSF Fund (2002) 
• Civil Protection Financial Instrument (2007) 
 
 
The costs of the ASEAN disaster response are covered through three funds. 
Firstly, the AADMER Agreement established the ASEAN Disaster Management 
and Emergency Relief Fund (ASEAN 2005, art.24). The fund is based on the 
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voluntary contribution of ASEAN member states and is administrated by the 
ASEAN Secretariat. Because of its voluntary basis, the AADMER Fund proved 
to rely too much on the benevolent contribution of the more threat countries 
without providing a solid background to implement long-term initiatives and to 
sustain the current costs. Therefore, in 2011 the ASEAN member states launched 
the AHA Centre Fund. This second mandatory fund is an annual contribution of 
30.000 USD equally paid by all ten ASEAN member states. Thirdly, the AHA 
Centre receives financial support by its partners.  
 
The financial costs of the EU civil protection actions are mainly covered by EU 
member states, but non-EU countries participating in the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism can also contribute. Some specific actions can be supported by the 
activation of EU structural funds. In particular, following the severe floods that 
affected Central Europe in 2002, the EU set up the European Union Solidarity 
Fund (EUSF) dedicated to supporting the response to major natural disasters 
within Europe (European Council 2002). Since November 2002 the EUSF has 
been used for supporting the response of 24 different European countries to 76 
disasters for a total amount corresponding to over 5 billion Euros (European 
Commission 2017). 
 
In 2007 the European Commission established a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument (European Council 2007c). The budget dedicated to the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism for the 2007-2013 period was 189.8 million Euros. The 
budget doubled for the subsequent 2014-2020 period. The total current budget is 
368.4 million Euros (out of €1 billion per year assigned to DG ECHO). Out of 
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this budget 223.7 million Euros is to be spent on prevention, preparedness and 
response actions inside the EU, and 144.6 million Euros is for actions abroad 
(European Parliament 2015).  
 
Before 2007 civil protection activities were financed under the Community 
action programmes in the field of civil protection. Starting with the first 
programme set up for the period January 1998 - December 1999, with a budget 
of €3 million (European Council 1997b). Following with the second programme 
set up for the period January 2000 to December 2004, with a budget of EUR 7.5 
million (European Council 1999b). The second programme was then prolonged 
for other two year with additional 4 million budget to cover the period January 
2005 to December 2006 (European Council 2004).  
 
Overall, the founding systems of the two regional organizations differ on the 
main element that the ASEAN contributions are mainly voluntary, whereas the 
EU commission can count on a multi-annual budget. Yet, with the establishment 
of the AHA Centre Fund, as the mandatory fund directly administrated by the 
AHA Centre, ASEAN moved away from its traditional approach. The adopted 
system of funding resembles in its flexibility the EU Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument adopted in 2007. The adoption by ASEAN member states of a 
mandatory system of funding was what triggered the attention of many scholars 
and expert that looked at the adoption of the AADMER and its instrument as an 
innovation within ASEAN. Yet, the financial instruments are just one element 









Exercises are key components of the preparedness phase of disaster management 
activities. Simulate a disaster in order to test the phases of the response and the 
activation of the tools implemented by the organisation is a fundamental activity 
that often produces lessons-learned reports and resolve in a revision of the 
standard operating procedures. Both the AHA centre and the ERCC conduct 
regular exercises.  
 
ASEAN regional response is tested during ARDEX. These comprehensive 
simulations are organised every two years by the AHA centre in cooperation 
with the host country. So far, a total of six ARDEX exercises have been 
organised and funded by the host country, together with ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners and other partners.  
 
Scenarios are designed according to the regional priorities and the objective of 
testing specific emergency procedures. The AHA Centre developed the ARDEX 
Handbook, a manual to guide the simulation that was tested for the first time in 
Brunei Darussalam during ARDEX 2016 (ARDEX-16). Participants to ARDEX-
16 included ASEAN NDMOs, as well as response teams from relevant UN 
agencies, international organisations and partners. ARDEX-16 was supported by 
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the German Agency for Development and Cooperation (GIZ) and the German 
Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), together with 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (AHA Centre 
2016a). The technical support provided under the Global Initiative on Disaster 
Risk Management (GIDRM17) and it mainly focused on four activities. First, the 
development of a standardised referee system, including a manual and a training 
course to evaluate member states’ performance during the ARDEX exercise. 
Second, GIDRM provided Map Action team deployed during the exercise. Third, 
it provided a focus on Inclusive Disability Awareness. Fourth, GIDRM provided 
a training session on Crisis Communication for Senior Executives. On top of 
these activities, BBK presented the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to ARDEX 
participants (GIDRM 2016). 
 
The AHA centre is also involved in two extra-regional simulations. Since 
2009, the ASEAN Regional Forum exercise (ARF-Direx) engages ASEAN 
member states with countries outside the region. The ARF-Direx is organised 
every two years by one ASEAN member state and one non-ASEAN ARF 
participating country. It mainly focuses on inter-agency coordination and civil-
military coordination. It is one of the most inclusive simulation exercises in the 
Asia Pacific region. 
 
The East Asia Summit Direx involves ASEAN member states, as well as 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Russia and US. These 
                                               
17 The GIDRM is a German initiative aiming at improving disaster risk management worldwide. The 
GIDRM started in August 2013 with a budget of 15.750 million Euros, including co-financing from the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). It focuses on 14 countries, including Indonesia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (GIZ 2017). 
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exercises represent the opportunity for AHA centre to compare its response 
mechanisms with other relevant stakeholders involved in the management of 
disasters. As it is not a member of the EAS Summit, it is worth noticing that the 
EU is not part of these exercises.  
 
At EU level ECHO funds both full-scale and modules exercises in the field of 
civil protection. These exercises are organised by civil protection national 
authorities and co-financed by the EU. Not all EU member states participate as 
these exercises are organised at sub-regional level. Between 2011 and 2016 
ECHO supported a total of 23 civil protection exercises18. The EU does not 
organise full-scale exercises involving all EU member states. The EU capacity is 
mainly tested via table-top exercises organised by the European Commission 
(ECHO 2016). 
 
ASEAN and EU do not have joint simulation exercises, yet they regularly meet 
during the ARF-Direx exercises (ARF Direx 2011, 2013, 2015).  
 
5.2 The Mechanism 
The second section of this chapter will unpack the mechanism that explains the 
process that led to the implementation of the AADMER Agreement. Similar to 
the previous chapter and in line with the analytical framework of this research, 
                                               




the mechanism is based on the interaction of four actors: the leader, the 
reference, the sponsor and the implementer.  
 
5.2.1 The Leader 
The ACDM Committee in cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat led the 
implementation of the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief 
(AADMER) Agreement. As leaders, they influenced the binding character of the 
AADMER agreement as well as the exceptionally short-term conclusion of the 
negotiation. 
 
The establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework 
was the first objective of the 2004 ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster 
Management (ARPDM). During its first meeting held in Brunei Darussalam in 
December 2003, the ACDM agreed to focus on strengthening the cooperation by 
implementing a cross-border framework to assure a concerted, coordinated and 
comprehensive regional approach to disaster management (AHA Centre 2016g). 
The work towards a regional framework on disaster management was presented 
by the ACDM as the next natural step in the institutionalization process of this 
issue (AHA Centre Official 2017a).  
 
The ACDM tasked the ASEAN Secretariat to start exploring the different options 
and to conduct few feasibility studies. A team of three people were assigned to 
this task: the Head of the ASEAN Secretariat Environment & Disaster Unit at 
that time (Mr. Raman), the first full timer assigned since the beginning of 2004 
to the disaster file at the Secretariat (Adelina Kamal) and an external consultant. 
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Results were presented in October 2004 at the second ACDM meeting held in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
 
The ARPDM aim was to draft a framework on the ASEAN regional disaster 
management. Yet, The ARPDM was not clear on the form of this framework. By 
using the word “framework” the door was left open to two options: a more 
binding agreement or a less binding declaration. After the first exploratory phase 
conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat, and the sense of urgency for concrete 
actions provoked by some event as stated by one of the representative of the 
ASEAN Secretariat at that time: ‘There were some landslides in Philippines in 
that period, it was not a disaster, but we felt the urge to act’ (AHA Centre 
Official 2017a), the ACDM was convinced about the need to have a stronger 
cooperation on disaster management, not just a declaration. However, the actual 
form of this arrangement was not yet agreed (AHA Centre 2016g). In order to get 
more directions on the issue and to persuade also the representatives less 
convinced of the need to have a binding agreement, the ACDM suggested a 
meeting at ministerial level. The first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster 
Management (AMMDM) was convened on December 2004. ASEAN Ministers 
tasked the ACDM to start the negotiation process for implementing a regional 
instrument on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, later named as 
AADMER. The AMMDM ministerial meeting agreed on the need to have a 
more binding agreement and not a general declaration, and allowed a maximum 
of one-year period to negotiate and finalise what was later named ASEAN 




Less than three weeks later, on 26 December 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
struck six countries across Asia. Four ASEAN Member States were severely hit, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, the others experienced the indirect 
consequences of the disaster in their homeland. Although the majority of 
ASEAN Member Countries were still dealing with the recovery phase and the 
effects of the Tsunami, the ACDM started the negotiation process by forming a 
Negotiating Committee, consisting of ACDM members assisted by legal 
representatives. 
 
The Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami 
took place and produced the “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency 
Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention of the Aftermath of 
Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004” (ASEAN Secretariat 
2005). This document represented the momentum. Although, the term to 
negotiate the AADMER Agreement was set in one year, it took only 4 months to 
get to an agreement. A process that started in February 1976, with the Concord I 
Declaration, and that lasted for 30 years, experienced an unprecedented 
acceleration. Overall, although at the beginning the ACDM and the ASEAN 
Secretariat led the discussion around a regional framework as the next step in a 
path set by the ARPDM Programme, the Tsunami reinvigorated the logics of 
efficiency and effectiveness and the meetings at all levels were used to persuade 
also non-affected member states to sustain the process.    
 
As negotiations were driven by the personal and direct experiences of the 
negotiator in facing the effects of the Tsunami it was really hard for the 
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representatives of the  less affected member states to hold back the advancement 
of the negotiation as they were pressured by the stories of their colleagues and 
the sense of urgency for the development of a binding regional response they 
were asking for (AHA Centre 2016g, 12). 
 
5.2.2 The Reference 
The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER) agreement references a global norm such as the UN Hyogo 
Framework for Action, as well as a local norm as the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution, presenting itself as a synthesis of global and local 
norms.  
 
The AADMER agreement is presented as the ‘one and only legally-binding 
instrument in the world relating to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)’ 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2010a). Indeed, the introduction of the AADMER 
Agreement directly reference the Hyogo Framework of Action, as well as the 
previous UN General Assembly Resolution on disaster preparedness and 
response as the international norms that guided the adoption of the ASEAN 
regional agreement. Yet, the AADMER agreement is also presented as being 
‘one of the first documents of its kind in the world’, a ‘truly ASEAN’ document 
built on the experiences of the practitioners working in the region (AHA Centre 
2016g, 12). Indeed, on one hand, the AADMER Agreement follows the idea 
already advanced by the Yokohama Strategy, and reinforced by the Hyogo 
Framework that institutions, mechanisms and capacities should be developed and 
strengthen at all levels (HFA 2005, para. 12.b). Not only it proposes the creation 
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of the AHA Centre, but also the adoption of other elements such as the creation 
of Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements (SASOP), 
as well as the implementation of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency 
Response and Simulation Exercises (ARDEX) or the provisions for an ASEAN 
Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. On the 
other hand, the AADMER Agreement fails to fully implement the international 
norm in three main aspects. First, the elements introduced by the AADMER are 
mainly focused on improving the preparedness and response to disasters instead 
of really covering the broad spectrum of disaster management. Although part 
three of the AADMER Agreement is dedicated to disaster prevention and 
mitigation, there are no provisions dedicated to the improvement of these 
components of disaster management. Second, the HFA calls for the 
empowerment of communities and local authorities as a way to build more 
resilient communities (HFA 2005, para. 13f). Yet, the AADMER Agreement 
does not offer any concrete provision in this direction and leave the 
strengthening of local management capability to the initiative of each single 
member state (ASEAN 2005c, para. 2b). Finally, the HFA reiterates the 
provision already advanced by the Yokohama Strategy that the responsibility for 
disaster management lies primarily with states, while adding that states are 
required to acknowledge the role of the international stakeholders as potentially 
helpful is supporting the state in the response (HFA 2005, para. 13b). Yet, the 
AADMER Agreement limited the emphasis on the role of state as the primary 
responsible to coordinate the emergency response and to assure the protection of 
its population on its territory, without acknowledging the role of the international 
system in providing effective response (ASEAN 2005c, para. 3.1). These three 
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main aspects of the UN Hyogo Framework for Action were left out as 
profoundly different from the local understanding of disaster management (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a). 
 
The Hyogo Framework was not the only reference inspiring the AADMER 
Agreement. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (HAZE 
Agreement) provided the local reference to the AADMER Agreement (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a). The Haze Agreement was adopted in June 2002 in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia and entered into force in November 2003. Even if, not all 
ASEAN countries ratified the HAZE agreement immediately, with countries 
such as Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines still discussing the ratification 
process and at the time of the discussions around the AADMER, elements of the 
HAZE agreement were incorporated in the AADMER (ASEAN Secretariat 
2017a; Tan 2005). Interestingly enough, the HAZE Agreement established an 
ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (ACC) 
(ASEAN 2002, para. 5). Currently, the ACC is not yet operational and the 
ASEAN Secretariat serves as the Interim ACC. Also similarly to the AADMER 
Agreement the HAZE Agreement contains provisions for the establishment of 
national focal points (ASEAN 2002, art.6) 
 
Overall the two ASEAN Agreements propose very similar regional structures to 
coordinate the response. Yet, the AADMER is much more detailed in 
establishing concrete provisions to improve the coordination and the response. 
This is explained by the fact that while discussing the AADMER Agreement the 
ASEAN national NDMOs were still responding to the 2004 disaster, meaning 
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they were testing their provision while negotiating them. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the AADMER Agreement contains a much deeper level of detail 
in presenting the instruments that need to be implemented or the need to 
reinforce exercises as an element to increase the preparedness of the regional 
response (AHA Centre Official 2017a).  
 
To conclude, the AADMER Agreement appears as a synthesis of a global norm, 
the Hyogo Framework of Action, as well as of a local norm, the ASEAN 
Agreement of Transboundary Haze Pollution. If the first one was chosen as the 
recognized legitimate global norm, the second one was the most known similar 
efforts done in the region.  
 
5.2.3 The Sponsor 
From a financial point of view, even if all ASEAN dialogue partners cooperating 
with ASEAN on issue related to disaster management declare the support to the 
AADMER agreement as the main objective of the cooperation, the 2004 
adoption of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM) and the signature of the AADMER Agreement in 2005 were not 
sponsored by any external partner. The exploratory feasibility studies conducted 
by the ASEAN Secretariat following the ACDM’s directives were conducted as 
an internal process funded by the ASEAN Secretariat itself and mainly used to 
sponsor the external consultant hired by the ASEAN Secretariat following the 
inputs of the ACDM (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Even more, the Negotiating 
Committee that for 4 months discussed the main provisions of the AADMER 
Agreement following the 2004 Tsunami was also an ASEAN initiative, that did 
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not used any external found. ASEAN member states’ representatives were 
travelling to the meetings on the expenses of their own national budgets and this 
was never questioned, as there was a need to show ‘as much pro-activity as 
possible’ in the ASEAN response to the Tsunami (AHA Centre Official 2017a; 
Thai Diplomat 2017).  
 
Overall, the financial support to this phase of the institutionalization process was 
provided by ASEAN member states and not financial donors, simply because the 
time was just too short to start looking for external funding (AHA Centre Official 
2017a). The support from ASEAN member states to the process was a rational 
decision based on the need to quickly show initiatives after the devastating 
Tsunami (Ong 2005; Thai Diplomat 2017).  
 
5.2.4 The Implementer 
The Negotiating Committee, consisting of ACDM members assisted by legal 
representatives was the main driver behind the technical implementation process 
of the AADMER agreement. The Negotiating Committee took inspiration from 
ASEAN member states national experiences (Thai Diplomat 2017; AHA Centre 
Official 2017a) in what can be defined as a case of emulation. In addition to that 
a strong component of learning was also present, in fact ‘negotiations were 
driven by the personal and direct experiences of the negotiators in facing the 
effects of the Tsunami. They were discussing the regional agreement, while still 
dealing with the devastating effects of the crisis at home. They knew what was 




Overall, three elements of the AADMER negotiation show how the initial 
emulation of national practices was influenced by the experiential learning the 
followed the 2004 Tsunami. 
 
Firstly, the Negotiating Committee started the discussion around the need to 
create an institution to translate in practice the regional instrument. The 
provisions for such a body were not present in the first draft of the AADMER, as 
this was not reflecting the traditional attention given by ASEAN member states 
to the principle of sovereignty, according to which the only coordinator during a 
disaster is the affected member states (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The idea of 
creating a regional instrument to assist the affected country was proposed by 
Indonesia and was based on the lessons learned that, even if during a disaster the 
affected country should own the leadership of the response and that this response 
should be driven by the needs of the affected country and not by the offer 
received, this might be hard to be done, as the state might be vulnerable and 
without the necessary manpower to deal not only with the emergency, but also 
with the incoming offers of assistance. The idea was to implement an institution 
able to assist the affected state in dealing with all the incoming offers: a body 
that can help the affected country in selecting the help according to its needs, as 
‘it is easy to supply support than to receive support. Support is hard to manage 
during a disaster, a lot of supplies are not useful and are a burden for the 
recipient.’ (AHA Centre Official 2017a). 
 
Overall, ASEAN member states representatives agreed on the need to implement 
an institution that could play the role of doorkeeper in supporting the affected 
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member state(s). The main elements imagined for this institution were the need 
to be permanent, fast moving and capable of transforming decision in action in a 
very short time as this was an important element missing in the response to the 
2004 Tsunami (AHA Centre Official 2017a) Different options were discussed. 
Starting with the ACDM, that was considered inappropriate for this role as 
decision-making body with meetings held twice per year. The ASEAN 
Secretariat was also considered, but this was in contrast with the need of having a 
fast-moving team of expert. The decision of implementing an independent 
operational institution with operational procedures different from the ASEAN 
Secretariat was agreed (AHA Centre Official 2017a). 
 
As indicated in the ASEAN Security Community Plan, the initial name imagined 
for this new institution was ‘ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre’, but the 
name was too focus on the humanitarian assistance, potentially leaving space to 
intervention in humanitarian crises created by conflicts. Therefore, some member 
states opposed the initial name obtaining to add the ‘disaster management’ 
element to the name, streamlining the focus of the centre towards humanitarian 
consequences of disaster and not conflicts. Finally, a consensus was reached 
around the current name ‘ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Disaster Management 
and Humanitarian Assistance’. Yet, the acronyms remained the same: AHA 
Centre (AHA Centre 2016g). 
 
The second element of discussion among member states representatives was on 
how to fund the implementation of the agreement (see outcomes in the previous 
sections). Some member states were in favour of an equal annual mandatory 
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fund, some others wanted the fund to be voluntary. The ASEAN Disaster 
Management and Emergency Relief Fund (ADMER Fund) was finally designed 
to be annually, but voluntary in line with the so called ‘ASEAN way’ approach 
to regional cooperation. Nevertheless, as this fund relied too much on the 
benevolent contribution of some member states undermining long-term 
initiatives, the decision to provide the AHA Centre with a budget based on a 
mandatory fund equally paid by all ASEAN member states was agreed (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a).  
 
Finally, the importance of exercises as tools to increase preparedness was 
recognised and implemented by the majority of ASEAN member states, but the 
response to the 2004 Tsunami showed the differences in the national approaches. 
From the use of different languages and technical terminologies, to the more 
practical way of organising the response, these differences contributed to the 
chaotic regional response. ‘ASEAN states all wanted to help by sending their 
specialised personnel on the ground, but they didn’t know how to do it, there was 
the need to have joint training as the only way to get to know each other’ (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a). 
 
To conclude, the Negotiating Committee was initially set up to negotiate the 
AADMER Agreement as this was the same process already implemented in other 
similar situation, as part of the ASEAN approach to institutionalization processes 
(historical Institutionalist logics), but after the Tsunami discussions were driven 
by a rational-choice logic. The main rationale driving the negotiating committee 
was not only to negotiate an agreement that could reach the approval of all 
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ASEAN member states, but also to develop an efficient and effective framework 
to improve the regional capacity to respond to similar disasters in the future.  
 
Chapter conclusions 
The signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER) in July 2005 represents the second analysed 
step towards the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional cooperation on 
disaster management. It followed the adoption of the ASEAN Regional 
Programme on Disaster management (ARPDM) analysed in Chapter 4 and it 
provided the legal basis for the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating 
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).  
 
The chapter started by looking at the main features of the proposed outcome by 
comparing it with the EU Community Mechanism implemented by the 2001 
Council Decision. The comparison of the two texts highlights similarities and 
differences of the two agreements. Although sharing the same objective, 
meaning the protection of people and property from both natural and man-made 
disasters, the two regional agreement differ in some substantial elements, such as 
the core principle (solidarity vs. subsidiarity), the area of response (within 
ASEAN only vs. inside and outside EU), the involvement of external partners 
(ASEAN only vs. open to non-EU participant states) and the provision of 
assistance (from inside and outside ASEAN vs. member states provisions). The 
comparative analysis continued by focusing on three aspects introduced by the 
two regional agreements and further developed in the following years. First, the 
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analysis of the two response cycles highlights how ASEAN and the EU share the 
principle that the regional mechanism should be activated by the affected 
member states, which remain the only responsible for the intervention. 
Moreover, both ASEAN and the EU share the principle according to which the 
response should be driven by the actual needs of the population. Yet, this 
principle can be linked back to the more general principles shared by the disaster 
management community and cannot be attributed to the diffusion of norms 
between the two organizations. Second, the two regions fund the response to 
disaster in two different ways. The explanation for these differences should be 
linked back to the different governance of the two organizations. Third, ASEAN 
and EU differ in the set-up of their respective regional exercises. Regional 
exercises are the main preparedness tool, yet the AHA Centre coordinates 
regional exercises that involve all ten ASEAN member states, whereas the EU 
sponsored sub-regional exercises coordinated by leading EU member states.  
 
After comparing the two mechanisms implemented by ASEAN and the EU and 
concluding that the partial similarities can actually be linked back to globally 
recognised principles and are therefore not the result of a form of regional 
influence by the EU, in its second part, the chapter applied the thesis framework. 
By looking at the four main actors which by performing certain action(s) 
produces the analysed outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013). The AADMER 
Agreement was produced thanks to the initiative and leadership of the ACDM 
supported by the ASEAN Secretariat (the leaders). They followed a path-
dependency logic at the beginning, as well as a more rational-choice approach 
after the Tsunami. As already showed in the previous chapter, the main mode of 
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influence was persuasion between ASEAN member states’ representatives within 
the ACDM. The AADMER agreement was drafted by constantly referring to the 
2005 Hyogo Framework as the recognised legitimate source, as well as by 
looking at already existing regional experiences, and in particular by looking at 
the 2002 ASEAN Haze Agreement as a known and trusted reference (the 
reference(s)), in a learning process characterized by the synthesis of these 
different norms. Overall, the discussion was conducted within the dedicated 
meetings and the negotiating committee (the sponsor) following a logic of 
efficiency and efficacy. Finally, the AADMER Agreement was drafted by the 
Negotiating Committee (the implementer), which worked on the text while 
coordinating the response to the 2004 Tsunami. The lessons learned while 
responding directly influenced some of the features present in the AADMER 
agreement. The Negotiating Committee responded at historical Institutionalist 
logics, but after the Tsunami discussions moved on a more rational-choice 
dimension.  
 
By analysing the mechanism that triggered the signature of the AADMER 
agreement, it is argued in this chapter that the EU cannot be considered a point of 
reference in disaster management policy for ASEAN member states. The Hyogo 
framework and the Haze Agreement played a much prominent role in influencing 
the adoption of the AADMER Agreement, which was already planned by the 
ARPDM programme. Overall, the AADMER Agreement was an ASEAN 
product, inspired by the Hyogo Framework and influenced by the Tsunami 
experience. Overall this chapter shows how if EU’s actions are analysed in 
comparison with other actors’ actions or local initiatives, the limitation of EU 
 
260	
actorness, defined as the capacity to influence the regionalization process (p.33), 





Table 6. The AADMER actors and mechanism overview 
  Objective of influence Rationale behind 
influence 
Modes of influence 
Leader ASEAN member states 
representatives via the ACDM 
Committee supported by 
ASEAN Secretariat 
A regional binding framework 
on disaster management 
negotiated in an exceptionally 
short period 
In the first phase presented as 
the natural next step after the 
ARPDM programme (HI); 
After Tsunami presented as a 
more efficient, effective way 
to respond to disasters (RCI); 
• Persuasion 
Reference 2005 UN Hyogo Framework 
of Action; ASEAN 
Transboundary haze Pollution 
Agreement 
ASEAN Disaster 
Management and Emergency 
Response Agreement 
(AADMER) 
The Hyogo Framework is 
recognised as legitimate (SI); 
HAZE Agreement as a known 
and trusted example to take 
inspiration from (HI); 
 
Indirect: 
• Synthesis of global 
(Hyogo) and local (HAZE) 
norms (learning) 
Sponsor ASEAN member states Financial support to the 
Negotiating Committee  
ASEAN member states aim 
was to show action to public 
opinion after Tsunami (RCI); 
 
Implementer Negotiating Committee, 
including ACDM and legal 
representatives, and ASEAN 
Secretariat  
Drafting the AADMER 
Agreement 
It was part of the path started 
by the ACDM (HI), but 
accelerated after the Tsunami 
(RCI); 
• Emulation of local 
experiences with elements 







From a framework to an instrument:  
the institutionalization of the AHA Centre 
 
This chapter focuses on the last phase of the process that led to the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster management: the 
operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre).  
After focusing on the processes that led to the ASEAN Regional Programme on 
Disaster Management (Chapter 4) and the AADMER Agreement (Chapter 5), 
this chapter analysis the AHA Centre, as the actual instrument implemented by 
ASEAN to coordinate the response. The chapter directly responds to the research 
question by providing an analysis of the different components of the mechanism 
behind the setting up of the AHA Centre and its instruments. It explores the EU 
influence in comparison with the other internal and external actors’ involved. It 
starts from the assumption suggested both by the literature on EU-ASEAN 
relations and EU discourses that the instruments implemented by ASEAN to 
respond to disaster were inspired by the instruments already developed by the 
EU, thanks to a series of inter-regional cooperation projects (see Chapter 3). 
Building on the assumption that in a process-tracing analysis the investigated 
causal mechanisms is defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system, which produces 
an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan 1996, 52), the 




The first section introduces the AHA Centre as the main outcome of the process. 
The AHA Centre is the final stage of the institutionalization process that lead to 
the regionalization of ASEAN disaster management. Initially outlined in the 
AADMER Agreement the evolution of the AHA Centre can be divided in three 
key moments. Firstly, between October 2007 and December 2009 the AADMER 
Agreement was approved, but it was still under ratification. During this period 
the AHA Centre started operating in interim mode. Secondly, between January 
2009 and November 2011, after the entry into force of the AADMER 
Agreement, but before the signature of the agreement on the official 
establishment of the AHA Centre, the Centre acted in provisional mode. Finally, 
between December 2011 and December 2016 the AHA Centre had its first five 
years of operational phase. During the first five years of official establishment 
the AHA Centre developed a set of instruments to better respond to disaster 
within the ASEAN region. 
 
The second section presents the mechanism that triggered the institutionalization 
of the instrument. This analysis starts by focusing on the actual set up of the 
AHA Centre, its premises and staff, as well as its technical and operational tools. 
Secondly, it focuses on the information tools implemented by the AHA Centre to 
monitor, coordinate and disseminate information. Finally, it analyses three of the 
operational instruments currently coordinated by the AHA Centre: The 
Emergency and Response Team (ERAT), the Disaster and Emergency Logistics 
System (DELSA) and the Executive Programme (ACE). Each analysis is divided 
in two steps. First, each instrument is introduced and compared to existing 
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similar EU tools. This first analysis explores in detail if the ASEAN instruments 
are in the end really similar to the one of the EU as both the literature on the EU-
ASEAN relation (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a) and 
EU discourses suggest. The analysis of the outcomes already gives an idea of the 
potential influence of the EU. In the second part, the black box of the mechanism 
that led the creation of each instrument is then revealed, clarifying the role of the 
different actors in the process. As in a process tracing analysis the mechanism is 
always composed by an actor engaging in an activity (Beach and Pedersen 2013), 
the analysis of the mechanism looks at four actors for each instrument. First, the 
leader is the actor which first advanced the idea, and which lead its 
implementation. Second, the reference is an existing similar instrument that –at 
least initially- inspired the AHA Centre’s instrument. Third, the sponsor is the 
actor that funded the instrument or that provides the means to implement the 
analysed instrument. Fourth, the implementer is the actor, typically an agency, a 
private company or a seconded consultant that materially supported the AHA 
Centre in the building of the instrument. Overall, all these actors played a key 
role in the building of each analysed instrument. Without one of them the final 
instrument would not be implemented or would have been different.  
 
6.1 The outcome  
The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (AHA Centre) is the operational manifestation of the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). 
Although operational since October 2007, the AHA Centre was officially 
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established on 17 November 2011 during the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, 
Indonesia, through the signature of the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management by ASEAN Foreign Ministers.  
 
The objectives of the AHA Centre are outlined in the article 20 of the AADMER 
Agreement, signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 26th July 2005 in Vientiane 
(Lao PDR) and entered into force on 24 December 2009. The objectives of the 
AHA Centre are to: (I) facilitate the cooperation among ASEAN member states 
by coordinating the network of National Focal Points (NFP) and by receiving, 
consolidating and disseminating data, analysis and recommendations sent by 
NFPs, while also facilitating technical cooperation and scientific research among 
ASEAN NFPs; (II) facilitate joint emergency preparedness and response by 
regularly reviewing regional standby arrangements, as well as by coordinating 
regional emergency response and by maintaining regional standby arrangements; 
(III) operationalize regional coordination mechanisms for emergency 
preparedness and response, such as the Disaster Emergency Logistics System 
(DELSA), the Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT), the ASEAN 
Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) and the 
AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE). The AHA Centre is an inter-
governmental organisation, which receives its strategic directions by the ASEAN 
Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), composed by the heads of the 
National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) of ten ASEAN Member 
States. Since its official establishment in November 2011, the AHA Centre has 
responded to 14 emergencies and provided preparedness and assessment 
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missions other 4 times. The AHA Centre response is focused on ASEAN 
member states only, and in its first five years of existence, seven ASEAN 
countries benefit from the AHA Centre support (See Annex 3). 
 
6.1.1 The Interim AHA Centre 
The 2005 AADMER Agreement established the creation of the AHA Centre 
(ASEAN 2005b, art.20). Yet, as the AADMER Agreement was still under 
ratification process, the ACDM together with the ASEAN Secretariat stared the 
creation of the interim AHA Centre. The request to start the operationalization of 
the AADMER Agreement was already advanced by Ministers during the 38th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Vientiane, 26 July 2005 (ASEAN 
2005a, para. 35). The following year, during the 39th AMM in Kuala Lumpur, 
Ministers noted the Indonesia’s offer to host the AHA Centre (ASEAN 2006). 
Following AMM Joint Communications, an initial exploratory study on the 
implementation of the AHA Centre’s concept of operation was conducted by the 
ASEAN Secretariat, and then discussed during two regional workshops (ADPC 
2009). The two regional workshops produced the first AHA Centre’s Concept of 
Operation (Conops), as well as a road map and a nine priorities action plan. The 
9th ACDM meeting endorsed the three documents. During the 40th AMM July 
2007 Ministers officially endorsed the offer of Indonesia to host the AHA 
Centre. Three months later the interim AHA Centre started its activities. Between 
October 2007 and December 2009 the ‘interim’ AHA Centre mainly focused on 
providing disaster monitoring and analysis report to ASEAN Member States. 
Moreover, during its interim phase, the AHA Centre closely worked with the 
ASEAN Secretariat to start the implementation of the provisions established by 
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the AADMER Agreement, in particular by developing the ASEAN Standard 
Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). The interim 
AHA Centre starts presenting itself as a new regional actor by actively 
participating in the Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise 
(ARDEX) organised in Singapore. Firstly in 2007, with a marginal role on a 
communication exercise, testing the connectivity between the ten ASEAN 
member states’ operation centre. Then, in 2008 with a bigger role in filed 
simulation. 
 
6.1.2 Cyclone Nargis and the international recognition of the AHA 
Centre 
In May 2008 Myanmar experienced Cyclone Nargis, the worst disasters of the 
country’s history. According to Red Cross figures, 84.500 people died and 
53.800 went missing. Overall, the UN estimates that 2.4 million people were 
affected (IFRC 2011). Myanmar military Junta was initially strongly criticized 
for limiting the access of humanitarian reliefs to the country arguing that ‘the 
country could get by without foreign handouts’ (The New York Times 2008). 
Overall, Cyclone Nargis represents an important moment in the history of the 
AHA Centre as it tested for the first time the initial provisions of the AADMER 
Agreement. Cyclone Nargis tested the AHA Centre Standard Operating 
Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOPS). Moreover, the 
ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) was deployed for 
the first time, providing useful feedback on how to better coordinate with the 
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national government. Cyclone Nargis represented an important moment in the 
life of the AHA Centre also because ASEAN AHA Centre played the role of 
regional coordinator in big scale disaster, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of 
international partners. In the words of John Holmes, the UN undersecretary 
general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator at that time: 
‘Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the special 
position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those 
of the United Nations in working effectively with the government.’ (Collins 
2013, 144) 
 
The ruling junta of Myanmar initially refused international aid, putting under 
serious threat its own population. The initial refusal of international help, 
including the help offered by neighbours’ countries could be explained by the 
threat perception of Myanmar. On one hand the country experienced several 
invasions in its history, which explain its general mistrust in external countries 
(Collins 2013). On the other side, the military junta did not want to give a 
message of weaknesses by admitting it needs help in managing the situation. On 
5th October, three days after the disaster, the ASEAN Secretary General Surin 
Pitsuwan, asked ASEAN countries to support Myanmar (ASEAN Secretariat 
2009a). By that time Philippine and Singapore have already sent their experts to 
Bangkok to join the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team deployed 
by OCHA assembled there. The government of Myanmar agreed to open the 
door to the ERAT Team tanks to the good offices of Thailand. Thailand was 
strong supporter of the idea that Cyclone Nargis represented a good opportunity 
for ASEAN to show the added value of responding as one. Therefore, they 
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strongly lobbied with the Myanmar authorities to accept the deployment of the 
ASEAN Team (Thai Diplomat 2017). On 9th May the ASEAN-ERAT Team was 
deployed to Myanmar. The ERAT Team was composed of representatives from 
Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and the ASEAN 
Secretariat. The three members from Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore were 
initially deployed with the OCHA Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team 
(UNDAC), but with no possibility to enter the country. They finally managed to 
be the first responders accessing Myanmar as official members of the ASEAN 
ERAT team (ASEAN Secretariat 2008). The US government also supported the 
ASEAN deployment in Myanmar by providing the ICT equipment to the 
ASEAN team. These laptops, printers, scanners, satellites phones etc. were then 
donated to the AHA Centre (AHA Centre 2012, 31).  
 
6.1.3 The Provisional AHA Centre 
The AADMER Agreement entered into force in December 2009. Yet, an 
agreement establishing the working arrangements of the AHA Centre was still 
under discussion. The ACDM set up a Task Force in charge of negotiating the 
different elements of this agreement among ASEAN member states. The Task 
Force was composed of representatives of the Philippines, chair of the ACDM at 
that time, Singapore, vice-chair of the ACDM, Indonesia as host country, the 
Interim AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
The discussion lead by the Task Force covers all elements necessary to 
operationalize the AHA Centre: organisational structure, immunities, funding 
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contributions and supervisory mechanism. Although ASEAN member states 
initially agreed as ‘annual but voluntary contribution’, it was agreed to set up a 
specific fund to cover the costs related to the AHA Centre. The initial amount 
proposed by the ASEAN Secretariat was about 100.000 USD. However, the 
AHA Centre Fund was set-up with an annual and equal contribution set at 30.000 
USD per year. Indeed, it was already a good achievement as, apart from the 
ASEAN Secretariat, the AHA Centre was the only ASEAN body financed with 
annual and equal contribution. Indonesia played a key role in advancing the 
negotiations as the agreement was expected to be signed during the next ASEAN 
Summit hosts by Indonesia as incoming 2011 ASEAN Chair. Indonesian 
government set up a National Task Force to accelerate the negotiation on 
Establishment Agreement and to setting up the provisional AHA Centre.  
 
In between the entry into force of the AADMER Agreement and the signature of 
the agreement officially establishing the AHA Centre, the centre continued 
working. The ‘provisional’ AHA Centre not only continued the awareness 
activities initiated by the interim AHA Centre among ASEAN member states and 
partners, but it also continued building the back bone of the centre by developing 
a strategic plan, the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and by continuing the 
work on the SASOP. The Provisional AHA Centre was set up to start 
undertaking disaster monitoring, developing partnerships, defining operational 
procedures and preparing for the official launch of the Centre. The Provisional 
AHA Centre developed a strategic plan, the first Standard Operating Procedures, 
and the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC). Overall, the Provisional AHA 
Centre continued the activities initiated by the Interim AHA Centre in building 
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awareness by participating in events, workshops and conferences. One of the 
main examples being the participation to the 2011 ASEAN Regional Forum on 
Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) in Manado, Indonesia. 
 
6.1.4 The Fully Operational AHA Centre 
On 17th November 2011 the Agreement on the Establishment of the AHA Centre 
was finally signed at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia. However, the 
AHA Centre was not yet ready to operate. A Special ACDM meeting was 
convened to discuss how to face the financial gap. Although member states 
agreed on an annual and equal contribution, the fund was not yet ready to be 
used. Australia intervened to fill the gap by providing 1 million AUD via the 
Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), co-managed by 
Australia and BNPB of Indonesia. The ASEAN Secretariat was initially in 
charge of managing the fund and start hiring AHA Centre’s staff. The occasion 
of the Special ACDM represented also the opportunity to remove the 
‘provisional’ label on the AHA Centre name and to appoint Said Faisal as 
Executive Director. The Special ACDM also discussed the number of staff. 
Although afraid of not be able to cover positions after the end of the Australia’s 
support (set for the end of 2012), the ACDM agreed on a team of 13 members. 
Finally, the Special ACDM endorsed the AHA Centre Strategic Work Plan.  
 
The AHA Centre was not even celebrating its first anniversary when the 2012 
Myanmar Earthquake hit the regions of Mandalay and Sagaing affecting more 
than 6.000 people. Although the disaster was not as devastating as previous ones, 
the Myanmar Earthquake represented the first opportunity for the AHA Centre to 
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act as a fully operational body. In its five years of existence the AHA Centre has 
implemented (or revised) several instruments with the aim of making the 
cooperation among ASEAN countries more effective. As already mentioned, the 
ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) was firstly 
implemented during the interim phase of the AHA Centre in October 2007, soon 
becoming a key component of it. Yet, other instruments were implemented in the 
following years. On December 2012 the Disaster Emergency Logistics System 
for ASEAN (DELSA) was also implemented to swiftly provide relief items in a 
post-disaster emergency situation. In 2014 the AHA Centre Executive 
Programme (ACE) was launched as a six-month training course for ASEAN 
member states representatives. Finally, the AHA Centre implemented a range of 
disaster management communication tools to facilitate the communication 
among ASEAN member states, but also to increase the visibility of the centre. 
 
6.2 The Mechanism 
The second section of the chapter is dedicated to the mechanism explaining the 
institutionalization of the AHA Centre. The analysis focuses on five key 
elements that characterised the AHA Centre. First, it focuses on the backbone of 
the Centre, explaining the role played by the intervening actor in defining 
location, staff members, operational budget and ICT and logistic tools. Second, it 
analyses the collection, coordination and dissemination of information done by 
the AHA Centre, as an essential component of the daily activities of the Centre. 
Third, the analysis moved to the three main instruments at the AHA Centre’s 
disposal to respond to crises or to improve preparedness: the Emergency and 
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Response Team (ERAT), the Disaster and Emergency Logistics System 
(DELSA) and the Executive Programme (ACE). 
 
For each of these components of the AHA Centre the analysis will first, briefly 
presents the instrument and its similarities with the existing EU instrument, and 
second it will present the mechanism resulting from the interaction of four key 




Table 7. AHA Centre actors overview 
	
 Leader Reference Sponsor Implementer 











Consultants from New 
















Intermedix and Kyoto 
University 




















DELSA Malaysia UNHRD in 
Malaysia 

















6.2.1 The AHA Centre set up 
 
6.2.1.1 The Instrument 
The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (AHA Centre) is the hub coordinating the ASEAN regional 
response in case of disaster. Based in Jakarta with an initial staff of 12 people it 
is currently run by 24 staff members. The AHA Centre can currently count on a 
budget of almost 4 million dollars, out of which 500.000 USD provided by the 
equal contribution of ASEAN member States (AHA Centre 2012, 2016a). The 
setting up of the AHA Centre mainly took part in its first phase, between 2007 
and 2013.  During this period the location, the staff team, the initial budget and 
the ICT and logistic tools were set up. Moreover, all initial operational guidelines 
were agreed. The AHA Centre resembles the EU ERCC. Both centres operate 
24/7, they both coordinate respective member states response to crisis (while 
ASEAN focusing only on internal disasters and the EU also responding outside 
EU borders), and both aim at ensuring better preparedness and coherent response 
based on needs. Yet, was the EU the main source of inspiration for the AHA 
Centre? The following analysis will show how, under Indonesia leadership, other 
ASEAN partners influenced the setting up of the centre much more than the EU 






6.2.1.2 The Mechanism  
The Leader 
The Government of Indonesia was the main promoter behind the AHA Centre, 
providing the location, the first three staff members and their basic equipment. In 
a case of positive manipulation of utility calculation, the capacity-building 
support of Indonesia to the AHA Centre was instrumental in the creation of the 
AHA Centre as the operational tool of the AADMER Agreement. The positive 
incentives proposed by Indonesia to other ASEAN member states in forms of 
logistical and personnel assistance for the implementation of the AHA Centre, 
were instrumental in influencing other ASEAN member states about the 
feasibility of the project (Singaporean Diplomat 2017, Thai Diplomat 2017).  
 
Firstly, Indonesia offered to host the interim AHA Centre in the Indonesian 
National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (BNPB), located in Jakarta, 
in a case of positive manipulation of utility calculation (see Chapter 2). The 
Indonesian offer was well received by other ASEAN member states, as it assured 
an easier coordination between the AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat and 
the ten ambassadors of the ASEAN member states. The Indonesian government 
presented the offer to the other ASEAN member states as the most effective and 
economically convenient way (Rational-choice argument) to implement an 
instrument that was the next step in the process (Singaporean Diplomat 2017, 
Thai Diplomat 2017). Secondly, the government of Indonesia was the main 
manager of the Interim AHA Centre (October 2007- December 2009) and it 
directly appointed the BNPB senior official Pak Tabrani as Executive Director of 
Interim AHA Centre. The Provisional AHA Centre (January 2009 – November 
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2011) was resourced by Indonesian Government, which appointed Said Faisal as 
the Executive Director of the provisional AHA Centre in early 2011. Said Faisal 
was former Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy of Secretary-General of 
ASEAN for post-Nargis recovery in Myanmar. He was the only individual 
officially working at the Provisional AHA Centre. Thirdly, the other staff 
members of the Provisional AHA Centre were mainly composed by Indonesian 
secondments, or project staff hired by donors and partners. This was the case for 
Adi Bishry, Indonesian ICT expert in charge of the ICT system of the AHA 
Centre. Initially seconded from the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and 
Application of Technology (BPPT) to the Provisional AHA Centre between 
January and August 2011, joined the AHA Centre in September 2011. His 
position was later founded via Japanese Government funds. Similarly, Janggam 
Adityawarma, Risk Assessment, Early Warning and Monitoring Indonesian 
Expert, who become the second staff member to join the AHA Centre in October 
2011 (Japanese Diplomat 2017b). 
 
The Reference 
The exploratory study conducted in 2006 on the implementation of the AHA 
Centre’s concept of operation represents the moment in which different options 
for the structure of the AHA Centre were discussed. The background experiences 
of the AHA Centre staff were the instrumental vehicle in influencing the vision 
of the AHA Centre. This was directly inspired by the Indonesian experiences, as 
well as by the experiences of Australia and New Zealand as the most pro-active 
ASEAN Dialogue Partners in this phase (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Firstly, 
the fact that AHA Centre shares the premises with the Indonesian BNPB 
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facilitated the exchange of practices between the Indonesian and the AHA Centre 
staff. In addition, the two Directors of respectively the Interim and Provisional 
AHA Centre have previous experiences within disaster management departments 
of the Indonesia government or related agencies, and these were replicated and 
reflected in the AHA Centre (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Moreover, the 
majority of the AHA Centre staff has previous experience within the UN or in 
other dialogue partners (mainly Australia and New Zealand) and these 
experiences were also influential in the elaboration of certain practices (AHA 
Centre Official 2017b). Overall, AHA Centre staff member follow an efficiency 
logic by conceptualizing the structure of the AHA Centre following what they 
considered the best practices of the different institutions they experienced (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a; 2017b). Finally, although representatives from the AHA 
Centre and the EU have the opportunity to meet (exercises or joint visits) this 
was not followed up by concrete capacity-building activities, such as the ones 
conducted by New Zealand, US or UN OCHA (See below).  
 
The Sponsor  
The daily activities of the AHA Centres would not be possible without the 
regular funds provide by the ASEAN Member States, as well as without the in-
kind donations of Australia Government. Overall, Australia contributed to the 
AHA Centre operational budget for a total of 4.6 million USD between 2012 and 
2016. This was still the result of the pressure coming from the Australian public 
opinion after the terrible Tsunami (Australian Diplomat 2017b). Japan was also 
instrumental in the development of the AHA Centre. The Government of Japan 
sponsored the ICT equipment necessary for the daily activities of the AHA 
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Centre, as well as the two staff positions dealing with ICT and disaster 
monitoring. In the case of Japan, the main reason for being involved in the 
process was the new push to be perceived as a credible and supportive actor in 
the region (Japanese Diplomat 2017a). Overall, the type of influence on the AHA 
Centre was based on resource dependencies, visible in the choice made in the 
adoption of some of the technical tools adopted by the AHA Centre, such as the 
WebEOC information management platform, the ICT projects development 




The AHA Centre Strategic Plan was drafted during the provisional phase of the 
AHA Centre. Consultants provided by the US Technical Assistance and Training 
Facility (USTATF) and New Zealand government supported Said Faisal and the 
two representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat (Dhannan Sunoto and Adelina 
Kamal) in the conceptualization of the plan. These consultants also provided 
suggestions on the type of job profiles necessary to the AHA Centre to be 
operational (AHA Centre 2012, 31).  The Standard Operating Procedures of the 
AHA Centre were also developed with the support of the US Forest Service 
(USFS). The cooperation was part of the broader ASEAN-US and ASEAN-New 
Zealand cooperation and the dialogue partners’ offer should be read as a way to 
reinforce the cooperation with ASEAN (sociological institutionalism logic). It 
has proven very hard to rebuild the exact part influenced by the interconnection 
of the three actors: US and New Zealand representatives and AHA Centre’s staff. 
Overall, even if the US and New Zealand experiences inspired the AHA Centre 
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plan, they were not fully copied, but adapted to the local context and to already 
existing practices (AHA Centre Official 2017a, 2017b). 
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Table 8. The AHA Centre set up actors and mechanism 
  Rationale behind influence Modes of influence 
Leader The government of Indonesia Jakarta presented as a convenient location to 
better cooperate with ASEAN Secretariat and 
ASEAS member states’ Ambassadors (RCI) 
The implementation of the AHA Centre 
presented as the logic next step in the process 
(HI) 
Positive manipulation of utility 
calculations 
Reference Indonesian disaster 
Management Agency (BNPB), 
Australia and New Zealand 
The references are recognised as legitimate 
(SI) and efficient (RCI); 
Indirect: 
Synthesis based on lessons learned 
from previous experiences of the 
AHA Centre staff 
Sponsor ASEAN member states, 
Australia, Japan 
ASEAN member states’ logic was the natural 
consequence of previous institutionalization 
actions (SI); For Australia it was still the 
result of public opinion pressure post-
Tsunami (RCI); For Japan it was a way to be 
perceived as a credible actor in the region 
(RCI); 
Resource dependencies 
Implementer Consultants from US and New 
Zealand, in cooperation with 
AHA Centre Staff  
The logic for both US and New Zealand was 






6.2.2 The collection, coordination and dissemination of information 
	
6.2.2.1 The Instrument(s) 
The AHA Centre has two main tasks: the management of information and the 
resource mobilization. Since its ‘interim’ phase’ the AHA Centre has developed 
a set of communication tools to monitor, coordinate and disseminate disaster 
related information. These tools serve the AHA Centre both during emergency 
times as well as in ‘peace’ times (AHA Centre 2016f). Since early 2012 the AHA 
Centre uses the Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), which allow 
for real time information gathering about weather conditions and help the AHA 
Centre to detect potential disasters. The main aim of the DMRS is to inform the 
regional decision-making process about upcoming or potential disasters and to 
facilitate the preparedness phase. Between 2011 and 2013 the AHA Centre 
developed the ASEAN Disaster Information Network (ADInet), a dissemination 
system to store all information on potential or current disasters. ADInet is 
designed to inform the wide public and to raise awareness. Finally, between 2013 
and 2015 the AHA Centre focused on enhancing the connectivity with the 
national NDMOs by developing the Web-based Emergency Operations Centre 
(WebEOC), an internal management instrument to coordinate the response 
between the AHA Centre, national NDMOs and ERAT teams. During non-
emergency time information on disaster and on AHA centre’s activities are 
distributed to the wide audience (weekly updates and monthly newsletters). 
Although the main target of this information are the national focal points of 
ASEAN member states and the ASEAN-ERAT members, the AHA Centre 
distributes information also to partners, responder organisations, mass media, 
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and the wider public, in different format such as email, SMS, social media 
account and web publication. In the next sections the main characteristics of 
these instruments in comparison with the EU tools and their evolution will be 
analysed. 
 
The ASEAN-DMRS is a monitoring system that combines hazard data from 
different regional and international sources to provide real-time information on 
disaster. This information is both used to inform disaster prevention actions (in 
case of typhoons for example), as well as to guide response activities in the 
aftermath of the event. The ASEAN-DMRS is a multi-hazard software developed 
in 2012. Although the ERCC (MIC at the time of DMRS implementation) also 
uses several tools to monitor disasters, the EU was not taken as a point of 
reference at the time of the building up of the DMRS. This is evident if we look 
at the different sets of internally developed instruments used by the EU. Starting 
with the European Flood Alert System (EFAS), operational since October 2012 
and the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), operational since 
1998 developed by the Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES), one of 
the scientific institutes of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre 
(JRC). Following with the Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System 
(GDACS) a 24/7 alert system gathering data about natural events, such as 
earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical storms, floods and volcanoes. GDACS has been 
developed in 2004 by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre and jointly used 
by the EU and UN. The Pacific Disaster Center is one of the partners of GDACS, 
which provides information on tropical cyclone monitoring since 2005 (GDACS 
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2014). The development of the DMRS was led by the AHA Centre but inspired, 
founded and implemented by the US and its agencies. 
 
Since April 2013 the internal coordination among ASEAN member states is done 
via the WebEOC. This information-sharing platform developed in 2013 
connects emergency responders from the AHA Centre, national NDMOs and 
ERAT teams. It allows them to exchange information (text, pictures, etc.) during 
the emergency situation also by using mobile phones. The connection between 
the ERCC and the EU national focal points is also performed by an online 
platform. The EU Common Emergency Communication and Information 
System (Cecis) serves the purpose of connecting the Brussels based responders 
with the national focal points and the team deployed on the site of the disasters. 
Yet, differently from the WebEOC, Cecis is mainly used as a market place to 
match requests and offers of assistance then as information sharing tool. In fact, 
Cecis is less accessible then WebEOC. Updating information from the ground 
and via mobile phones is not possible, which makes it harder for the deployed 
team to upload information directly collected from the emergency cite (European 
Commission 2016b). Therefore, information is collected by the ERCC, which 
prepares a Deployment Plan in cooperation with the affected state. The 
deployment plan lists all the assets and expertise needed for the response and it is 
used a basis for the request posted by ERCC on cecis. Cecis is the instrument 
used by the EU Civil Protection to coordinate information between Brussels and 
member states. Cecis has been developed by an external Portuguese company 
selected in a call for tender (European Commission Official 2017c) ERCC 




The AHA Centre also implemented tools to disseminate information to wider 
public both during emergencies, as well as during non-emergencies times. 
During emergency times and for disasters that affect at least 100 people, and 
involve more than one sub-district, the AHA centre activates the ASEAN 
Disaster Information Network (ADInet). This platform provides the single 
repository open to the public, where information on the on-going situation is 
collected. Reports about all types of natural emergencies (floods, storms, 
earthquakes, volcano’s activities, etc.) can be uploaded and are verified by the 
AHA Centre. Moreover, during times of emergency the AHA Centre produces 
Flesh Updates and Situation Updates. Flesh Updates are one-page reports 
contain basic information and statistics on the on-going emergency. The main 
targets of these dissemination tools are national NDMOs, as well as other 
relevant stakeholders. Flesh Updates are also available to the wide public, as they 
are published on the AHA centre’s social media accounts. Situation Updates are 
circulated to ASEAN stakeholders every two days during an emergency. They 
contain in-depth information and insights about the disaster, the affected 
countries and the response, including plans of actions undertaken, maps, images 
and graphics related to the emergency.  Information comes from AHA Centre, 
the deployed ASEAN-ERAT, the NDMO of the affected country, as well as 
other sources, such as media outlets, and other UN and NGO reports from the 
ground. 
 
The main EU open repository collecting information about the responses 
provided by the ERCC during crisis is the ERCC Portal. The ERCC Portal is 
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open to the public, but differently from the ASEAN ADInet, information can be 
posted only by the ERCC. Brief ECHO Crisis Reports are posted in the ERCC 
following the request of the affected member state(s) or for disaster classified as 
red emergency. During crisis the ERCC produces three types of information tool. 
The ECHO Civil Protection Messages (CP messages) target participant states 
and are produced once per day. CP messages are also shared with other 
responders via the Virtual OSOCC, the On-Site Operation Coordination Centre 
established during an emergency by UN OCHA. The ECHO Crisis Reports 
provide general information about an on-going humanitarian crisis and they can 
contain also a section dedicated to civil protection if relevant for the crisis. These 
reports are widely available via ECHO website and social media accounts. The 
Analytical brief are the reports dedicated to the ECHO management. These 
briefs are not distributed widely and their main purpose it is ECHO internal 
coordination. Since February 2017 ECHO implemented the Aristotle system 
(European Commission 2018) to provide multi-hazards assessment in crisis 
situation. Aristotle project connects 15 specialised institutes available 24/7 to 
provide a multi-hazards report within 3 hours since the request is issued. The 
multi-hazard report is used to better communicate with the affected country if the 
crisis is happening within the EU and it is distributed to other participant states 
only if the crisis is happening outside EU borders. Aristotle is still a work in 
progress, and it does not include forest fires and floods outside the EU. 
 
The AHA centre also regularly produces other three types of communication 
products not linked to any particular ongoing emergency, with the main aim of 
disseminate information to a wider public. Every Monday the AHA centre 
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distributes Weekly Disaster Updates containing overview of disasters happened 
during the previous week with links to the relevant information available on 
ADInet. These updates are circulated to national NDMOs, Dialogue Partners, 
UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, Civil Society Organisations and other 
stakeholders. The AHA centre also dedicates a monthly newsletter to disaster 
preparedness. The Disaster Risk Foresight (Diasfore) is a monthly newsletter 
focus on providing recommendations to prepare for possible disasters. The main 
target is the ASEAN community, but it is open to partners and interested 
stakeholders. Finally, since February 2015 the AHA centre distributes ‘The 
Column’, a monthly newsletter available both in electronic and print format. 
This dissemination tool aims at promoting the activities run by the AHA centre 
within and outside ASEAN region to a wider public.  The column also includes 
an overview of disasters happened across ASEAN that month (Monthly Disaster 
Outlook).  
 
DG ECHO also produces regular dissemination tools not linked with any specific 
emergency. ECHO Daily Flash is a daily overview of on-going emergencies 
within and outside the EU. The one-page reports offer summaries of current 
humanitarian crises as well as disasters. Moreover, since 2010 the EU Civil 
Protection department published NexT, a biannual newsletter aiming at 
informing the civil protection national experts on the training and exercises 





Table 9. ASEAN and EU’s tools to collect, coordinate and disseminate 
informations 
   
 ASEAN EU 
Monitoring ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and 
Response System (DMRS) 
European Flood Alert System (EFAS) 
European Forest Fire Information System 
(EFFIS) 
Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination 
System (GDACS)  
Coordination  Web-Based Emergency Operation 
Centre (WebEOC) 
-only information sharing- 
Common Emergency Communication and 
Information System (Cecis) 






• Flesh updates 
• Situation updates  
• ERCC Portal 
• Civil Protection (CP) messages 
• ECHO Crisis Reports 
• Analytical brief 





• Weekly disaster updates  
• Disaster Risk Foresight (Disfore) 
monthly Newsletter 
• The monthly Column  
• ECHO Daily Flash  







6.2.2.2 The Mechanism 
 
The Leader 
The implementation of DMRS started during the preliminary phase of the AHA 
Centre. The AHA Centre was in the lead of the process by coordinating the 
setting up of a prototype version of DMRS first, and by organizing a series of 
workshop to develop and learn how to use the DMRS tool. Similarly, also the 
development of ADInet, as well as the tools to share information collected by the 
AHA Centre during crisis (Flesh and Situation Updates) and the dissemination 
tools not linked to any emergencies (Diasfore and the Column) were coordinated 
directly by the AHA Centre as part of the initial capacity building phase. Overall, 
the main logic behind these implementations were inspired by the institutional 
rational-choice argument that this is the most efficient way to collect and share 
information on disasters at regional level (RCI) (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In 
addition, the sharing of information was also presented as a key moment in the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI) (Thai Diplomat 2017). 
Overall the member of the AHA Centre persuaded the ASEAN member states’ 
representatives on the need to implement these tools, as ‘these types of 
instruments for the collection and dissemination of information are the backbone 
of a centre dealing with risks and the response to disasters. Collecting, analysing 
and distributing real-time information is overall the mission that ASEAN 
member states gave them, but this cannot be accomplished unless they have the 




Different from the first two cases, is the development of the ADInet. The 
implementation of the WebEOC was done as part of the initial capacity building 
phase of the AHA Centre, under phase II of the ICT project coordinated by 
Singapore. Following the previous phase of the project, the Government of 
Singapore proposed this second step (HI), de-facto influencing the process by 




The tools developed by the AHA Centre to collect, coordinate and disseminate 
information mainly reference tools developed outside the Asian-Pacific region 
that are recognised as legitimate by the AHA Centre and ASEAN leadership, as 
well as by the ASEAN member states. The AHA Centre adopted the tools 
proposed by the respective reference(s) either because this was accompanied by 
the positive incentives of implementing a recognised legitimate instrument 
within the AHA Centre (DMRS), or because they were already socialized to the 
existing instrument and wanted to implement it within the AHA Centre 
(WebEOC), or – finally - because the instrument was perceived as already 
adherent to the AHA Centre’s needs (Ushahidi Platform). 
 
The initial idea of supporting an ASEAN a multi-hazard early warning system 
was advanced by U.S. President Barack Obama in November 2009, during the 
First ASEAN-US Leaders’s Meeting (ASEAN Secretariat 2009c, para. 26). 
Following Obama’s offer, the US Department of State funded ASEAN-US 
technical assistance and Training Facility (USTATF) proposed the building of an 
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early warning system based on the one implemented by the Pacific Disaster 
Center (PDC). The offer was well received by ASEAN, as –in the words of 
ASEAN Secretary-General-: ‘I feel comforted that the AHA Centre is getting a 
state-of-the-art technology from the U.S.’ (US Mission to ASEAN 2012).  
 
WebEOC is an information management tool developed by Intermedix and used 
in disaster management to collect and share information.  Intermedix is a private 
company providing technological products and services to emergency 
management agencies (AHA Centre Official 2017b). WebEOC is largely used in 
the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Europe and Asia-Pacific 
demonstrating how it is overall recognised as a legitimate tool to share 
information in the region. Being a well-known tool within the disaster 
management community, it is not surprising that the implementation of a tool to 
connect the AHA Centre and NDMOs was inspired by this existing model (AHA 
Centre Official 2017a) in a typical case of socialization, also promoted by the 
same Intermedix as a way to reinforce even more their legitimacy in the Asian-
Pacific region. 
 
ADInet was initially based on the Ushahidi platform (AHA Centre 2012, 4) a 
crowdsourcing tool developed in 2008 to map reports of violence in Kenya after 
the post-election violence in 2008. Since then, Ushahidi has evolved 
considerably and was tasked by the US Center for Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) to create a platform 
aggregating and transparently mapping all the disaster management training 
events in the Asia-Pacific region. Overall, Ushahidi is a well know instrument in 
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the Asian-Pacific region (Ushahidi 2018), therefore is not surprising that the 
AHA Centre also use it as an initial tool to disseminate information about 
disasters to raise public awareness, but also to increase the visibility of the centre 
among responders (indirect SI). Overall, the ADInet is an example of emulation 
of the Ushahidi platform, an existing tool recognised as legitimate. 
 
The Sponsor  
The AHA Centre’s tools for the collection, coordination and dissemination of 
information were sponsored by Dialogue Partners often in line with a path-
dependency logic (HI) as these tools were part of already existing projects (i.e. 
WebEOC or ADInet) or promised as part of the cooperation (USAID 
commitment after Obama’s speech).  
 
The DMRS platform was founded by the U.S. Government through the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the 
technical assistance provided by the United States to ASEAN and following 
President Obama’s commitment in 2010, in line with a path-dependence logic 
(HI) the USAID project was lunched in 2013.  The same logic can be considered 
when looking at the sponsorship of the WebEOC platform.  
 
The WebEOC platform was developed in the framework of the ICT project 
sponsored by Japan ASEAN Integration funds (JAIF) with 1.627.634 USD. It 
was the natural development of the first phase of the ICT project. Overall, the 
project provided the software and hardware essentials for the operationalization 
of the AHA Centre. The first phase focused mainly on buying the basic 
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equipment for the AHA Centre, whereas the second phase was devoted to 
connecting the AHA Centre with national NDMOs (Japanese Diplomat 2017a, 
2017b). As alternative tools were not even discussed, the AHA Centre accepted 
the adoption of WebEOC (AHA Centre Official 2017a, 2017b). The selection of 
the tool implemented by Intermedix was part of the ICT project. Finally, the 
development of ADInet was part of the Phase I of the capacity-building ICT 
Project founded by Japan. Differently, reports on crisis situations are part of the 
AHA Centre activities. These do not require any specific separate budget, but are 
covered via the AHA Centre annual budget.  
 
Overall, the AHA Centre accepted the sponsorships of the main technical tools 
mainly because this was the only option available at that time. These instruments 
are the core of the work of a Centre of which the primary aim is to collect, 
coordinate and share information among its stakeholders. Alternatives were not 
even discussed as the proposed tools were already accompanied by an offer to 




The implementation of the tools to collect, coordinate and disseminate 
information was done by the provider of the tools already proposed. Nothing new 
was created, but already existing tools were emulated or copied from tools 
already developed by the various implementer(s). Once again, alternatives were 
not even discussed as the institutions in charge of the implementation was part of 
the package that came together with choosing a certain reference, which was 
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overall, already accompanied by the means to be implemented (sponsorship), as 
well as the technical support for the implementation (implementer) (AHA Centre 
Official 2017a).  
 
The DMRS multi-hazard software is a product developed by the Pacific Disaster 
Center (PDC) since November 2012. Created in 2006, PDC is located in the state 
of Hawaii (U.S.) and it has been managed by the University of Hawaii under a 
Cooperative Agreement with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
(Policy) (Pacific Disaster Centre (PDC) 2017b). The DMRS is based on the 
DisasterAWARE platform developed by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) 
(Pacific Disaster Centre (PDC) 2017a). The DisasterAWARE system was 
already incorporated is some of the ASEAN NDMOs. Starting with Thailand, 
which in 2006 included DisasterAWARE as tool of the Thailand’s National 
Disaster Warning Center, followed in 2011 by the Vietnam’s Disaster 
Management Center in 2011 and Indonesia’s BNPB in 2014. Indeed, the 
DisasterAWARE system is the most used in the US and South East Asia. A 
series of workshop took place throughout 2012 to discuss the implementation of 
the platform. The first workshop was held in May 2012 in Jakarta and a second 
workshop was held in Singapore in July 2012.  
 
Also the WebEOC was directly implemented by Intermedix, which coordinate 
the setting up phase within the AHA Centre and the training to AHA Centre staff 
and NDMOs representatives. A series of trainings to show the use of WebEOC 
to NDMOs representatives were organised by the AHA Centre with the 
cooperation of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute of the Kyoto University 
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and Intermedix (AHA Centre 2013). This was for Intermedix a deliverable of the 
project they were financed to implement (RCI) and they influenced the 
information sharing system implemented by the AHA Centre by literally copying 
the same tool already implemented in other countries of the region (Thai 
Diplomat 2017; AHA Centre Official 2017a).  
 
A slightly different case is the one regarding the tools developed by the AHA 
Centre to inform about on-going crisis. These were mainly implemented directly 
by the AHA Centre staff, following logics of efficiency and effectiveness (RCI). 
Inspired by the individual experiences of the AHA Centre staff members and 





Table 10. The collection, coordination and dissemination of information tools: actors and mechanism 
  Rationale behind influence Modes of influence 
DMRS monitoring tool, actors and mechanism 
Leader The AHA Centre This is perceived as the most efficient way to collect 
information (RCI); 
Collecting information is an unavoidable step of the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI) 
Persuasion 
Reference US The reference is recognised as legitimate (SI); Manipulation of utility 
calculation 
Sponsor USAID Part of previous action promised by President Obama 
(HI).   
Resource dependencies 
Implementer Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) PDC was already the main partner of the US in providing 
the Disaster AWARE tool already implemented in some 
ASEAN member states (HI). 
Emulation 
WebEOC coordination tool, actors and mechanism 
Leader The government of Singapore The natural follow up of the previous phase of the ICT 
project (HI) 
Manipulation of utility 
calculations 
Reference WebEOC by Intermedix The references are recognised as legitimate (indirect SI) 
and the reference itself is willing to reinforce its 
legitimacy (SI) 
Socialization 
Sponsor ICT Project by Japan Part of previous action link to the ICT project (HI).   Resource dependencies 
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Implementer Intermedix and Kyoto University  It was part of the implementation of the ICT project 
phase II part that they were assigned to fulfil (RCI) 
Copy 
Dissemination tools, actors and mechanism 
Leader AHA Centre This is perceived as the most efficient way to share 
information (RCI); 
Sharing information is an unavoidable step of the 
institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI)  
Persuasion 
Reference Ushahidi Platform The references are recognised as legitimate and is 
adopted to reinforce the legitimacy of the adopting actor 
(indirect SI) 
Emulation 
Sponsor ICT Project by Japan for ADI net, 
other tools thanks to Australia and 
ASEAN member states 
Part of previous action link to the ICT project (HI). Resource dependencies 
Implementer AHA Centre  It was part of the setting up of the AHA Centre, inspired 








6.2.3 The ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team 
(ERAT) 
	
6.2.3.1 The Instrument 
The ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Teams were originally 
inspired by the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC Teams), 
trained by Singapore and supported by Australia. This changed in 2012 and now 
ASEAT-ERAT is managed, trained and deployed by the AHA Centre. Initially 
called ASEAN Assessment Teams, the name was changed in ‘ASEAN 
Emergency Response and Assessment Team’, to underline that the ERAT team 
activity is not limited to providing assessments only, but that they are also active 
in coordinating the response to the crisis. As of today, ASEAN-ERAT counts 
more than 150 team members and has been deployed to 18 different 
emergencies.   
 
The EU civil protection coordination and assessment (EUCP) teams aim at 
coordinating the work of the different states contributing to the EU civil 
protection mechanism and willing to respond to that specific crisis (European 
Commission 2016b). EUCP teams might also provide technical advice and 
facilitate the coordination with the affected state. They are usually deployed 
within 24 hours. The ERCC can already send a request to participating states 
before there is a formal request from the affected country, but of course the 
deployment cannot go ahead until the affected states send an official request, that 
should be approved by participating states. The EUCP team’s composition 
depends on participant states availability. After a formal request is sent via Cecis, 
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participant states nominate their candidates. The duration of this process might 
vary, but it is usually less than 24 hours.  
 
Table 11. ASEAN and EU’s emergency teams 
 ASEAN EU 
Objectives • Support affected country NDMOs 
in the first assessment of the 
disaster; 
• Provide operational support to the 
NDMO 
• Coordinate the mobilisation of 
regional assets and disaster relief 
goods 
• Show ASEAN solidarity 
• Coordinate the work of the different 
Participating States teams and modules 
on the ground; 
• Provide technical advice and facilitate 
coordination with the affected country 
Mobilisation Within 8 hours, for a maximum of 14 
days 
• Less than 24 hours 
Composition ERAT’s current roster contains 155 
members and is updated quarterly. 
• (NDMOs) and other government 
authorities responsible for disaster 
management 
• civil society,  
• private sector 
• academia 
• (not available) 
Team structure • ERAT Team Leader  
ASEAN national specialists 
responsible for: 
• assessment and information 
management;  
• emergency communications;  
• logistics;  
• coordination;  
• other specific expertise based on 
affected country’s needs. 
At least one female member 
• (not available) 
Personal 
Preparedness 
Induction training and part of the ACE 
programme 
• Provided by participating states, based on 
the EU modular training  
Costs coverage Coordinated by the AHA Centre 
Mission fund: USD 10.000 for 
ADMER Fund 
• Provided by states participating to the EU 





The ERAT Teams have two main declared purposes. The first one is to provide 
technical assistance to the affected ASEAN country. ERAT teams provide rapid 
assessments, information management, and coordination activities, as well as 
other services upon the request of the affected member state. In case of disaster, 
the ERAT teams are deployed within eight hours from the affected ASEAN 
country’s request for a maximum of 14 days. Following the disaster, the 
deployed ERAT team supports the national NDMO in drafting the first report 
assessment within 72 hours. The report gives a first estimation of the scale, 
severity and impact of the disaster, also providing a first needs assessment. If 
needed, the ERAT team also provides operational support to the NDMO, for 
example in setting up an emergency communication system. The ERAT team 
coordinates from the ground the mobilisation of regional assets and disaster relief 
goods coming from the AHA Centre to the affected country. The second purpose 
is to make the ASEAN more visible, in the words of Said Faisal: ‘When we 
deploy ERAT, we don’t just deploy a person or a group of individuals. We 
deploy the solidarity of ASEAN. It is about delivering results and adding value 
framed within ASEAN solidarity. Even the acronyms ERAT means ‘closely’ in 
the Bahasa Indonesian language.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 21). 
 
ERAT’s current roster contains 155 members, drawn from National Disaster 
Management Organisations (NDMOs) and other government authorities 
responsible for disaster management, ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre, as 




The ERAT Team is composed by a group of ASEAN national specialists 
responsible for assessment and information management; emergency 
communications; logistics; coordination; and the other specific functions 
requested by the NDMO on the basis of the affected country’s needs. The ERAT 
Team Leader coordinates the team and reports directly to the country’s 
coordinator appointed by the national NDMO (AHA Centre 2016e, 35). Every 
ERAT team must include at least one female member. The ERAT roster is 
quarterly updated with the specialists identified by ASEAN member states. The 
national NDMOs already pre-approve the ERAT members, eliminating the need 
for further deployment approval processes. 
 
The ERAT personnel should be ready to be deployed within few hours upon 
request from the NDMO of the affected country. Therefore, they are requested to 
attend a compulsory induction course and have all the documents ready for 
deployments (passport, visa, etc.). The course duration was extended to two full 
weeks, divided in one theoretical and one practical parts. During the theoretical 
part, ERAT future members receive an overview of the international 
humanitarian system, the AADMER, ASEAN mechanisms, functions of the 
AHA Centre, and more practical skills, such as using the emergency 
telecommunications equipment, doing rapid assessments, and coordinating with 
the national NDMOs. The last 2 days are used to test participants in a realistic 
simulation. Since 2015, at the end of the training ERAT members receive a kit, 
consisting of a backpack, containing all basic personal equipment needed for the 




The AHA Centre is responsible to arrange, support and cover the costs of the 
ERAT team before and during the deployment and use the ASEAN Disaster 
Management and Emergency Relief (ADMER) Fund to set up a mission fund of 
10.000 USD.  
 
At EU level the training of the experts deployed as member of EUCP teams is 
responsibility of the state participating to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. 
They are usually asked to attend the modular training system provided by the 
ERCC.  
 
6.2.3.2 The Mechanism 
 
The Leader 
The idea of developing an ASEAN team to assess the situation on the ground in 
the aftermath of the crisis was already advanced in 2002 during the discussions 
around the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze pollution. The 
AADMER Agreement reinforced the idea of having a joint assessment between 
the assisting and affected country, as a way to mutually agreed on the type of 
assistance required (ASEAN 2005b, art.11.3). The 10th ACDM Meeting held in 
Singapore on 26 October 2007 agreed on forming a regional assessment team. 
The proposal was already advanced by Malaysia during an ACDM sub-
committee in May 2007 and then reinforced by the lessons-learned report of the 
3rd ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise 
(ARDEX) held in Singapore on October 2007. The 11th ACDM Meeting held in 
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Malaysia on March 2008 adopted the SASOP, which includes the provision for 
the deployment of an ASEAN Rapid Assessment Team.  
 
Winston Chang, member of the Singapore Civil Defence Force and UNDAC 
member, was part of the first ERAT Team deployed in response to Nargis19. He 
admittedly entered to Myanmar only thanks to the fact that he was part of the 
ASEAN Team. In his words ‘The global response community was held at the 
global staging point, Bangkok, which was the most accessible airport. Everybody 
was going to the embassy, trying to get visas. We were stuck there for a couple 
of days. Even Ow Yong [also Singapore nationality and UNDAC member] and 
myself, we were infamously turned back at the airport, even with our UN 
passports. Although we flew from Bangkok into Yangon, we had to turn back. 
[…]But later, through the ASEAN channel, they said, ‘Okay, a team of ERAT 
can come in’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 14). 
 
Although currently often presented as a flagship example of ASEAN integration 
in the response to disasters, the idea of having assessment teams under the 
ASEAN flag was mainly presented to other ASEAN representatives as the most 
efficient way to gather vital information from the ground and to coordinate the 
ASEAN response more effectively (RCI).  
 
The Reference 
                                               
19 The members of the first ERAT team deployed to Myanmar were Adelina Kamal from the ASEAN 
Secretariat, UNDAC members Jemilah Mahmood (Malaysia), Winston Chang (Singapore), Ow Yong Tuck 
Wah (Singapore), along with other members of the ERAT team from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei 
Darussalam, and the Philippines, formed ERAT’s pioneer team. As the ERAT team was created ‘on the 
spot’ the team received t-shirts from the ASEAN gift shop as “we needed a sort of ASEAN logo so people 
would know who we were on the missions” (ERAT book, p. 20). 
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The idea to develop multi-country assessment team was inspired by the UN 
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) ‘which offered an appropriate 
model for the region’s culture and diverse political and economic context’ (AHA 
Centre 2016e, 5). UN OCHA participated in several exercises organised by 
ASEAN. The organization of regional exercises in which UNDAC teams took 
part, represented an opportunity for ASEAN member states representatives to 
learn how the OCHA system works. These exercises provided the opportunity to 
exchange ideas and, in a case of lessons drawing (Rose 1991) to encourage 
ASEAN representatives to develop an instrument similar to the one already in 
placed within the UN. The UNDAC system was already well known by ASEAN 
disaster management experts as some of them were already part of a UNDAC 
team. As of today, some of the members of the ASEAN ERAT team are also 
members of UNDAC team (CFE-DM 2015, 31). During the ARDEX 2007 the 
UN OCHA representatives directly suggested the implementation of UN-like 
team to run the ASEAN first assessment after a crisis. ‘It was also Dr. Rajan 
Gengaje from UNOCHA who served as one of our referees in ARDEX that 
reinforced the idea. He spelt out the basis for an ASEAN rapid assessment team, 
because, there will be times that UNDAC will not be available to respond to 
ASEAN, or not be able to respond to disasters in ASEAN.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 
12). The first ERAT Team was deployed following Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. 
As the creation of these teams was agreed only few months before Nargis, a real 
structure was not yet in place. Therefore, the members of the first ERAT Team 
were all citizens of ASEAN Member States hand-picked from the UNDAC roster 





The reasons why UN OCHA supported the development of the ERAT Team are 
summarised in the word of Oliver Lacey Hall, head of UNOCHA Indonesia and 
former OCHA Regional Director for Asia-Pacific “The ASEAN 2025 vision on 
disaster management is broadly clear. Under the UN’s previous Secretary 
General, Ban Ki-moon, he made it clear that he regarded relationships with 
regional organisations like ASEAN to be very important. The indications from 
our new Secretary General are that he shares this view and will want to ensure 
that regional organisations, like ASEAN, and the UN and now and every more 
synergistic way of working together” (AHA Centre 2016e, 44). Overall, OCHA 
follow this call coming from the UN Secretary General to reinforce ASEAN 
legitimacy in the region, and acted in his area of specialisation, to reinforce the 
disaster response capacity of the regional organisation, as a way to reinforce 
ASEAN legitimacy in front of ASEAN member states (SI). Once UNDAC teams 
were identified as the reference for a similar instrument in ASEAN, OCHA 
decided to sponsor the process.  
 
The Implementer 
Following the adoption of the AADMER Work Programme in 2010, the ERAT 
Team become the ASEAN flagship instrument to respond to disasters. The full 
operationalization of ERAT was coordinated by Singapore. In particular, 
Singapore took on a leading role in drafting the guidelines for the deployment of 
ERAT and in developing the first series of ASEAN-ERAT induction courses. 
Col. Kadir Maideen from the Singapore Civil Defence Force’s (SCDF) was 
instrumental in the development of ERAT and its guidelines. With a long 
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experience as second commander of the SCDF Disaster Assistance and Rescue 
Team (DART) and after receiving the Medal of Valour after working round the 
clock in response to the Nicoll highway collapsed in 2004, he was seconded to 
the ASEAN Secretariat. In 23-24 April 2010 Singapore hosted a training 
organised by UNDAC for ASEAN member States representatives to discuss the 
development of the ASEAN-ERAT team. In the words of Kadir Maideen: ‘I had 
good colleagues from the Bangkok office, Oliver Lacey Hall [UN OCHA], Dr. 
Rajan [UNOCHA], and others. They were very supportive of us having a 
response system. They gave everybody the whole architecture of the UN. Then, 
that’s where we came in, myself, Adelina [Kamal, ASEAN Secretariat], to share 
with them how the ASEAN architecture would fit in.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 54).  
 
In October 2010 the first week–long ERAT induction course was organised in 
Singapore. The ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines were presented as a sort of handbook 
on the ASEAN response. The Guidelines draw on the lessons learned from the 
Cyclone Nargis operation, adapting the UNDAC approaches to ASEAN context. 
An example of this adaptation was the inclusion of a list of terminology, such as 
local terms for village and village heads (AHA Centre 2016e, 54). Only few 
weeks after the training an earthquake on the Mentawai Islands (Indonesia) 
provided the opportunity to test the freshly trained ERAT teams as well as the 
ERAT Guidelines. This response provided once again useful lessons to be 
implemented in the following one. Among the others, the lack of a formal 
assessment methodology, the lack of communication equipment different from 




The coordination of ERAT Teams was handed over to the newly created AHA 
Centre in April 2013 during the 3rd ERAT induction course organised in 
Singapore. In October 2013 the AHA Centre coordinated the ERAT Teams 
during the ARDEX 13 Exercise organised in Vietnam. On the side of the 
Exercise a refresher course was organised for the participants of the first two 
induction courses, in order to update them on the AHA Centre, as well as on the 
new structures created between 2010 and 2013. Two weeks after the ERAT 
Team under the AHA Centre coordination were tested once again in a big 
disaster.  
 
On 8th November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines. The AHA Centre 
deployed an ERAT team of four members which was expected not only to 
provide assessment of the situation, but also to coordinate the relief supplies 
provided by a huge number of humanitarian actors and organizations. In the 
words of Arnel Capili, current Head of Operation, and one of the members of the 
ERAT Team at that time: ‘For me, out of that experience came the feeling that 
ASEAN could have done more. My lesson from that was that we need to 
structure how we respond. We need to bring more to the affected country, not 
necessarily bring more in quantity but a more targeted response that would add 
value to the Member States’ response.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 65). Overall, the 
ERAT Team deployed after Typhoon Haiyan was considered too small 
compared to the large proportion of the disaster, its mandate was bigger than just 
providing an assessment of the situation. The ERAT team was functional to also 
coordinate the relief sent by ASEAN Member States to assist the affected areas 




The recommendations generated by the Haiyan experience were collected in the 
report ‘Weathering the Perfect Storm: Lessons Learnt on the ASEAN’s Response 
to the Aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan’. The lessons learned produced the ERAT 
Transformation Plan, which was approved during the 9th Meeting of the ACDM 
Working Group on Preparedness and Response in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) in 
2015. 
 
During the 23rd ACDM Meeting in Da Nang, Viet Nam, the committee agreed to 
change ERAT’s name from the “Emergency Rapid Assessment Team” to 
“Emergency Response and Assessment Team” to more accurately capture the 
nature of its operations, which included rapid disaster assessments, and 
supporting emergency response operations of the affected country. Some 
scholars considered this change as an example of selective borrowing of EU-like 
instrument. In particular the name change of ERAT teams from ‘Rapid 
Assessment Team’, to ‘Response and Assessment Team’ is considered a clear 
reference to the EU Civil Protection Module system (Pennisi di Floristella 2015, 
23). As we just saw, the process leading to the change of name was a reflection 
of the experiential learning of ASEAN on the ground, and it would be hard to 
link this experience with the reference to the EU instrument.  
 
In June 2014, the 4th ASEAN-ERAT Induction Course was organised in 
Indonesia by the AHA Centre. The training still strongly relays on the Singapore 
SCDF and UNOCHA, but it is much more focus on the instrument available at 
ASEAN level (AADMER framework, the AHA CENTRE, DELSA), as well as 
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on understanding the international humanitarian system. The ASEAN-ERAT 
training receives funding from Australia and Japan.  
 
As of today, ASEAN-ERAT counts more than 150 team members and have been 
deployed to 18 different emergencies. The aim expressed in the ERAT 
Transformation Plan is to reach by 2020 much bigger numbers. A total of 500 
members with a full induction training, 50 members with a specialised training 
on issues ranging from emergency communication to civil-military coordination 
and a core group of 20 members with advanced training on leadership in crisis. 
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Table 12. ERAT Teams actors and mechanism 





As the most efficient way to gather 
information and coordinate the response 




Reinforce the efficacy and efficiency of 
the ASEAN system to respond (direct 
RCI); 
For AHA Centre as a way to gain more 




Sponsor UNOCHA Reinforce ASEAN legitimacy in the 
region (SI)  
Resource 
dependencies 
Implementer Singapore  It was part of the setting up of the AHA 
Centre, inspired by logics of efficiency 







6.2.4 The Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) 
 
6.2.4.1 The Instrument 
The Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) is a mechanism 
for the provision of relief items to ASEAN countries during the post-disaster 
emergency situations. Launched on 7 December 2012, DELSA main component, 
the emergency relief supply stockpile is housed in UN-WFP Humanitarian 
Response Depot in Subang (Malaysia). Managed by the AHA Centre, DELSA is 
directly funded by Japanese Government. Subang (Malaysia) is one of the six 
WFP strategically located depots that procures, stores, and transports emergency 
supplies on behalf of the humanitarian community20. The DELSA relief stockpile 
aim is to increase the preparedness of the response by storing the assets and 
capacities and by making them available for a quick response. The standby 
arrangement system is based on the voluntary contribution of ASEAN Member 
states. Differently from the UN and ASEAN, the EU does not relay on a 
stockpile system. Relief items are directly mobilized by member states upon 
request (European Commission Official 2017d). 
 
  
                                               
20 The other UNHRD depots are located in Italy (2000), United Arab Emirates (2008), Ghana (2014), 
Panama (2014), Spain (2014). 
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6.2.4.2 The Mechanism 
 
The Leader 
The provision for an ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Response was already present in the AADMER Agreement (ASEAN 
2005b, art.8). Malaysia first proposed the creation of an ASEAN warehouse to be 
hosted in Subang. Already in November 2007 Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, suggested the use of the Subang Air Base in 
Kuala Lumpur as an ASEAN centre for disaster relief operations. The proposal 
on establishing an emergency stockpiles advanced during the 2007 ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting and was proposed again at the 16th ASEAN Summit 
held in April 2010 in Viet Nam. ASEAN Leaders ‘encouraged the ASEAN 
Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance [AHA Centre] to establish 
linkages and cooperation with other humanitarian centres in the region, including 
the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang, Malaysia’ (Koh 
2009, 1178). Indeed, Malaysia is strategically located in the middle of Southeast 
Asia and in particular Subang is in a relatively insulated position, protected by 
potential major disasters like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. This 
explanation persuaded the ACDM to welcome the Malaysia offer. Overall, 
Malaysia’s aim was to demonstrate a strong support to ASEAN regional 
cooperation, in particular in the field of disasters management. In the word of a 
Malaysian Diplomat to ASEAN ‘we saw this as our contribution to the 
establishment of a regional warehouse, without that a regional response would be 
much more complicated considered the geography of our region’ (Malaysian 





In May 2010 the 16th ACDM Meeting discussion on the establishment of an 
ASEAN emergency stockpile started. The different available options were 
discussed, not only stockpiling, but also others such as pre-arrangements with 
potential suppliers. Yet, ACDM agreed the creation of a regional stockpile at the 
UNHRD in Subang (Malaysia). ‘[DELSA] was the most feasible and cost- 
effective solution to the current situation. […] The alternative, i.e. establishing or 
supplementing national stockpiles in each Member State, was considered more 
difficult and costly to implement in view of different hazards, exposure, 
frequency, capacity, population, and geographical location of each Member 
State’ (AHA Centre 2016d, 36). 
 
Considering the need to better understand the different national needs, the 
ACDM tasked Malaysia and Singapore, as the Co-Chairs of the working group 
dealing with ASEN preparedness, to organize a regional workshop to discuss the 
best option to set up a regional relief stockpile21. The workshop, organised in 
cooperation with the AHA Centre and ASEAN Secretariat, was held in Kuala 
Lumpur on 6-7 December 2011. Each ASEAN country sent two representatives, 
one disaster management expert and one logistics expert. Besides national 
experts, also representatives from the Japan Mission to ASEAN and JAIF 
Management Team also participated and ‘provided the workshop with insights’ 
(AHA Centre 2016d, 34). Furthermore, ‘WFP representatives were appointed as 
                                               
21 The initial proposal advanced by the ACDM was to appoint one logistic expert in charge of examining the 
different preferences of ASEAN Member States. The regional workshop solution was finally adopted as the 
most cost and time efficient one (AHA Centre 2016d, 28). 
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facilitators, in view of their vast experience in disaster management logistics and 
their agency’s lead role among the United Nations’ logistics cluster’ (AHA 
Centre 2016d, 34). Indeed, the role of WFP representatives was more than 
facilitators. They acted as solid benchmark to ASEAN member states requests. 
‘During the workshop, each Member State was requested to identify the most-
needed relief items in case of disaster emergencies. To avoid over-demand or 
under-supply of relief items to the affected countries, the WFP presented a 
proposed a priority list based on its experience in past disaster responses. The list 
was then verified with the Member States’ lists.’.  
 
The 19th ACDM Meeting endorsed the final proposal in March 2012 and the 
Government of Japan gave its green light in July 2012. DELSA was officially 
launched on 7 December 2012 in Subang (Malaysia). Yet, the first deployment 
was already one month prior to the official launch in response to the Thabaittkyin 
earthquake in Myanmar in November 2012. Moreover, DELSA was immediately 
activated (one hour after the launching ceremony) following the Typhoon Bopha 
in the Philippines.  
 
Between December 2012 and December 2016 DELSA was activated 14 times. 
The experiences learned after these activations triggered a series of changes. 
Among them the creation of a list of pre-approved vendors, meaning that during 
emergency operations, the AHA Centre could directly procure the relief items 
speeding up the delivery process that previously took up to 11 days. Another 
change that followed the direct experience of the AHA Centre was the use of 
“white stock”. The AHA Centre delivers to the affected NDMOs unlabelled 
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relief stocks provided by the local warehouse of the WFP. The same items are 
then replaced by the WFP by directly taken similar one from the ASEAN 
warehouse in Subang (AHA Centre Official 2017a).  
 
The Sponsor  
The DELSA stockpile is funded by Japan. During the 12th ASEAN-Japan 
Summit, Japan announced an additional contribution of 90 million USD to the 
Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) aiming at supporting ‘[ASEAN] Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response, Emergency Assistance Related to 
Financial Crisis and Japanese Language Training Courses for Nurses and 
Certified Care Workers’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2009b). Two months later, in 
October 2009 the 14th ACDM meeting agreed to use the JAIF funds to 
implement the ASEAN disaster relief stockpiles. Up to December 2016 the 
overall amount of JAIF funding dedicated to the DELSA project (including the 
ACE Programme) are more than 12 million USD. Japan funding follow the 
discussion within the region and the preferences of the member states. There was 
not element in the document analysis or in the interviews that suggested any 
form of influence from Japan on the DELSA project.   
 
The Implementer 
The depot was built in 2012 and is made available by the Government of 
Malaysia. In early 2010 the Government of Malaysia and WFP signed an 
agreement for the opening of the fifth response depot in Subang. Constructions 
were completed in March 2012. The government of Malaysia contributes USD 1 
million annually (de Souza and Stumpf 2012, 37). Overall, the relationship 
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between Malaysian and WFP’ representatives was a long-standing cooperation. 
They simply expanded the issue covered from a national perspective to a more 




Table 13. DELSA actors and mechanism 
  Rationale behind influence Modes of influence 
Leader Malaysia  For Malaysia as a way to advance 
regional cooperation on the disaster 
management (SI); 
For the ACDM as the most efficient way 






Recognised as the most efficient and 
cost-effective way for the region 
(indirect RCI); 
Considered that Malaysia was one of the 
co-chairs, their experience with UNHRD 
was also based on an already long-
standing relation (HI) 
Direct socialization 
and indirect copying 
Sponsor Japan Reinforce ASAN legitimacy in the 
region (SI)  
No influence 
Implementer Malaysia 
and WFP  
The two already worked together in the 
general setting up of the UNHRD in 
Subang, so it was the continuation of an 






6.2.5 The AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE) 
6.2.5.1 The Instrument 
In 2013, the AHA Centre launched the ACE Programme, an intensive six-month 
training course on disaster management for ASEAN member states 
representatives. Each country identifies their participants. The programme is 
funded by the Japanese government and implemented with the collaboration of 
dialogue partners. Between 2014 and 2016 the ACE Programme trained 45 
officers from eight ASEAN member states (see Annex 4).  
 
The ACE Programme has three main objectives: training the ASEAN officers on 
technical and logistical aspects of the response to disasters, providing technical 
support to the AHA centre by spending around 150 hours of work within the 
AHA centre, and strengthening the connection between officers coming from 
different ASEAN countries to the declared aim of reinforcing their ‘sense of 
regionalism and cooperation’ (AHA Centre 2016c, 18). The objectives of the EU 
Civil Protection Programme are two folds. First, enhancing the technical 
preparation of its participants via the participation to intense-designed modules. 
Second, providing an opportunity to exchange and sharing knowledge on how 
the management of disaster is conducted in the different national systems of 
participating states, mainly done via the exchange programme. Differently from 
the ACE Programme, which implies 150 hours of practical work within the AHA 
Centre, the EU component does not foresee a training period within the EU 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). The ACE programme 
duration is set for six months for a total of 1000 hours. The training is dedicated 
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to a preselected group of 16 officers (2 per countries since 2015) selected by the 
national focal points. The programme is divided in three cores: the Working at 
the AHA Centre core (500 hours), the Training on technical and non-technical 
skills core (350 hours) and the Study visit and development core (150 hours). In 
terms of specific knowledge, ACE programme focuses its first core (500 hours) 
on developing an in-depth knowledge of all the key components of the ASEAN 
regional mechanism (AADMER, SASOP, DELSA, AHA Centre, ERAT, etc.), as 
well as key skills for the day-to-day run of the AHA Centre, mainly in terms of 
monitoring an analysis, ICT, communication, data collection, preparedness and 
response, disaster monitoring. The second core (350 hours) is dedicated to 
technical skills, such as logistic, camp coordination, civil-military coordination, 
rapid assessment, post-disaster needs analysis and project management, as well 
as to soft skills, such as leadership in crisis, personality development, 
communication for disaster management professionals. Finally, the third core 
(150 hours) is dedicated to field visits and simulations. During the visits 
participants gain first-hand experience in real disaster settings, different from the 
one typical from their own country (i.e. participant from Thailand –not prone to 
earthquakes- can see areas affected by an earthquake).  
 
The EU Programme also involves technical training courses, while adding a 
second major component to the training in promoting the exchange of experts 
between participating countries (see below). The EU technical trainings are 
divided in different modules. The participation to the different modules was not 
compulsory and structured as one single training, but having followed the 
courses according to the basic order of courses provided by EU Civil Protection 
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was preferred (see the 2012 training course overview). In 201222 the EU Civil 
Protection offered a different set of introductive, operational and management 
trainings (European Commission 2012). The Community Mechanism 
Introduction Course (CMI) was a four-day introductory course and it was a 
prerequisite to access the other modules. The module provided the basic 
knowledge about the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and actors in the 
international emergency environment inside and outside Europe. A similar six-
days introductory course was offered to technical specialists, such as marine 
pollution and water management experts, environmental experts, geo-hazard or 
logistics experts, medical staff and infrastructure engineers. The Technical 
Experts Course (TEC) was designed to introduce technical experts to the EU 
Mechanism and the mission cycle of international missions. The Operational 
Management course (OPM) was an eight-day course specifically aimed at future 
deployments inside and outside Europe. A set of specialised four- or six-days 
training was dedicated to develop technical expertise in the field of security 
(SEC), information management (IMC), international coordination (ICC) and 
mission assessment (AMC). Two management trainings were also offered. The 
High Level Coordination (HLC) course was both the concluding training after 
previous modules, as well as standing alone module for specific candidates (like 
from other organisations or with extensive field-experience) that could have 
being admitted directly after permission of the EU commission. Differently from 
the ACE Programme, which is directed only to the 16 ASEAN officers selected 
by the national NDMOs, the targeted expertise of the EU training varies 
                                               
22 2012 is selected as it is the year before the launch of the ACE Programme. Although it is not proven that 
the ASEAN representatives run any explorative studies on existing trainings prior to setting their own, it is 
reasonable to imagine that this would be the setting they would have considered if looking at the EU.  
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depending on the modules proposed. The Community Mechanism Introduction 
Course (CMI) was open to all staff from national civil protection departments of 
the participating countries and other organisations that could serve as the core for 
the affected state in case their country might have to request and receive 
international assistance. The Operational Management course (OPM) targeted 
national experts and European Commission representatives aiming at joining a 
European Civil Protection team deployed to coordinate the response to 
emergencies.  
 
In addition to the technical training, the EU also implemented the EU Exchange 
of Experts in Civil Protection Programme. The Programme, funded by the 
European Commission and coordinated by the German Federal Agency for 
Technical Relief (THW), aims at promoting the exchange between different 
national expertise by allowing experts from one national systems to be 
temporarily seconded to another participating country, in order to gain direct 
experience and more in-depth knowledge of how the civil protection system 
works in a different participating country. Although this component of the EU 
training might sound as a way to reinforce the regional dimension of the EU 
Civil Protection by sharing knowledge and building trust, the short duration of 
the exchange (from a few days to two weeks) makes it more an exchange of 
technical expertise among experts coming from different countries (European 
Commission Official 2017b).  
 
Although the ACE Programme is in principle not restricted to ASEAN citizens, 
the structure and the high costs of the training per individual make it de-facto 
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limited to representatives of the national NDMOs. On the other hand, for each 
cycle of training courses provided by the EU, the total number of course places is 
divided between the Participating States (EU members and non), on a quota 
based on both the reported training needs and the size of the country, as well as 
other European Commission services, the United Nations and the Red Cross Red 
Crescent Movement. Each state participating to the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism has appointed a national training coordinator, who is in charge of the 
selection of national experts to attend the EU trainings. Even more, the Exchange 
of Experts programme is not only open to participating countries, but also to 
Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, 
Tunisia and Ukraine.  
 
The management of the ACE Programme is centralized within the AHA Centre 
with one officer dedicated full time to the programme. This officer is in charge of 
the overall coordination of the training, as well as of the support of the 
participants both in terms of logistics and general needs. EU trainings are 
provided by external partners selected via a public Call for Tender. The call sets 
the general terms of the training (duration, general content, number of 
participants), but leave the curriculum design up to the implementer (European 
Commission Official 2017b).  
 
The participants of the AHA programme are selected by the national NDMOs, 
but selection’s criteria are set at AHA centre level. The ACE programme requires 
(1) a bachelor degree in relevant subjects, but participants with a master degree 
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are preferred. In terms of previous experience, participants to the ACE 
programme are expected to have (3) at least three years of relevant work 
experience. In terms of specific skills, the ACE applicants should have (4) a good 
understanding of disaster emergency preparedness and response, as well as (5) a 
good understanding of the regional dimension of disaster management issues. In 
terms of more general skills, a (2) good knowledge of written and spoken 
English is required, as well as (3) good computer skills, (4) the ability to work 
under pressure, (5) the capacity to work with individuals of different cultural 
backgrounds, and (5) personal qualities such as ‘leadership, initiative, 
adaptability and sound judgment’. Applicants should be up to 40 years-old, and 
yet ‘it is expected that applicants should be no longer than 32 years-old’. This 
should be also considered in view of the young age of ASEAN population. The 
EU Programme does not set any specific criteria for the selection of participants. 
The selection is done at national level by the participating country. Therefore, it 
is up to participant states to set the criteria for participation to the training.  
 
The costs of the ACE Programme are shared between ASEAN member states 
and external partners. Japan (via JAIF) directly found the programme, but other 
dialogue partners (mainly New Zealand and US) and private companies also 
engage with the Programme by providing free-of-charge services and/or items. 
The ASEAN Member States cover the salaries of their participants throughout 
the programme and ensure them with a position in their respective NDMO at the 




Overall, the ACE Programme is quite different from the trainings and exchange 
of experts developed within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (See Table 
below). And once again, this can be explained by looking at the mechanism that 
lead the creation of the AHA Centre, in which the EU did not played any 
relevant role.  
 
Table 14. ASEAN and EU’s training offers 
 ASEAN EU 
Objectives • Technical and logistical trainings;  
• Supporting to the day to day work 
of the AHA centre;  
• Reinforcing the ‘sense of 
regionalism and cooperation’; 
• Technical preparation; 
• Exchange-sharing, networking and learn 
about different national systems. 
Duration 6 months intensive 1000 hours training 
(around 125 days) 
Modular trainings 
Structure • Working at the AHA Centre core 
(500 hours) 
• Technical and non technical skills 
core (350 hours)  
• Study visit and development core 
(150 hours). 
 
• Community Mechanism Introduction 
Courses (CMI 4 days or TEC 6 days); 
• Operational Management course (OPM 8 
days) 
• Specialised four or six days trainings 
(SEC 4 days, IMC 4 days, ICC 4 days and 
AMC 6 days); 
• Management trainings (HLC & HOT)  
Accessibility De-facto restricted to ASEAN 
NDMOs officials 
Open to EU participants, experts from other 
participating countries, and other 
organizations (Red Cross, UN, etc.) 
Management Centralized by AHA Centre with 
training offered by different 
organizations. 
Public call for tenders 
Selection criteria Final decision by NDMOs, but AHA 
set criteria 
 
• BA degree  
• at least 3 years of relevant work 
experience 
• up to 40 years-old 
• good understanding of disaster 
emergency preparedness and 
response,  
• good understanding of the 
regional dimension of disaster 
management issues.  
• General skills: English language, 
computer skills, work under 
Decision by national focal points, no 
common criteria for selection 
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pressure, work with individuals of 
different cultural backgrounds 
Costs coverage Salaries pay by ASEAN member 
states 
General support by external partners 
Training provided by ECHO budget, Salaries 
pay by participant states. 
 
6.2.5.2 The Mechanism 
 
The Leader 
The ACE programme was developed in the shadow of the DELSA project. In 
fact, it was during the discussions surrounding the development of the ASEAN 
emergency logistic system that the need to develop ASEAN institutional capacity 
building was raised. The initial proposal advanced by the AHA Centre to create a 
specific training programme was a response to the critics advanced by some 
ASEAN member states’ representative during the implementation of the DELSA 
programme on the sustainability of the project across time and need to develop 
the internal expertise to manage the DELSA stockpile (Malaysian diplomat 
2017). The overall idea was to form member states national experts on the 
regional system to respond to crisis, as well as to create an opportunity for them 
to connect. The actual form of this ‘training’ for national experts was discussed 
during formal and informal sessions. The consultation process focuses on the 
curriculum design, the programme name, duration and selection criteria for 
participants. The AHA Centre led the consultation, together with the ASEAN 
Secretariat. ASEAN member state’s positions were expressed both within the 
ACDM Preparedness and Response Working Group, as well as within the 
ACDM (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The consultation process also involved the 
Japan Mission to ASEAN, as well as the JAIF Management Team. Japan was 
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already very involved in supporting the DELSA project therefore the 
involvement of JAIF in the ACE Programme was ‘almost automatic’ (Japanese 
Diplomat 2017b), demonstrating how the involvement of Japan as partner was 
not based on any efficiency calculation (RCI), but the result of their involvement 
in previous projects (HI). 
 
The Reference 
The programme was initially proposed as a one year ‘Junior Attachment 
Programme’ (JAP). In the initial idea advanced by the AHA Centre, the JAP 
Programme was conceptualized as a one-year programme dedicated to two junior 
officers coming from the national agencies (NDMOs). The selected officers 
would have been seconded to the AHA Centre to learn more about the ASEAN 
mechanism to respond to disasters, as well as to support the daily work of the 
AHA Centre. Moreover, the pull of 20 junior officers would have learned more 
about the practices of the other ASEAN member states. This initial proposal was 
not far from the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme offered by the 
UN. Similar to the UN JPO programme the ASEAN Programme was initially 
conceptualized as one-year period, sponsored by the respective governments. 
The final structure of the ACE Programme was finally approved on 29 July 2013 
following the consultation phase and was quite different from the first proposal. 
First, the programme was not limited to junior staff, but also more senior 
personnel. Second, the duration was reduced to six months following the request 
advanced by member states. Releasing an officer for one full year would have 
had a too strong impact on the daily work of national NDMOs. Third, 
secondment to the AHA Centre period was integrated with actual trainings on 
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specific technical and soft skills. Leading entities different from the AHA Centre 
were identified as the most suited trainers for this part of the programme. The 
ACE Programme was officially launched in January 2014. A total of three 
rounds trainings have been carried on by the end of 2016 with a total of 39 
officials trained. In 2015 a field visit component was added to the curriculum 
following participants’ requests. Officials participating to the ACE Programme 
have very different expertise. Not all ASEAN countries experience the same type 
of disasters, for example the knowledge of a Thai official about earthquakes is 
limited if compared to the one of an official coming from Myanmar. Field visits 
were considered a good way to provide participants with the same background 
knowledge about disasters sites and by meeting the official involved in that type 
of disasters. The 2015 group visited Aceh (Indonesia) to get a first sense of what 
was the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In 2016 the visit was organised in Tacloban 
(Philippines), the most affected region after Typhoon Haiyan. Overall, although 
initially clearly inspired by the UN JPO Programme, the ACE Programme finally 
adopted its own structure based on NDMOs requests and shaped by feedbacks 
from participants.  
 
The Sponsor(s) 
The external support is a necessary element for the functioning of the ACE 
Programme. The ACE Programme is mainly funded by JAIF, as part of the 
Japan-ASEAN cooperation. Overall, the ACE Programme is part of the DELSA 
project. As explained in the leadership part, discussion about implementing a 
training system for the AHA Centre was advanced in the implementation phase 
of the DELSA project. Overall, more than 12 million dollars are allocated for the 
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DELSA project. ASEAN member states contribute by covering the salaries of 
their seconded officials and by providing specific trainings or field trips. 
 
The Implementer(s) 
The AHA Centre is centrally coordinating the ACE Programme. It provides 
specific trainings and it coordinates the entire curriculum. Yet, dialogue partners 
are essentials in supporting the implementation of its different components (see 
table below). Since 2014 several partners have contributed to the curriculum of 
the ACE Programme. The UN family contributed with trainings from UN OCHA 
on civil-military coordination, needs assessment conduction, International 
Humanitarian System and communication for disaster management 
professionals, as well as with trainings on logistics and supply chain 
management provided by the WFP. The US government also contributed 
offering trainings on exercise planning and incident command system. Countries 
such as Japan and New Zealand organise study trip to their disaster sites as well 
as to the departments dealing with disaster management in their respective 
countries.  These study trip outside the ASEAN region, help participant in their 
understanding of how disaster management is conducted outside the ASEAN 
region (since 2015 they also have study visits inside the region). Some of the 
trainings have been added to the curriculum following the requests of 
participants. This is the case for the Project Management Training organised by 
RedR (AHA Centre 2016c, 20), or the English for Disaster Management 
Professionals organised by British Council (AHA Centre 2016c, 27). Some of 
the trainings organised by the AHA Centre or by a partner organisation saw 
interventions from other experts. This is the case of the Humanitarian Logistics 
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Training organised by the WFP, which saw the intervention of facilitators from 
Save the Children, Red Cross and The Kuehne Foundations. The EU never took 
part in the trainings, nor as a coordinator of one of the specific trainings, nor as 
one of the invited facilitators.  
 
The ACE Programme is the last instrument developed within the ASEAN 
disaster management framework. Overall, for ASEAN AHA Centre it represents 
the move from being a capacity-building receiver to be a capacity-building 
provider. Although still relaying on external funding the ACE Programme was 
the ‘less externally influenced’ instrument. The framework is built by the AHA 
Centre in cooperation with national NDMOs, the external partners see the added 
value of cooperating. In the words of Antonio Massella, UNOCHA Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific: ‘The ACE Programme was a unique opportunity 
for OCHA to continue its ongoing relationship with the AHA Centre and also to 
get to know the future generation of ASEAN’s disaster management leaders here 
in the Southeast Asia region. The ACE Programme also helps OCHA’s Regional 
Office achieved two of its core strategic objectives, specifically strengthening 
relationship of the regional organisations, specifically ASEAN and secondly 
strengthening relationship and support to national disaster management agencies 




Table 15. ACE: Overview of partnerships 
Partners 2014 2015 2016 
Government of Japan 4 days Study Trip to Japan 6 days Study Trip to Japan 6 days Study Trip to Japan 
Government of New Zealand 5 days Study Trip to New Zealand 10 days Study Trip to Canterbury 
and Wellington, NZ 
10 days Study Trip to Dunedin, 
Canterbury, Wellington and 
Auckland 
Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) 
 Hazard and Area Business 
Continuity management workshop 
 
US Pacific Command Exercise Planning Training   
UK Ministry of Defence via experts 
from the British Council 
Peacekeeping English Project  
 English for Disaster Management 
Professional 
 
University of Canterbury, NZ Leadership in crisis and exercise 
management trainings  
 Leadership in crisis training  
UNOCHA Communication training for disaster 
management professionals  
 
Civil-military coordination 
framework in disaster management  
Coordinated Needs Assessment 
training  
 
International Humanitarian System 
 
Communications and Disaster 
professional training 






International Humanitarian System 
 
331	
UN World Food Programme (WFP) Humanitarian Logistics and supply 
chain management training 
Humanitarian Logistics and supply 
chain management training 
Humanitarian Logistics and supply 
chain management training 
International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) 
Camp coordination and camp 
management and shelter workshop 
Camp coordination and camp 
management training 
Camp coordination and camp 
management training 
US Forest Service of the US 
Department of Agriculture 
Incident command system training  Incident command system training Incident command system training 
Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) 
 Humanitarian Induction Course 
during study trip in Semerang and 
Yogyakarta  
Red Cross Induction Course 
RedR  Project Management for 
Development Professional Training 
 
London School Academy Indonesia Communication training for disaster 
management professionals  
Personality Development Workshop  






Table 16. ACE actors and mechanism 
  Rationale behind influence Modes of 
influence 
Leader AHA Centre  The necessary following step after the 
creation of DELSA stockpile (HI) 
Persuasion 
Reference UN JPO 
Programme 
The reference is a well-known junior 
training system (HI) and is recognised 
as legitimate (SI) 
Synthesis 
Sponsor JAIF as part of 
Japan-ASEAN 
Cooperation 
Follow up to DELSA project (HI)  No influence 
Implemente
r 
AHA Centre in 
cooperation with 
partners  
For the AHA Centre this is a way to 
present itself as a legitimate actor in 
the eyes of ASEAN member states 
(SI); 
For other partners this is a way to 
support AHA Centre legitimization in 








The final phase of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management, 
namely the setting up of the AHA Centre and its instruments, can be seen as a 
synthesis of lesson drawing and emulation, often emerging from socialization 
and persuasion practices mixed with the experiential learning of the AHA Centre 
staff. Often led by one of the ASEAN member states (being Indonesia, Malaysia 
or Singapore) or directly by AHA Centre staff, the different instruments were 
implemented thanks to the collaboration of strategic partners. Strategic partners 
played a fundamental role in the development of the AHA Centre, some directly 
funding the instrument, some others providing the expertise to implement it, 
some others inspiring at least the first set up of the instrument (see Annex 5). 
Different logics can explain the adoption of the different instruments, from a 
more institutional rational choice logics (RCI) evident in all the references made 
by the actor involved to reach more efficiency in the response, to a path-
dependency logic in line with a more historical Institutionalist approach (as in 
the case of DELSA and ACE). Gaining more legitimacy is also a clear 
explanation in the adoption of several instruments. 
 
Overall, summarizing the role played by ASEAN strategic partners, we can see 
that Japan was supporting the AHA Centre already in the early stages by 
providing the funding for the study on the establishment and operationalization 
of the AHA Centre and by sponsoring two positions within the interim AHA 
Centre (ICT and Senior Disaster Monitoring and Analysis). The Government of 
Japan was also instrumental in providing the funding to establish the ASEAN 
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Emergency Stockpile (DELSA), in supporting the ACE Programme and in the 
building up of the ICT technology to monitor disaster and share information 
among ASEAN Countries. Australia provided the first 1 million AUD used to fill 
the 2012-2013 financial gap to operationalize the AHA Centre. In the subsequent 
years the contribution in support of the operationalization of the AHA Centre 
was revised up to 4.6 million USD. In 2013 Australia also allocated 500.000 
USD to support the ASEAN-ERAT teams deployed in the Philippines following 
the Typhoon Haiyan. Finally, from 2013 Australia funded the organization of 
several ASEAN-ERAT Induction and Refresher Course, as well as the 
development of the ERAT Guidelines. The U.S. Government funded and 
supported the establishment of the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response 
System (DMRS), it provided the ICT equipment that the AHA Centre used in 
response to Cyclone Nargis and it seconded an advisor to work on the AHA 
Centre Work plan, as well as on the job description of AHA staff members. In 
the following years the US strongly supported the AHA Centre via capacity 
building activities. New Zealand provided two advisors to the AHA Centre 
mainly working on the development of the Strategic Plan and on the job profiles.  
Between 2013 and 2015 New Zealand funded the recruitment of a consortium of 
consultants to advise the AHA Centre on risk monitoring, maintenance of 
standard operating procedures and database management. Moreover, New 
Zealand also supported the ACE Programme by providing trainings on 
leadership and Advanced Crisis Management.  
 
The European Union did not play a functional role in the establishment and 
operationalization of the AHA Centre. Differently from what is suggested by 
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some EU-ASEAN cooperation literature (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Börzel and 
Risse 2009, 2012a) and by EU representatives, the activity promoted or 
sponsored by the EU never qualified the EU for one of the key roles identified in 
the analysis. In July 2012 representatives from the ACDM, the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the AHA Centre visited the EU facilities dealing with crisis 
management, in particular the ERCC and the EEAS Situation Room. The visit 
was the opportunity to discuss future projects, mainly (I) a visit of the EU 
representatives to the AHA Centre; (II) A technical workshop to be organised by 
Belgium in Jakarta to draft a plan of cooperation; (III) a set of potential capacity 
building activities such as in-house training to AHA Centre staff and NDMOs 
representatives, a senior executive programme to give the opportunity to head of 
ASEAN NDMOs to meet and discuss with head of EU national focal points, a 
comparative study to identify area for capacity building activities, and technical 
assistance in the areas indicated by the AHA Centre Work Plan. In May 2013 an 
EU delegation participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Disaster 
Relief Exercises (DiREx) held in Cha-Am (Thailand). In the words of Jean-Louis 
de Brouwer, ECHO Director of Operations: ‘Training in rapid deployment and 
good co-ordination between ASEAN member states and regional partners such 
as the EU is vital in creating effective disaster response which saves lives. These 
exercises provide an important platform for an exchange of technical knowledge 
and experiences’ (European Commission 2013). The EU delegation included 
members of the EEAS, as well as representatives of ECHO. The day before 
DiREx, Alicia Dela Rosa Bala, Deputy Secretary-General for ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community (ASCC) attended the inauguration of ECHO Emergency 
Response Center (EERC) in Brussels. In July 2013 the EU Instrument for 
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Stability launched the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme. The 
2.776.288 Euros project was coordinated by Eunida and started with a capacity-
building workshop organised by Belgium. The aim of the project was to 
strengthen the ASEAN crisis response architecture, in particular the early 
warning and situation awareness capabilities of both the AHA Centre as well as a 
number of individual National Crisis Response Centres in the ASEAN region. 
Moreover, it aimed at facilitating links between the EU situation room, the 
Emergency Response Centre (MIC/EERC), the AHA Centre, the ASEAN 
Secretariat and other Emergency Operation Centres in ASEAN in order to 
strengthen capacities to foresee and rapidly react to emergency response 
situations. Finally, the project included a High-Level Conference on Managing 
Complex International Crisis held in Brussels in order to strengthen cooperation 
and networking between the EU and international early-warning actors. Despite 
these series of events and joint visits organised between the EU and the AHA 
Centre and ACDM representatives, this research shows how the EU was not a 
leader, nor a reference, a sponsor, or an implementer of any tools implemented 
by the AHA Centres. 
 
The Eurocentric literature, as well as EU discourses, often considers the EU the 
main point of reference for ASEAN (See Chapter 1). Yet, this chapter 
demonstrates how the EU was not influential in providing not only a valid 
reference to the AHA Centre and its tools and how other actors played a much 
more relevant role, but also even the possibility to sponsor some initiative was 
missed. It first demonstrated how the instruments, once analysed in their details 
are different from the one implemented by the EU. In cases such as the DELSA 
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or the ACE Programme, the EU even implemented a completely opposite 
instrument. The chapter shows how ‘the reference’ was often chosen because it 
was familiar to the leader, the funder and/or the implementer. Strategic partners 
such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the US influenced the instruments by 
being involved in the institutionalization process of the AHA Centre, both as 
funder and/or implementer. This is the case of the DMRS monitoring system 
funded by the U.S. and based on DisasterAWARE a tool developed and used by 
the U.S. Pacific Disaster Centre in cooperation with the U.S. Undersecretary of 
Defence. In other cases, such as the establishment of the ERAT Teams or the 
ACE Programme, it was the leader that draws lessons from the UN because it is 
familiar with its tools.  In the case of the ERAT Teams they were inspired by the 
UN Disaster and Coordination teams (UNDAC), in the case of the ACE 
Programme, it was initially conceptualized thinking about the UN JPO 
Programme. Indeed, the UN was not only an active partner since the beginning 
of the AHA Centre and an instrumental implementer for some of the Centre’ 
capacities such as DELSA warehouse, the ERAT trainings and the ACE 
Programme. The UN often provided the inspirational reference for the first 
conceptualization of the AHA Centre instrument, chosen by the leaders because 
it is more familiar with it. The familiarity is due to the previous experience of the 
actual individuals leading the process, either because of their previous 
experiences within the UN system or because they closely worked with some of 
the tools they then used as inspiration. This is the case of the first ERAT Team 
deployed in response to Cyclone Nargis for example, in which the ASEAN 




The chapter analysis mainly focused on the lessons drawing elements of the 
evolution of the AHA Centre and its tools. Yet, the evolution should not ignore 
the experiences faced by the AHA Centre and its staff that triggered the 
evolution of each instrument. The experiential learning of the AHA Centre and 
its components is linked to the catastrophic events that provided lessons to be 
learned. Disaster such as Cyclone Nargis (2008) or Typhoon Haiyan (2013) 
tested the AHA Centre’s first provisions and shaped them. 
 
Overall, the evolution of the AHA Centre should not only be attributed to the 
partnerships. In particular, the leadership carried on by ASEAN member states or 
directly from the AHA Centre was often driven by direct experiences of its staff. 
Overall, the experiential learning, as the lessons learned followed up a direct 
experience in testing the implemented tools, played an equal role in the 







The exploration of the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional response to 
disasters and the relative role of the EU in influencing this process are the main 
aims of this doctoral research. The central research questions of this project 
“Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU 
directly or indirectly influence this process?” have been answered in the three 
empirical chapters focused on the three phases of the institutionalization process 
of the ASEAN disaster management policy, by applying an original framework 
based on four analytical categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the 
implementer. By opening the black box of the processes that led to the 
institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management policy, this study 
explored the role of internal and external actors in directly and indirectly 
influencing a regional organization such as ASEAN, also analysing the role of 
the EU influencing this outcome. By doing so, this analysis contributes to 
enhance the empirical knowledge on EU–ASEAN cooperation in the field of 
disaster management, and it also contributes to the EU actorness debate and, in 
particular, to its inter-regional dimension. 
 
 
The two main theoretical contributions: an analytical framework for the 





This research showed not only that initiatives taken by the European Union (EU) 
can be compared to the ones of other actors, but also that this comparative 
analysis is useful as it gives new perspectives on the analysis of EU’s actions 
towards regional organisations. This research is an empirical demonstration that 
going beyond the understanding of the EU as an actor sui generis is not only 
possible, but it is necessary as it puts the EU’s action into perspective.  
 
First, linked to the ongoing debate in the research community focused on 
interregional relations, this research is a contribution to the post-revisionist turn 
in inter-regional studies (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). The recognition that 
Interregionalism is not a monopoly of the EU and the consequent need to analyse 
the actions of other actors and their influence in the institutionalization process, 
resulted in an original framework that emphasizes where the EU is failing in 
influencing the process. Even when, as suggested by post-revisionist scholars, 
the EU has the potential to be a point of reference, as in the disaster management 
policy, the analysis should focus on the different elements of the process and 
should not be limited to the outcome. The framework proposed by this thesis 
allows for a more clear understanding of what it means to be a point of reference 
and how this can be analysed in practice. The decision of focusing on the 
intervention of multiple actors in the institutionalization process has implied 
some methodological decisions, including the empirical focus on one single 
policy (disaster management in this case). The focus on the analysis of the 
actions advanced by multiple actors, made it necessary to focus on one single 
policy as this allowed for the necessary depth in the analysis of the process. 
Although the possibility of comparing EU’s actions to other actors’ actions in 
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different policies would offer more generalizable results, this proved to be very 
complex in one single piece of research. The results presented in this research 
would definitely benefit from similar analysis in other policy fields.  
 
Second, this doctoral research links the debate on EU actorness with the one on 
influence. It defines actorness as the effective capacity of an actor of influencing 
regionalisation processes and, by doing so, it offers a definition that can be 
applied to several other empirical cases. It offers a potential solution to reconcile 
the two debates, the one on actorness and the one on influence, that so far have 
often taken parallel a path. After establishing the institutionalization of a new 
policy at the regional level as the main outcome to be explored, the thesis argued 
that actors are fundamental drivers of the institutionalization of regional policies 
and that their role in influencing these processes should be explored in a 
systematic way. In order to do so, the analysis is built around four analytical 
categories (the leaders, the reference, the sponsor, the implementer). The thesis 
provides a definition of each of this analytical category, and clarifies the 
objective of the influence, the institutional logics that explains the actor’s 
involvement and the different modes of influence applied by each category. The 
argument of this research is that different actors can perform these roles in 
different situations and this allows for a systematic analysis of the process that 
goes beyond the main characteristic of the actors. Being a nation state, a regional 
organisation, an ASEAN member state country, or a private institution does not 
prevent the actor to perform certain actions contributing to the 
institutionalization process. The contribution given by the different actors can be 
explored and explained and, most importantly, the EU becomes only one of the 
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potential actors’ influencing the process. Even if the focus of the thesis was on 
the actors’ influence on the institutionalization process, an analysis of the 
outcomes’ similarities and differences was also included.  A clear overview of 
similarities and differences between norms and instruments proved to be a useful 
first step to argue the need to further explore the influence mechanisms on the 
process. This thesis used what are sometimes perceived as competing approaches 
(analysis of outcomes vs. processes) as two complementary aspects of the 
analysis.  
 
Overall, the proposed framework is designed to be applied to other actors 
different from regional organizations, and does not need to include the EU 
among the potential actors. The discussion on influence and actorness can and 
should go beyond the EU and should be tested in other institutionalization 
processes, advancing not only the EU studies literature and IR, but also the 
Public Policy literature. The aim of the thesis was to find an analytical 
framework that allows for a systematic analysis of the processes, not limited to 
the comparison of the outcomes. The suggestion that beyond each process of 
influence there are four actors’ categories with different aims and instruments to 
pursue forms of influence makes the analysis of those processes more systematic 
and applicable to all sort of actors and processes.  
 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the actors involved, crises, defined as a 
‘perceived threat that must be urgently averted or addressed in order to avoid 
dire consequences’ (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), also proved to have an 
important impact on the institutionalization process. Indeed, the literature 
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considers crises as important drivers in these processes. Also in this thesis, 
considered that disaster management was the analysed policy, natural disasters 
played an important role. Yet, more than critical juncture that triggered 
institutional change (Pierson, 2004, 135) the empirical analysis showed how 
crises acted more as accelerator of already existing processes. 
 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, process-tracing proved to be a 
valuable method, but with its own challenges. On one hand, the 
conceptualization that an outcome (institutionalization process) is the result of 
the interaction of a number of different actors that influence the process really 
inspired the conceptualization of a replicable analytical framework. On the other 
hand, by conducting the empirical analysis a lot of uncertainty was created by the 
idea of avoiding the ‘the story-telling trap’. Overall, the empirical analysis of a 
mechanism cannot avoid telling a story. The story of how different actors interact 
in certain moments, the instruments they used and the rational behind their 
involvement need a certain narrative. Therefore, even if evidence is a 
fundamental element of this analysis, they were necessarily presented as part of a 
story.  
 
The findings: the relative role of the EU in the institutionalization of the 
ASEAN disaster management policy 
The thesis’ research question is answered in the three empirical chapters. Each of 
them is dedicated to one of the steps of the institutionalization process: the 
launch of the first ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management 
(ARPDM), the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
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Emergency Response (AADMER) and the operationalization of the AHA Centre 
as the main hub to coordinate the management of disaster in the ASEAN region.  
 
The thesis showed the limitations of the EU’s action in influencing the ASEAN 
institutionalization process of disaster management, and it also offers a more 
specific description of this limitation, showing how the EU played sometimes the 
role of sponsor or implementer, but with limited influence on the overall process. 
This thesis shows that, differently from what some scholars present, the EU is far 
from being a model or reference for ASEAN in the field of disaster management.  
  
First, even if both scholars and practitioners often identify the ASEAN Regional 
Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the ASEAN version of the 
EU Civil Protection Action Programme adopted in 1997, directly inspired by the 
EU, the EU played a marginal role in the launch of the ARPDM in May 2004 by 
sponsoring the set of meetings and workshops that finally led to the adoption of 
the ARPDM programme. During the first phase of the institutionalization 
process, the EU de facto acted as the sponsor, but did not really exercise any 
direct or indirect influence in the process, nor provided an inspiration to the norm 
finally adopted by ASEAN. The analysis of the institutionalization process 
showed how the other three main actors were the ASEAN member states 
representatives grouped in the Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) 
and in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and supported 
by the ASEAN Secretariat (the leader(s)); the Yokohama strategy established in 
1994 (United Nations 1994), as well as on the already existing experiences in the 
region, which inspired the content of the norm (the reference(s)); and the Asian 
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Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) which was key in connecting the different 
actor of the mechanism and in drafting the document (the implementer). The 
rationale behind the influence of these actors can be linked back to both 
sociological and historical rationales and the modes of influence were direct 
(socialization and persuasions) in the case of the leaders, whereas more indirect 
modes of influence were applied by the other three identified actors, showing 
how overall this phase of the process was more led by ASEAN member states 
and ASEAN Secretariat representatives, than by external actors.  
 
Second, by analysing the mechanism that triggered the signature of the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) this 
research argues that the EU cannot be considered a point of reference for 
ASEAN in the adoption of this norm. Although the AADMER is often presented 
as the ASEAN version of the EU Community Mechanism implemented from 
2001, the empirical analysis shows how the outcomes’ partial similarities can 
actually be linked back to globally recognised principles and are therefore not the 
result of a form of regional influence by the EU. Even more, the analysis 
demonstrated that the main actors performing the fundamental roles in the 
institutionalization process were different from the EU. The Hyogo framework 
and the Haze Agreement played a much prominent role in influencing the 
adoption of the AADMER Agreement, which was already planned by the 
ARPDM programme (the references). Overall, the AADMER Agreement was an 
ASEAN product, inspired by the Hyogo Framework and influenced by the 





Third, beyond the missing influence of the key norms adopted by ASEAN in the 
field of disaster management, the EU did not play a functional role in the 
establishment and operationalization of the AHA Centre. The sixth chapter 
analysed the set-up of the AHA Centre, as well as how the collection, 
coordination and dissemination of information is conducted, it also analysed the 
ASEAN Emergency and Assessment Team (ERAT), the Disaster Emergency 
Logistic System (DELSA) and the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE), 
both in terms of final outcome, as well as in terms of adoption process, 
concluding that despite the existence of projects to strengthen the cooperation 
between the EU and ASEAN in the field of disaster management, these activities 
promoted or sponsored by the EU never qualified the EU for one of the key roles 
(leader, reference, sponsor or implementer) and this is because other external 
actors were much more effective in their cooperation, de-facto influencing the 
instruments implemented by the AHA Centre. The rationale behind their 
influence could be mainly linked back to their historical relation with the 
ASEAN region, a relation that the EU is still in the process of building, and in 
the social relation often existing between representatives of ASEAN and the 
analysed partners’ countries, meaning Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the 
US.  
 
Overall, the thesis showed that as soon as the analysis moves beyond the EU and 
includes the actions of other local and external actors the influence of the EU on 
the process is very limited. The analysis of the regionalisation process that goes 
beyond the assessment of its outcome, and that analyses the role played by the 
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different actors’ types provided a benchmark for the (limited) EU actions. The 
potential direct and indirect influence of the actors involved proved to be an 
effective way to analyse actorness in terms of actor types. 
 
Even if the empirical findings and implications of the analysis might sound 
disappointing for certain EU officials, the thesis aims to stress that the disaster 
management policy remains an important area for potential further cooperation 
for the EU and ASEAN. With the ASEAN Declaration on ‘One ASEAN One 
Response’ published in September 2016 and the ASEAN vision of becoming ‘a 
global leader on disaster management by 2025’, it is key for the EU to find new 
ways to approach the cooperation with ASEAN in the field of disaster 
management. Beyond its contribution to the literature, this thesis speaks also to 
the policy-makers working on the EU-ASEAN cooperation, by opening the 
process beyond these ASEAN initiatives the thesis aims to be a real 
encouragement for EU policy-makers to start treating ASEAN as a more equal 
partner in the field of disaster management and beyond. It suggests a conceptual 
turn in the way the EU-ASEAN cooperation is conceptualised and conducted. If 
the EU aim is to be perceived as an influential actor in the ASEAN region, a 
preliminary reflection should be done in terms of ‘which type of actor does the 
EU aim to be in ASEAN?’. As this research suggests, this can be defined by 
clarifying the main rationale driving this desire, and by assessing the modes of 
influence that the EU can implement in the region. For example, does the EU 
have access to the forum where ASEAN leaders can be persuaded about the need 
of implementing certain norms or instruments? Or, do EU officers have enough 
contacts with the ASEAN officers to implement forms of socialization to EU 
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practices? Answering these questions is a necessary step to clearly assess if the 
EU has the means to effectively implement its aims in the region. In addition, 
beyond the self-reflection on what the EU aims to do -and can do- in the region, 
this thesis also suggests that any further initiative in the field of disaster 
management (and beyond) should also carefully take into consideration what are 
the ASEAN priorities in the analysed field, as well as what are other actors doing 
in the field. Overcoming the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor 
also has very practical consequences, it means going beyond the vision of the EU 
as the unique actor in the region and have a more clear understanding of what are 
the on-going dynamics in the region before implementing any actions. Who are 
the other actors involved? What are their aims and means? How can the EU 
intervene in this scenario avoiding overlaps and repetition? These are all 
questions that EU practitioners should ask themselves before implementing any 
further action in the region. 
 
Avenues for further research 
This research generates a number of other questions to be explored. Although the 
framework proposed in this research aims for a certain degree of generalizability, 
the four analytical categories and their characteristics can be definitely applied to 
other institutionalization processes.  
 
First, in 2016, the so-called regional order remains one of the core elements of 
the new EU Global Strategy. “[the EU] will promote and support cooperative 
regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. Regional orders 
do not take a single form. Where possible and when in line with our interests, the 
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EU will support regional organisations. We will not strive to export our model, 
but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences.” 
(EUGS 2016, 32). Beyond the ASEAN case, similar regional processes are 
happening across the globe where the EU is involved, therefore it would be 
interesting to explore if the role of the EU changes according to the region 
interested. For example, does the role of the EU in influencing 
institutionalizations processes changes in regions where the cooperation with the 
EU is based on a much longer relationship (see in the African continent) or 
where the role is historically different from the one of ASEAN (see with 
Mercosur)? And if yes, in which capacity does the EU influence these processes, 
as leader, reference, sponsor or implementer? Furthermore, beyond the potential 
involvement in different regions, does the involvement of the EU change 
according to the policy explored? For example, other policies, such as economic 
cooperation, environment, agriculture, etc., might experience a different 
involvement of the EU compared disaster management policy, which is a 
relatively new policy for the EU. Both these questions would test the proposed 
framework further and would add other cases to the discussion.   
 
Second, the question of the role of crises as trigger (Pierson 2004) or accelerator 
of processes still need further exploration, and it is another interesting aspect 
resulted from the empirical analysis that would be worth exploring further. Even 
if in this thesis crises acted more as accelerator of existing institutionalization 
processes, further analysis is required to assess the generalizability of this claim 
and to clarify if this result of the research is a case-specific conclusion or a more 




Third, process-tracing proved to be a valuable research method as it allowed to 
explore the process beyond the outcome. Yet, it leaves the researcher with the 
feeling of always missing something: ‘is there something I have missed or some 
information I have overlooked?’, ‘are there other actors I could have potentially 
interviewed?’, or ‘did I properly understand the context of the event, in particular 
the one that happened long time ago?’. More discussions need to take place 
among researchers using this method to see what can be done to better define 
when facts become evidence, in particular when the focus is one narrow policy 
and the number of actors involved is relatively limited.  
 
To conclude, although a growing literature explores regional initiatives to 
manage disasters from an internal point of view (Coppola 2006; Kirton 2013; 
Morsut 2014; Rum 2016), the exploration of the differences and similarities 
between these regional institutions, as well as the role that actors have in 
influencing the institutionalization process of regional disaster management 
initiatives was still missing. For example, looking at the EU, in the past fifteen 
years a quite advanced system to respond to both natural and man-made disasters 
has been developed. This has encouraged some scholars (Pennisi di Floristella 
2015), as well as some practitioners to suggest that the EU could potentially be 
considered a role model for other regions interested in implementing a regional 
system to coordinate the management of crisis. Yet, a systematic analysis of the 
influence of the EU, as well as of the other relevant actors, on regions such as 
ASEAN, in the field of disaster management was still missing. This thesis 
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provides an empirical contribution to this knowledge, but it also provides an 
analytical framework that would be possibly applied to other similar cases.  
 
The EU remains an important global actor and has the potentials to play a major 
role in the regional integration processes that are happening at the global level. 
Yet, the capacities of the EU to influence these processes and have a role in the 
growing inter-regional dimension of international relations will depend on the 
EU capacity to challenge its own strengths. EU scholars should focus more on 
the other actors that, similarly to the EU, play important roles in the analysed 
processes. The conceptualization of the EU as an actor that cannot be compared 
should not be used as a justification, and comparative analyses should be 




Table 17. Summary 
  Objective of influence Rationale behind influence Modes of influence 
Leader ASEAN member states 
representatives via the ACDM 
Committee supported by ASEAN 
Secretariat 
Regional framework on disaster 
management 
In the first phase presented as the 
natural next step after the 
ARPDM programme (HI); 
After Tsunami presented as a 
more efficient, effective way to 
respond to disasters (RCI); 
• Persuasion 
Reference 2005 UN Hyogo Framework of 
Action; ASEAN Transboundary 
haze Pollution Agreement 
ASEAN Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response 
Agreement (AADMER) 
Indirect: 
The Hyogo Framework is 
recognised as legitimate (OI); 
HAZE Agreement as a known and 
trusted example to take inspiration 
from  (HI); 
Indirect: 
• Synthesis of global (Hyogo) 
and local (HAZE) norms 
(learning) 
Sponsor ASEAN member states Financial support to the 
Negotiating Committee  
ASEAN member states aim was 
to show action to public opinion 
after Tsunami (RCI); 
 
Implementer Negotiating Committee, including 
ACDM and legal representatives, 
and ASEAN Secretariat  
Drafting the AADMER 
Agreement 
It was part of the path started by 
the ACDM (HI), but accelerated 
after the Tsunami 
(RCI); 
• Emulation of local 
experiences with elements of 






1. List of interviews23 
	
AHA Centre Official 2017a Jakarta, 10 February 2017 
AHA Centre Official 2017b Skype, 12 October 
ASEAN Official 2017a Jakarta, 13 February 2017 
ASEAN Official 2017b Jakarta, 14 February 2017 
Australian Diplomat 2017a Jakarta, 16 February 2017 
Australian Diplomat 2017b Jakarta, 16 February 2017 
Cambodian Diplomat 2017 Jakarta, 9 February 2017 
EEAS Official 2015 Brussels, 15 October 2015 
EEAS Official 2017a Jakarta, 6 February 2017 
EEAS Official 2017b Jakarta, 7 February 2017 
European Commission Official 2017a Brussels, 10 July 2017 
European Commission Official 2017b Brussels, 25 October 2017 
European Commission Official 2017c Brussels, 25 October 2017 
European Commission Official 2017d Brussels, 7 December 2017 
European Commission Official 2017e Brussels, 14 December 2017 
European Commission Official 2015 Brussels, 30 September 2015 
Indonesian Academic 2017a Jakarta, 9 February 2017 
Indonesian Academic 2017b Jakarta, 9 February 2017 
Japanese Diplomat 2017a Jakarta, 15 February 2017 
                                               
23  This research project considered the ethical implications for the involved participants, the wider 
community, and for the researcher. A continued assessment of the ethical consequences have been done 
during the research period, using the PAIS Research Ethics Guidelines, as well as the guiding principles of 
the University’s Research Code of Practice, the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Research 
Ethics Framework and the Department’s guidelines for the ethical conduct of research. Although the 
investigated subject does not foresee any risk for the interviewees, does not include children or incompetent 
adults and does not collect personal data, the research has been conducted in an ethical way. First, 
researcher has always introduced herself as an independent researcher part of a programme sponsored by the 
EU Commission. Second, a summary of the research project has been distributed to the interviewees prior to 
the interview. Third, before starting the interview researcher has always briefly summarized the key 
elements of the research, and has given the details of Warwick and ULB institutions and supervisors. 
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Japanese Diplomat 2017b Jakarta, 15 February 2017 
Singaporean Diplomat 2017 Jakarta, 13 February 2017 
Thai Diplomat 2017 Jakarta, 14 February 2017 
Malaysian Diplomat 2017 Jakarta, 14 February 2017 
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2. ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) (2004-2010) 
 
Objectives Sub-components 
Component 1: Establishing the ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework 
Promote cooperation and collaboration among Member 
Countries in all areas of disaster management including joint 
projects, collaborative research and networking. 
Establishing the ASEAN Response Action Plan (RAP) 
Enhancing Quick Response Capacities of Member Countries 
ASEAN Joint Simulation Exercises for Disaster Relief 
Technical Cooperation Projects 
• Earthquake Vulnerability Reduction 
• Flash Flood, Landslide, Sea/ River Erosion Preparedness and Mitigation 
• Dissemination of Flood Early Warning 
• Safety of Children in Flood-Prone Areas 
• Typhoon and Cyclone Preparedness and Mitigation 









Component 2: Capacity Building 
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Strengthen capacity building in areas of priority concern of 
Member Countries, and promote human resources 
development in disaster management in accordance with the 
needs of Member Countries 
ASEAN Disaster Management Training Institutes Network 
• Specialised Disaster Management Training 
• Specialised Training in Risk, Damage and Needs Assessment 
• Specialised Training in Collapsed Structure Search and Rescue  
• Specialised Training in Forest Fire Fighting 
• Refresher Courses/ Expertise Development 
• Training on the Management of Disaster Stress and Behavior 
Component 3: Sharing information and resources 
Promote sharing of information, expertise, best practices, and 
resources. 
ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network (ASEAN 
DISCNet)  
• Development of ACDM Website and NDMO Websites 
• Establishing Effective Communication Systems 
• Publication of ADMIN Newsletter  
• ASEAN Inventory of Disaster Management Experts (Brain Bank) and 
Resources  
• ASEAN Hazard and Vulnerability Mapping Project 
Research and Development and Dissemination of Good Practices 







Component 4: Promoting collaboration and strengthening partnerships 
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Promote partnerships among various stakeholders (GOs, 
NGOs, and community based international organizations)  
Supporting Community-Based Management Programmes  
Partnerships with Relevant Organizations and NGOs  
Mobilising Financial Support and Resources  
Component 5: Public Education, Awareness and Advocacy 
Promote advocacy, public education and awareness 
programme related to disaster management 
ASEAN Day for Disaster Management 
Integration of Disaster Management in School Curricula 
Enhancing Disaster Management Public Education and Awareness Programmes  
Mainstreaming Disaster Management into Development Plans of ASEAN Member 
Countries 
 




3. AHA Centre Emergency Responses 2011-2016 
 
When? What? Where? How?  
(level of…) 






Myanmar  Deployed coordination 
support team 
250 Multi Purpose Tents 








see if index of 
disaster 
Deployed emergency 
response and ERAT team 
250 Multi Purpose Tents 
600 Family Kit 
5000 Rolls of Trapaulins 
USD 1000 worth of rice 
Meal for 200 volunteers 
3 Mobile storage Unit 
45 KVA generators  






Jakarta Flood Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
  Portable toilets 
Drinking water  
Trash bags  
Sanitary wipes  









 Deployed Response team 250 Family Tents 





















 Deployed Response team 250 Family Tents 






Philippines  Deployed response team 
and ERAT  



























 Deployed emergency 
response and ERAT team 








Malaysia  Deployed 3 ASEAN-
ERAT members 
538 Family Tents 
538 Family Kits 
498 Shelter Toolkits 
1000 Rolls of Tarpaulins 








Myanmar  Deployed in-country 
coordination Team 
(ICCT): 2 AHA Centre + 
7 ASEAN ERAT 
members 
2000 Tarpaulins 
2000 Collapsible jerry 
cans 
2000 mosquito nets 
4 Aluminium Boats with 
engine 
3 Mobile storage unit  
2000 Family Kits 









 Deployed 3 AHA Centre 
+ In-country  ASEAN 
ERAT members 







Philippines  Deployed in-country 
coordination Team 
(ICCT): 2 AHA Centre + 
2 ASEAN ERAT 
members from the 
Philippines 














Maes Rasmey (m) Cambodia 
Hari Susanto (m) Indonesia 
Ayu Setiadewi (f) Indonesia 
Vilaykam Lathsaath (f) Lao PDR 
Ka Saysana (m) Lao PDR 
Shalihin Annuar (m) Malaysia 
Nurul Fatien Rusly (f) Malaysia 
Win Ohnmar (f)  Myanmar 
Aye Kyi Mann (f) Myanmar 
Wariga Reiwlaung (f) Thailand 
Kedsirin Panichayacheewa (f) Thailand 
Le Ngoc Diep (m) Viet Nam 
Nguyen Van Hoang  (m) Viet Nam 
2015  
Mao Saohorn (m) Cambodia 
Ly Chandra (m)  Cambodia 
Theophilus Yanuarto (m) Indonesia 
Merina Sofiati (f)  Indonesia 
Sombath Douangsavanh (m) Lao PDR 
Bouasavanh Vongbounieua (m) Lao PDR 
Amir Shah Noor Ahmad (m) Malaysia 
Muhammad Fauzie Ismail (m) Malaysia 
Khan Lynn (m) Myanmar 
Min Soe Han (m) Myanmar 
Marc Remembrant Victore (m) Philippines 
Riezel Joy Chatto (f) Philippines 
Wirinda Sirisuwan (f) Thailand 
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Pisuth Wannachatrasiri (m) Thailand 
Vu Hoang (m) Viet Nam 
Duong Duc My (m) Viet Nam 
2016  
Chun Buntha (m) Cambodia 
Lorn Trob (m) Cambodia 
Wahyu Indriyadi (m) Indonesia 
Luqmanul Hakim (m) Indonesia 
Sacksy Vilayhak (m) Lao PDR 
Vimala Khountalangsy (f) Lao PDR 
Fazlisyah Bin Muslim (m) Malaysia 
Rohaizat Bin Hadli (m) Malaysia 
Thein Zaw Htike (m) Myanmar 
Zaw Myo Khine (m) Myanmar 
Mary Grace Somido (f) Philippines 
Mark July Yap (m) Philippines 
Phatsita Rern gnirunsathit (f) Thailand 
Suttapak Suksabal (f) Thailand 
Nguyen Duc Thang (m) Viet Nam 
Nguyen Vinh Long (m) Viet Nam 
 
 




5. AHA Centre overview of partners support 2011-2015 
	
Country Up to 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Japan Establishment of an Integrated 
Information and 
Communication Technology 
System to strengthen the 
Operation of the AHA Centre  
(ICT Project Phase I) 
USD 1.627.634 
 
Establishment of a Disaster 
Emergency Logistic System 
for ASEAN (DELSA) 
USD 12.265.967 
Second Phase on the 
Establishment of an Integrated 
Information and 
Communication Technology 
System to strengthen the 
Operation of the AHA Centre  
(ICT Project Phase II) 
USD 4.92 million  
 
Via the support for the 
ASEAN Logistic System 
(DELSA), Japan also 
supported the ACE 
Programme 
Launch of the 5 years ICT 
Blueprint strategy for the 
hiring of an ICT advisory firm 




Continuation of the support of 
DELSA.  
 




Series of training on WebEOC 
established under the ICT 
Project Phase II.  
Feasibility Study for the 
Establishment of Satellite 
Disaster Emergency Logistic 
in ASEAN member States 
USD 380.431 
 
Continuation of previous 
projects: DELSAICT Phase II 
and 5 years ICT Blue Print.   
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Australia In-kind support to AHA 
Centre’s initial financial and 
operational needs for the 
period 2012-2013 
AUD 1million 
Additional contribution to 
cover the AHA Centre’s 
financial and operational 
needs up to 2014 AUD 
400.000 
 
Support to the emergency 
operations in the Philippines 
after Typhoon Haiyan 
USD 50.000 
 
Funding support for the 
ASEAN-ERAT Induction 
Course and Refresher Course 
In-kind support to 
operationalization of the AHA 




Funding support for the 
development of the lessons 
learned  from Typhoon 
Haiyan and the provision of 
the advisory service of Ernst 
and Young Consulting on 
financial functions. 
 
Support  of the 4th ASEAN-
ERAT Induction course and 
the development of ERAT 
Guidelines. 
Signature of the Amendment 
6 of the Cooperation 
Agreement for the provision 
of additional 714.841 USD for 






Two Advisor to support the 
drafting of the Strategic 
Workplan and AHA Centre 
job descriptions 
Two years funding to recruit a 
consortium of consultants 
(Humanitarian Advisory 
Group) to advise the AHA 
Centre on risk monitoring, 
maintenance of standard 
operating procedures and 
database management (2013-
15) 
600.000 NZD  
 
Support of the ACE 
Programme by providing 
training on leadership and 
Advanced Crisis Management 
Support for an intensive 
leadership in crisis training for 
ACE Programme and AHA 
Centre staff provided by 
Canterbury’s Centre for Risk, 
Resilience and Renewal 
(UCR3) 
Continuation of previously 
launched projects. 
US Creation of the Disaster 
Monitoring and Response 
System (DMRS).  
 
Donation of basic ICT 
equipment previously used by 
ERAT in response to Cyclone 
Nargis; 
 
One advisor through USTATF 
and technical assistance from 
the US Forest Service. 
Training on DMRS Systems 
 
Development of the AHA 
Centre Concept of Operation 
by US Forest Service 
 
Workshop in Jakarta on 
Planning, Mission Analysis 
and Decision support 
(November 2013) 
Capacity building  programme 
provided by the Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and 
Civil Aid  (OHDACA) 
based on the proposal written 




EU Visit to Brussels based EU 
facilities dealing with crisis 
management (ERCC and 
EEAS Situation Room) in 
July 2012 organised for 
representatives from the 
ACDM, the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the AHA 
Centre. 
Launch of the ASEAN-EU 
Emergency management 
Programme (July 2013-
December 2015) by the 
Instrument for Stability 
EUR 2.776.288 
Capacity-building workshop 




in the 2015 report copy and 
past of previous year.  
UN  World Food Programme: 
Signature of the Memorandum 
of Understanding to manage 
the UNHRD warehouse in 
Subang (Malaysia)  
UNOCHA: Joint workshop to 
develop mutual understanding 
in March 2013 
Set of training provided by 
UN family (OCHA, 
SPIDERWFP) in the 
framework of ACE 
Programme and ERAT 
Trainings.  
Set of training provided by 
UN family (OCHA, 
SPIDERWFP) in the 
framework of ACE 
Programme and ERAT 
Trainings. 
China   Memorandum of 
Understanding and 
commitment for 8 million US 
in grant assistance. 
 
Support in the establishment 
of a second disaster relief 
warehouse in Cambodia.  
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